Israel's embassy in Norway condemned the events organized by the Norwegian Holocaust Center in Oslo, saying they 'legitimize antisemitism.' The center said the aim is to 'understand shadows of historical traumas without equating them'
Israel's Embassy in Norway called for an independent Holocaust studies center in Oslo to cancel two upcoming events that it claims are a "grotesque distortion of Holocaust memory."
As part of a lecture series titled "In Shadow of War – The Way Forward," the Norwegian Center for Holocaust Studies and Religious Minorities is hosting two events with the University of Oslo this spring. The first event, which took place on Thursday, was a lecture by Prof. Nadim Khoury titled "Nakba and Holocaust as cultural traumas."
According to the University of Oslo's website ahead of the event, Khoury – a Palestinian professor of international studies at the Innland Norway University of Applied Sciences – "will trace their trajectories since 1948 and explore how they are intertwined and how the tensions between them are shaping the path forward in Israeli and Palestinian lives."
A second event, scheduled for June 3, will feature Israeli historian and Brown University professor Omer Bartov, whose contributions to Holocaust scholarship were recognized by Yad Vashem in 2019.
In an April 28 X post, Israel's embassy in Norway called on the HL Center to cancel the events "immediately."
"The Norwegian Holocaust Center's decision to host events drawing parallels between the Holocaust, the 'Nakba' and the war in Gaza is a grotesque distortion of Holocaust memory," the post read. The embassy added that the center has chosen political activism over historical responsibility and it called upon it to cancel the events and stop "legitimizing antisemitism in its modern forms."
Addressing the criticism in a social media post, the HL Center explained that it invited academics from different environments and backgrounds as speakers in order to "address and reflect on challenging topics without ending up in polarized debates where constructive nuance tends to disappear."
HL Center director Jan Heiret told Haaretz that the event with Khoury was supposed to follow another event hosting Martin Auerbach, former director of the National Israeli Center for Psychosocial Support of Survivors of the Holocaust and the Second Generation (AMCHA). Auerbach couldn't come due to uncertainty around the ongoing conflict with Iran, but Heiret said the center will make another attempt to host him in the autumn.
Heiret added that both events are meant "to find a way out of a destructive spiral of hatred, dehumanization and violence."
"We must understand the long-lasting shadows of historical traumas without equating, or even putting up, the Holocaust with the Nakba – which would be a historical distortion given the events are so different in nature, course and scope," Heiret said. "We acknowledge that the consequences for the individuals and collectives traumatized by them are interconnected, and that the denial of the trauma of the other lies at the core of the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
Leif Knutsen, an activist and the chair of the Jewish Community of Norway, says the academics invited to speak at the HL Center "represent a fringe element," and that it's a recurring issue.
"The center doesn't question them; it doesn't bring anyone to balance the discussion and it doesn't present their perspectives in anything like a critical light," Knutsen said. "It's always in the same direction – one that's beyond critical to Israel. Someone should be sitting on stage and presenting an alternative point of view or at least a nuanced one."
Knutsen said Norway's Jewish population of about 2,000 is particularly vulnerable due to a sharp rise in antisemitic attitudes. In its most recent report published in early 2024, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies documented an increase in antisemitic attitudes among Norwegians, with 11.5 percent of survey respondents having "pronounced prejudices" against Jews.
Images from Norway, 2024
"The center should be combating antisemitism rather than promoting a one-sided program," he said. "Even worse is the effect that such extreme voices have on Norwegian Jews who are being lectured about their own understanding of reality on the basis of a supposedly academic framework that completely ignores the real conditions in Norway."
According to its website, the Norwegian Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities is a research, education and documentation center intended to focus on the Holocaust and other genocides, as well as antisemitism and minority rights in Norway. The center's exhibitions receive roughly 50,000 visitors each year. It was established in 2001 using capital from a national restitution settlement over World War II between Norway and the country's Jewish community.
The center has previously faced criticism for its programming. In a letter sent in September 2024, more than 100 Norwegian Holocaust survivors and their descendants accused the center of failing to use "its mandate to combat the hostility we experience," and that instead of fighting antisemitism it was positioning itself as a "critic of Israel's policies and military tactics." The letter also said the center manifests "bias in its choice of experts and supporting a narrative that's negative toward Israel as a Jewish state."
In another letter from January 2025, the Norwegian branch of B'nai Brith criticized Heiret for mentioning Palestinians twice while delivering a speech on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, amid Israel's war in Gaza.
"By focusing on Gaza and Palestinian civilians who have lost their lives during the commemoration of the Holocaust and the genocide of the Jews in Europe, at a time when one-sided and anti-Israel portrayals make debates related to Israel very un-nuanced, the director has in a blatant way contributed to the tendency to relativize the Holocaust and the genocide of the Jews," the letter said.
"As the center's own research shows, demonization of Israel leads to increasing antisemitism in Norway. Trivialization of the Holocaust is, as is well-known, defined as antisemitism."
Atefeh Sebdani was born in Iran to parents active in the MEK but was torn from them and sent for molding to a family in Sweden. In an interview, she describes life in the exiled cult and its rejection of Persian culture.
At a protest in Stockholm in April, alongside the Lion and Sun flags representing pre-revolution Iran, Israeli and American flags were also waved. As in similar events around the world, the demonstrators praised the Israeli-American attack on Iran and expressed support for Reza Pahlavi, son of the shah who was deposed in 1979, as Iran's future leader.
The rule of the ayatollahs unites many Iranian exiles against the regime, and threatens political activists operating against it in Europe. However, one of the women who helps the organizers of the Stockholm demonstrations, Atefeh Sebdani, has suffered for most of her life from another Iranian group – an organization that was once part of the Islamic Revolution but later became its enemy.
Mujahedin-e Khalq was founded in 1965 by a group of Iranian students who opposed the shah's rule. The organization combined elements of Shiite Islam with Marxist and anti-imperialist ideas and operated underground during the 1970s. During this period, it attacked regime targets and gained support as an opposition organization.
When the Islamic Revolution emerged in the late 1970s, MEK even joined Khomeini on his path to power. Yet after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, conflict arose between it and the new regime and by the early 1980s, the MEK was attacking government targets. That was countered with brutal repression that included the execution of thousands. The MEK leadership fled into exile in Iraq, where it formed a controversial alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.
Atefeh Sebdani in Stockholm, 2026. Photo: David Stavrou
Atefeh Sebdani's story begins in the clash between the ayatollahs' regime and the MEK. "My parents were imprisoned after the revolution because of their rivalry with the new regime. They were considered enemies of the state and like other MEK members, after they were released, they were forced to leave," she says.
She was two years old at the time. Sebdani recounts that she, her younger brother, her father and her pregnant mother fled to Pakistan and lived there destitute on the streets. Her father continued from Pakistan onto Iraq, where he joined other MEK members in a camp called Ashraf, which later became the movement's center.
"After some time, we also moved to the camp. By that stage it had become a kind of small town with kindergartens, parks, and schools – mainly for propaganda purposes. They wanted to show how good things were there so others would join," she says. "For me, it was like paradise. I had everything; it was idyllic. I was with my mother and I was happy."
Then, without warning, everything ended at once. She hadn't even turned five yet but her mother told her she would have to take care of her two brothers by herself. She didn't explain why or how, but when the day came, Sebdani found herself standing by a bus with a group of crying women. When the bus departed, five-year-old Sebdani became a mother in practice.
"On the way, I had to take care of one brother who was still a baby and wanted to breastfeed, and another who was very ill," she recalls. She adds that the expulsion of the children from Camp Ashraf was a process. She doesn't know exactly how long it took, but she remembers children disappearing from kindergarten without knowing why or where they were going.
Eventually, all the roughly 900 children in the camp were separated from their parents and transported to other countries.
"The place was emptied of children's voices," she says. "And children's voices are the most human thing there is – the core of life – and that was taken away."
Why were the children expelled?
"The children were an element that disturbed the organization's leader, Massoud Rajavi. The ideological struggle to liberate Iran turned into the struggle of a narcissistic leader who wanted all the power in his hands. He wanted the men and women in the movement to be under his absolute control, and the children stood in his way. The movement began as an ideological movement, but it became a cult."
What Sebdani describes aligns with what is known from other sources about the MEK. During the 1980s and 1990s, the organization became highly centralized, developing political and military branches that operated from bases in Iraq. At the same time, the National Council of Resistance of Iran was established as a political umbrella organization.
'The family I came to was politically obligated to take children. It's not that they loved children or wanted us. We underwent heavy indoctrination and were forced to constantly work for the organization.'
During this period, allegations indeed emerged about cult-like characteristics such as strict internal discipline, ideological control, and exclusion of dissenters.
However, the organization's leader, Rajavi, has not been seen in public since the early 2000s, and his fate remains unclear, as the organization has not disclosed information about his whereabouts nor announced his death. Meanwhile, his wife, Maryam Rajavi, serves as the public face of the organization – contributing to an atmosphere of secrecy and uncertainty regarding its structure and decision-making.
After several months and a long journey that included stops in Jordan and Germany, Sebdani and her two younger brothers arrived in Gothenburg in western Sweden.
"For all that time, I was sure we would soon be reunited with my mother," she recalls. "We sat on planes and trains, I saw things I didn't know, I saw climates and people change, there were new languages and places – but alongside the excitement, I constantly feared we were moving further away from my mother and worried she wouldn't be able to find us."
In Gothenburg, they were told they would soon meet their mother. "I was very excited. But what actually happened was different – we stood on a train platform, and instead of my mother, two other people I didn't know arrived, a woman and a man, and we were told: these are your mother and father. That's when the nightmare began."
Atefeh and her two brothers
The people who took Sebdani and her brothers were MEK members living in Sweden and working for the movement. They also had a child of their own, and took in two other children out of roughly 200 MEK children who arrived in Sweden. Sebdani says she later traced the fate of hundreds of other children who were "exported" from Camp Ashraf and that she obtained a document listing their destinations – including Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and the United States.
"The family I came to was politically obligated to take children," she says. "It's not that they loved children or wanted us. We underwent heavy indoctrination and were forced to constantly work for the organization." She does not reveal the identities of her foster parents, but her childhood memories expose the nature of the organization as it became a cult.
According to her, MEK families abroad were completely mobilized. They engaged in recruiting members and funds, organizing demonstrations, fighting opponents, and harassing defectors. She describes this society as oikophobic (one that is hostile, dislikes and rejects its own "home" culture, country and traditions). "They hated anything Iranian that wasn't related to the MEK. We weren't allowed, for example, to listen to Persian music unless it was the music of MEK members. I didn't read books in Persian. There was no Persian culture—everything was subordinated to the organization."
As far as you know, is this still the case?
"Yes. They still have offices in different countries and a strong presence on social media. The headquarters is in Auvers-sur-Oise, a suburb northwest of Paris, where political leadership members and full-time 'soldiers' are based. At the same time, there are activists like my foster family, and MEK members in Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania. That camp is essentially a 'troll factory' that produces large numbers of accounts and spreads propaganda in Persian and English. They write articles about themselves, smear their opponents, and create the impression of support – even though they have no real support."
Camp Ashraf 3 is the fortified camp to which most MEK members – estimated at 2,500 to 3,000 – were transferred from Iraq between 2013 and 2016. The move was carried out with the support of the United States, the United Nations, and the Albanian government. It took place because after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK was no longer protected in Iraq, and international actors worked to evacuate them. Although the organization had been designated a terrorist organization in the U.S. for many years, it was removed from the list in 2012 as a result of pressure applied by the movement, and some American and other actors even saw it as a partner in opposing the Iranian regime. According to reports, the MEK no longer engages in military activity, but the camp in Albania has become a center of political and media activity with a highly centralized and controlled structure.
"It's a place where entry and exit are not free, and in the past there were physical punishments and torture of those who wanted to leave," says Sebdani. "I know stories of people who disappeared and of mandatory daily confessions about 'dirty thoughts' – for example, sexual thoughts and masturbation. You weren't even allowed to think about your children or speak with members of the opposite sex without permission. Today, with defectors speaking out and social media, the movement can no longer allow itself to use such methods."
Sebdani is not alone in her claims about the MEK. The French newspaper Le Monde conducted interviews in 2024 with former members of the organization living in Europe, including two named Amir Vafa and Amin Golmaryami. Vafa described how he and others were forced to participate in public confession sessions in which, once a week, everyone had to describe their sexual fantasies. He added that friendships were closely monitored: "It was forbidden to have lunch with the same friend twice in a row."
Golmaryami added that during clashes with Iraqi security forces in 2011, MEK leaders sent him and his comrades to go "in front of Iraqi bullets to increase the number of casualties." He claims they did this in order to "put pressure on Europe and the United States to remove the organization from the list of terrorist organizations and facilitate the relocation of its members to another country."
Another MEK member, Reza Torabi, said that at the age of 17 he was a zealous member and was assigned the role of "welcoming" young newcomers. "Our objective was to brainwash them, make them forget their previous lives, and instill in them the ideology of the Mujahedeen," he said. "My dedication was unwavering." In hindsight, he believes that he too fell victim to manipulation and regrets "the harm [he] caused in the course of his duties."
A 2005 report by Human Rights Watch, based on in-depth interviews with former members, also described a reality of beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture.
How do you believe control of MEK member is maintained today?
"If you look at people like the father, you see someone who joined in his twenties and spent his entire life inside this system. He never paid a bill or looked for a job – everything was handled by the organization. He doesn't know how to buy a plane ticket or even drive to the end of a street. The MEK infantilized these people, and there is no one to take care of them if they leave."
Does that mean there are no new members?
"That's right. There are no new members. It's a movement of older people – but they pay young people to attend demonstrations. If you go to MEK protests, you'll find Poles and Ukrainians who don't speak Persian and don't know what they're protesting about, alongside Swedes with no connection to the organization who were paid to join."
Who pays for all this?
"From what I saw and was part of, many people pay the MEK monthly so they won't harass them – Iranians in exile subjected to pressure, propaganda, flattery, and social coercion. There are also welfare funds, for example for foster families, as well as political donations and funding from human rights organizations influenced by the group's propaganda."
Beyond the political activity, the period that Sebdani stayed with her foster family, had another aspect. She talks about indoctrination and the constant threat that was used to make her stay.
"From the age of five, I experienced sexual abuse, physical abuse and psychological abuse in the foster family," she says, "but I couldn't say anything because they threatened to separate me from my brothers. I was not allowed to be a child. The first thing that happened to me in the foster family was that my father began to show interest in my naked body. He wanted me to do things. I felt it was wrong and frightening, but I knew nothing about sex or sexuality and I didn't understand.
"Over time, it only got worse, and my foster brother abused me too, encouraged by my foster mother. I had no childhood; it was just survival. I was the one who cleaned and tidied, I had to be a good student, and also the one who went out to demonstrations and went to Mujahideen conferences around the world". Talking to Sebdani she describes a reality full of exploitation, punishment, crying at night, and deception of Swedish welfare services.
As an adult, she eventually left, moved to Stockholm, became an engineer, and worked for Microsoft. After a personal crisis, she began telling her story and wrote a book (Min hand i min, "My Hand in Mine", published by Albert Bonniers förlag, 2024). Today she is married and has three children.
Politically, Sebdani is active among supporters of Reza Pahlavi. "I saw the difference between the two leaders," she says. "I met Maryam Rajavi as a child, and recently I met Pahlavi in Paris with a group of other former MEK children. I support the Iranian people, and the people support Pahlavi. He is exactly what Iran needs – a secular, humane person, with a family, who knows what living a normal life is, who listens and can unite people."
After Sebdani's meeting with Reza Pahlavi and other "MEK children" she became the target of an online campaign against her. Sebdani says that this isn't the first time and she has been targeted by a smear campaign led by the MEK on several previous occasions before.
Sebdani's book
"This kind of harassment happens to everyone who has left the organization and spoken out," she says. This time, the MEK website denied Sebdani's account through a letter it claimed was written by her biological father. "For me, as a father, seeing 'Atefeh Sebdani' at a gathering of the Shah's son was painful… Atefeh is the same person who, by spreading defamation against the organization under the false pretext of being part of a group of 'child soldiers,' has for many years become a full servant of Iranian intelligence."
The text claims that Sebdani was never part of the MEK and accuses her and her associates of collaborating with the regime in Tehran. Sebdani does not know whether her father actually wrote the text, but she says that everything in it is false and that she is familiar with other examples of letters that MEK members were forced to write under coercion.
Following the letter, a senior figure in the organization, Freydoun Salimi, also spoke out, accusing Sebdani of never having been a member of the group and of acting as an agent of the regime. In responses to his claims on X, supporters of the organization repeat the accusations and insult Sebdani. On other social media platforms, she is also accused of assisting Israel, betraying Iran, and supporting Americans attacking her country.
Sebdani's personal MEK story has a positive ending – she escaped, her siblings left, and even her mother eventually left the organization. The organization itself, however, is still very much alive. It even claims to still have networks inside Iran, though most analysts believe its influence there is limited. "The MEK is more of a European problem than an Iranian one," Sebdani concludes. "In Iran, they have no real support, not even with regime critics. But after the 'Woman, Life, Freedom' protests, it's clear that a unifying leader is needed, otherwise, there will be no change – and I have no doubt that Pahlavi is the right person."
For 40 years, the assassination of Sweden's prime minister, Olof Palme, has remained unsolved. Now, some are revisiting a dark possibility: not a lone gunman, but a covert network embedded deep within Swedish society – part of a secret Europe-wide effort to resist a Soviet invasion
The most shocking event in the history of modern Sweden occurred almost exactly 40 years ago. On the evening of Friday, February 28, 1986, Prime Minister Olof Palme and his wife, Lisbet, went to see a movie in central Stockholm. It was a cold winter evening in the capital. As he often did, Palme dismissed his bodyguards and the couple travelled three subway stations to the theater without a security escort. When they emerged onto the street, they met up with their 25-year-old son, Mårten, and his partner. The four bought tickets and went in.
Shortly after 11:20 P.M., while the prime minister and his wife were walking back home along a main street in the city, a man approached them from behind and fired a gun at close range. Palme was hit and collapsed on the frozen pavement. A second shot was fired immediately afterward, lightly wounding Lisbet. Bystanders attempted to help but it was in vain. Palme died on the spot. An ambulance was called and evacuated his body and his wife to a hospital, arriving less than 20 minutes after the shots were fired.
The hours that followed were dramatic. News of the murder spread in the Swedish media and overseas. The country went on high alert, and Deputy Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson convened the cabinet. At 5 A.M. Saturday morning a press conference was held. Flags were subsequently lowered to half-mast, flowers and candles were placed at the murder site, and an atmosphere of national mourning and crisis permeated the country. At the same time, it emerged that almost every possible mistake was made in the investigation of the murder: The shooter immediately fled; police arriving at the scene failed to apprehend him. They also did not set up roadblocks or cordon off the area. Coordination between law enforcement forces at the site was poor; no situation room was established, and testimonies from eyewitnesses were neither systematically collected nor fully documented. These errors were never corrected in the intervening four decades.
Olof Pale's Murder Site on Sveavägen in Cenral Stockholm
In the years following the murder, what is referred to by Swedish authorities as "the largest and longest-running murder investigation in the world" was launched, but despite significant resources, it was marred by disputes and conflicts and did not lead to any definitive outcome. Many investigative directions were pursued but no one was charged. In the first year, the Kurdish PKK organization was a central focus. Later, theories involving possible actors from various countries, such as South Africa – which allegedly had both a motive and the capability for executing a political assassination abroad – were explored but did not result in indictments. Such was also the case following investigations of theories involving terrorist organizations from the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
In 1988, a local criminal named Christer Pettersson was convicted of the murder, mainly based on a controversial identification by Lisbet Palme; a year later he was acquitted on appeal due to lack of evidence. In June 2020, the Swedish prosecution announced that the investigation was closed, declaring that a man named Stig Engström was the probable suspect. Engström had allegedly been present at the scene on the night of the shooting and had been interviewed as a witness in later years, but he died in 2000 and therefore could not be prosecuted. His motive was unclear, and the evidence against him was circumstantial and unconvincing. Nevertheless, this was enough for the prosecution to close the case.
But this was not the end of the story: In December 2025, the prosecution reversed its position. In a surprising development, it announced that a renewed examination of the investigative material had concluded that there was insufficient evidence against Engström, and thus he was no longer officially considered to be the suspect. At the same time, no other names were suggested, nor was the investigation formally reopened. Thus, 40 years later, the Swedish public still does not know who killed its prime minister or why. Meanwhile, on the margins of these developments, a discussion has surfaced about another historical phenomenon, which – like the identity of the man who pulled the trigger – was heretofore unknown to the Swedish public and kept in the shadows for decades.
"Today, we know no more about the murder than we did the day after it happened," says Gunnar Wall, a journalist and author who has dedicated years to researching and writing books about the Palme assassination. "We do not know if it was a lone assassin or an organized group, we do not know the motive, how the killer escaped, whether he was Swedish or foreign, or whether he is still alive today and, if so, is he in Sweden or abroad. Given this situation, there are countless speculations and theories."
Wall, recipient of the 1998 and 2024 Guldspaden (Golden Spade) award, Sweden's most prestigious prize for investigative journalism, for books he wrote about the incident, notes that while there are those who claim to know who the murderer was, despite years of research, he himself does not.
Gunnar Wall
However, Wall points to an interesting issue. The decision not to reopen the investigation late last year is strange, in his view, because about 15 years ago Sweden changed its legislation regarding statutes of limitations. Serious inquests into crimes such as murder, under the new law, are no longer closed after 25 years as was previously the case, and can remain open indefinitely. The prosecutor who last December chose not to resume the whole process justified that by saying there were no conditions for doing so – even though he admitted that he had examined only the Engström lead and not other possibilities.
When the previous prosecutor closed the case in 2020, it was possible to say that happened because he had reached a dead end – but the same cannot be said about his successor's decision, since he said he had not even attempted to evaluate materials that did not concern Engström. And yet, he seemed determined to leave the case closed nonetheless.
"The investigators of the Palme murder examined, almost until the very last moment, indications of [involvement by] a larger group that went beyond Engström alone," says Wall, who bases his claims on interviews he conducted with the investigators themselves and with additional witnesses, as well as on reviews of countless documents, reports and other materials. "Their main hypothesis was that forces within a secret Swedish network were behind the murder, and they tried to link Engström to these actors. When they failed, they abandoned the hypothesis and Engström remained the sole suspect. Five years later, because the evidence against him was weak, it all ended with no conviction and no suspect."
Suggestions about some secret entity having been behind the Palme assassination may sound like far-fetched conspiracy theories – but they are not. For decades, underground organizations called stay-behind networks existed in Sweden and many other European countries. While a direct link between the Swedish stay-behind network and Palme's assassination has not been proven, the existence of the group is an established fact. These clandestine bodies were created after World War II as a way for countries to prepare for a possible invasion and hostile occupation. Their work included drafting blueprints for underground resistance groups, maintaining contact with a government-in-exile and actively opposing an occupier.
In the early days of the Cold War, following World War II, the threat of Soviet aggression was tangible. Across Europe, secret networks were created in various countries, in order to forge connections between the military, police, intelligence services and civil society. Initially, these organizations were intended to prepare for a Soviet invasion, but over time some engaged in other activities, sometimes even conducting covert operations within their own borders, including false flag operations – designed to appear as if carried out by others to justify certain political or military reactions.
The most famous example is the Italian network and operation code named Gladio, whose existence was revealed to parliament in 1990 by Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Some claimed that this stay-behind network participated in domestic acts of political terrorism in the 1970s and '80s. Parliamentary inquiries looked into its operations and ties with foreign actors and intelligence bodies such as the CIA and NATO, and exposed its involvement in guerrilla training, communications networks, weapons storage and sabotage. There were also suspicions that Italy's network operatives engaged in domestic political activity, including terrorism designed to strengthen the Italian right and diminish the left. Similar underground groups have been documented in Belgium and Switzerland, and evidence of same exists in France and Germany, although without confirmation of domestic violence. There are also hypotheses about the involvement of such networks in coups and politically motivated violence in Greece and Turkey.
The investigators' hypothesis was that forces within a secret Swedish network were behind the murder, and they tried to link Engström to these actors. When they failed, they abandoned the hypothesis.
The whole phenomenon remains highly controversial and difficult to research due to the secrecy and compartmentalization surrounding it, yet there is general agreement that stay-behind networks have existed across Europe, operating without parliamentary oversight and known to only a small circle of decision-makers.
After years of rumors and official denials of such bodies existing underground in Sweden, in 2013, one of the country's major newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, published an article by Inga-Britt Ahlenius, a civil servant who worked at the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office and the United Nations. Based on evidence and research that had emerged since the 1990s, Ahlenius wrote: "While the initial disclosure of Sweden's institutional but unofficial Cold War connections with Western powers was met with denials and outrage, it was eventually accepted as the new truth. Thus, the revelation of stay-behind networks is often treated more like a romantic spy adventure than a historical fact." She noted that the secret resistance movement established in Sweden, and closely linked with Western powers, was likely initiated by Prime Minister Tage Erlander (Palme's predecessor) along with several ministers.
"[It was] initially led by Alvar Lindencrona, CEO of Thule insurance, three department heads and regional/local 'cells' operated under him," she wrote and added, "meetings occurred in secret rooms in Lindencrona's house or Thule's offices, and funding came from secret sources. Between 1951 and 1953, the CIA under William Colby, stationed in Stockholm and later CIA director, helped establish the network in Sweden, although the Swedes retained top-level control."
Journalist Wall adds some background information: Experience from World War II, he says, showed that countries that were occupied had been unprepared for such an eventuality – there were no resistance movements and they in essence had to be improvised. Thereafter, it was in the interest of those countries and others to prepare properly for the threat of military occupation; in Sweden, various actors dealt with this scenario at an early stage. Immediately after the war, a secret, state-level initiative was launched by the prime minister; the CIA entered the picture in the 1950s. Before that certain extremist elements had worked toward similar aims – among them war veterans who supported the Nazis during the war and volunteered to fight alongside them in the Continuation War in Finland. In the end, these three trajectories evolved into the Sweden's stay-behind network, although it is unclear exactly what remained of them in its final iteration.
"Unlike in other places, despite the cooperation with American and other actors, the Swedish network was established and organized by Swedes," says historian Mats Deland, a senior lecturer at Mid Sweden University (Mittuniversitetet) in Sundsvall. "Sweden did not participate in World War II, but it could learn from the Nazi invasion of Norway in 1940. The Norwegians sank the Blücher, one of the German ships on its way to capture the Norwegian capital in the Oslo fjord, which delayed the Germans and caused them heavy losses, while at the same time giving the Norwegians time to evacuate the royal family and their government northward.
"This experience was important for both the Norwegians and the Swedes who learned from it and came up with the idea to establish an organization that could evacuate the Swedish royal family and the government, but also 'stay behind' and protect the country. This goal of staying behind was the result of another experience from World War II: the NKVD, the Soviet security service under Stalin, who remained behind and became partisans in the German-occupied areas."
So, in the Swedish case, the stay-behind network was not controlled by the Americans or by NATO?
Deland: "Correct, in Sweden this was a local initiative. The Americans arrived a little after the network was established, and even then, they did not take control; they only integrated needs arising from NATO doctrine, which was based on the fact that only the United States had nuclear weapons. In the case of a Soviet invasion and the need for American aircraft to fly over Sweden, the idea was, like the French resistance – and to some extent the Belgian and Dutch resistance – to create escape lines that could smuggle out downed crews. But the United States did not establish the network and did not manage it. This may have changed in 1965, when Swedish security services were reorganized [when the Cold War-era external intelligence agency, T-kontoret, and internal intelligence agency, B-kontoret, merged into a single, secret organization], partly with the involvement of Olof Palme. It is possible that American involvement increased then."
How much was the Swedish stay behind network controlled by the state, and how much of its activity was conducted by civilian or military actors without the knowledge or control of the political leadership?
"Between 1947 and 1951, there were many volunteers in the network, including people who had served alongside the Germans during World War II, some of whom were highly problematic. Because of these types, the secret police discovered the network even though they were not supposed to know about it. Only the people directly involved – Prime Minister Erlander and a small part of the security apparatus – were meant to be 'in the loop.' Following this discovery, which angered Erlander and the security apparatus greatly, the network was reorganized, removing the problematic elements and incorporating trade union members and the business sector."
,Olof Palme, Tage Erlander, Sten Andersson and Ingvar Carlsson (1968) Photo: Lennart Nygren / SvD / Scanpix
According to Deland – and in keeping with Ahlenius' observations, as mentioned – the network was indeed led by executives such as Alvar Lindencrona, the head of the Thule company, a businessman with relatively progressive social views for his time, and it recruited forces from the trade unions that had a traditional affinity to the ruling Social Democratic Party. "These were ordinary people," he says, "not former soldiers. Although they needed training, they could be trusted, and the network remained secret until the 1990s." In other words, even though neither the Swedish parliament nor the rest of the government knew about the network, it was indeed an official entity. Indeed Deland notes that a recent book revealed an interesting document: an official government decision from the 1950s forming Sweden's stay-behind network, showing that it was legal and above board. The diaries of Prime Minister Erlander show that he may have given it a green light as early as 1947.
The book Deland refers to is Johan Wennström's "Sweden's Cause Was Our Cause: The Secret Swedish Resistance Movement" (2023). Wennström calls his country's stay-behind underground a "resistance movement," and reveals that the organization's code name, used by its members at the time, was Metro. Wennström says Metro was not established or controlled by NATO and it did not act on the latter's behalf, although he confirms there was cooperation with MI6 in Britain and, to some extent, with the CIA, mainly concerning programs such as evacuating Swedish decision-makers to England if necessary.
Furthermore, Wennström writes, Metro likely included several hundred people, as well as a sort of "invisible combat unit" that could expand to as many as 3,000. The underlying principle was that the network's members would recruit additional people from their immediate circle if necessary. The author also describes the group's structure was fairly cooperative, with representation from various sectors of Swedish society; information about its activities, he says, was distributed on a strict "need-to-know" basis. The organization was formally legalized in 1955, having been mandated by an earlier government decision. Typically, it was involved in organizing potential resistance and civil defense activities, such as mapping escape routes, planning acts of sabotage of critical infrastructure that could fall into Soviet hands, rescuing government officials and storing weapons. Wennström does not know when the organization ceased to exist, or if it exists today.
The phenomenon remains highly controversial and difficult to research, yet there's general agreement that stay-behind networks existed in Europe, operating without parliamentary oversight and known to few decision-makers.
Regarding other countries that had stay-behind networks, it is clear, both from Wennström's book and other sources, that heterogeneity was the keyword. Each country built its organization differently depending on perceived threat and the nature of the country's political, military and industrial power structures. Even in NATO member states, the networks were not necessarily under that organization's control. Parliamentary or public oversight was generally minimal, and there is still controversy over what their involvement was in domestic activity beyond preparing for a possible Soviet invasion during the Cold War era.
One of those who has focused on the phenomenon at the European level is Swiss author and researcher Daniele Ganser, whose controversial 2005 book – "NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe" – is one of the best-known on the subject. It received praise but also criticism by some who claim that it is based on an unsubstantiated conspiracy. In it Ganser claims that Western intelligence networks operated secretly in Allied countries during the postwar era, sometimes beyond the bounds of proper legal and political oversight. He cites Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Turkey, emphasizing that in some of these countries the stay-behind networks were indeed involved in terrorism, false-flag operations and political manipulation.
Mats Deland collaborated with Ganser on the Swedish edition of the book, which includes a chapter on the possible connection to the Palme assassination.
Did Prime Minister Olof Palme know about the network?
Deland: "We know he was aware of it during the tenure of his predecessor, Erlander, because he worked on it as one of Erlander's people in the 1950s. What he knew later, we do not know for certain. But it is reasonable to assume that all prime ministers knew about the network, although there are no official documents on the matter."
What can be said, to the best of your knowledge, about the Swedish stay-behind network in the 1980s, during Palme's second government?
"We don't know. We have some information about the network in the 1950s, but very little about the 1980s."
When did suspicions arise about a connection between the network and Palme's assassination?
"These were suspicions that arose from the very beginning. There was an investigative attempt as part of the official inquiry, and there were also discussions about people from the Stockholm police who could have been involved in the murder, but these are speculations and I do not deal with them."
Sometimes it's difficult to know whether a fact uncovered in an investigation is the key to solving a (murder) mystery or just a coincidence. The last person suspected of killing Prime Minister Palme, Stig Engström, who died 26 years ago, was nicknamed the "Scandia Man" because his workplace was in a building called the Scandia building. The building had previously housed the headquarters of the above-mentioned Thule insurance company Thule merged with Scandia in the 1960s and was run by Alvar Lindercrona who, as said, apparently headed country's the stay-behind network; indeed some of its meetings took place in that same building. In other words, if Engström murdered Palme, he did so while leaving a place where in the past – and possibly as late as the 1980s – meetings of senior members of the country's stay-behind network were held. Is this a coincidence? And even though there is no evidence that Engström was actually connected to the underground organization, is there any logic to the claim that it was involved in Palme's murder?
Wall, the journalist, is not unequivocal on this matter, but he does suggest some key historical points that should be taken into account. "One of the things that happened during Palme's second term as prime minister in the 1980s was a series of alleged Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish territorial waters," he explains. "These incidents caused a severe security crisis, and some argued that they were preparations for an invasion and the establishment of espionage infrastructure. Within the Swedish security establishment, there were claims that Palme did not take the threat seriously and that, because of this, he posed a security risk to Sweden.
"Furthermore, Palme was supposed to travel to Moscow to meet Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1986. Palme, who returned to serve as prime minister in 1982, was active on the international stage on issues of arms reduction and nuclear disarmament. His opponents argued that he had close and controversial ties to the Soviet Union, although a more balanced description would be that he was open to discussions with Soviet leaders about disarmament – something that went against both NATO's view and the opinions of senior Swedish military officials. The assassination on February 28, 1986, meant that it was Palme's successor, Ingvar Carlsson, who met Gorbachev."
As far as is known, the issue of disarmament was not on the agenda at that Swedish-Soviet summit.
Wall adds that there were a number of people who claimed to have received offers to kill Olof Palme; in several cases, it was suggested that Swedish intelligence services were behind those offers. But no one known to have actually belonged to any of these secret services has ever come forward to confirm that they were approached. Wall also provided Haaretz with documents he's collected showing that evidence indicating that people with radio devices were present in the area on the night of the assassination was not taken seriously by the investigators. He does not claim that there is proof that the murder was organized by political actors, but argues that it is certainly a line of inquiry worthy of serious examination.
And he is not alone: Ahead of the 40th anniversary of the assassination, a public appeal was launched to encourage the Swedish government and parliament to establish a "truth commission" to finally resolve any outstanding questions.
"On February 28, 1986, Olof Palme fell victim to a brutal attack on an open street in central Stockholm," the appeal begins. "The assassination of the prime minister of Sweden was a unique attack on our democracy. In a country governed by the rule of law like Sweden, everything possible should have been done to solve this murder. The fact that it remains unsolved 40 years later is unacceptable, especially when not all possibilities for an indisputable and absolute solution have been investigated."
The text cites problems that may have prevented discovery of the truth – still-classified archives, false answers given to the investigators by secret service personnel and investigative files that have disappeared. Possible involvement of the Swedish stay-behind network is also mentioned, and the conclusion is: "This is the only assassination of a political leader in modern Europe that may remain unsolved. Clarifying all the circumstances surrounding Olof Palme's murder will strengthen Sweden."
Still, at this rate, it is doubtful whether the mystery will ever be solved. Even if it is, the relatively recent revelations regarding stay-behind networks in Europe are just another example of how, even if and when the public discovers the truth, it sometimes comes decades too late, in the form of very old news.
In light of Ina Hamdan's widely discussed revelations about members of Sweden's Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) who have expressed support for violent organizations or spread antisemitic propaganda, there is reason to revisit an interesting publication that the Malmö branch of the Party released in 2023 under the title Anti-Racist Handbook.
Vänsterpartiet's Anti-Racist Handbook is a strange document to read in light of current Swedish discourse. On the one hand, it's an ambitious text about how racism and discrimination should be fought. The reader learns about structural racism and intersectionality, Islamophobia and Afrophobia, colonialism and gender power structures and there's an almost academic overview of the various manifestations of racism in Swedish society. In light of this, the book argues that the party should actively recruit "non-white comrades," and proposes a range of symbolic, political and educational measures to combat racism.
On the other hand, there is very little about Islamism and contemporary antisemitism. This is interesting because it may be the key to understanding why people who devote their lives to "anti-racist politics" sometimes end up supporting violent, genocidal and fundamentalist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah, while spreading propaganda against Jews and their national movement.
The point is the striking difference in how much nuance, complexity and analytical sensitivity the leaders of the Swedish Left Party in Malmö are willing to apply to different social phenomena.
When it comes to racism against Black people, the handbook explains how racism has changed form and modernized. Although African Americans are no longer sold from from one cotton plantation to another and are no longer viewed as people with smaller brains, racism still exists. In Sweden, the handbook explains, there is Afrophobia, manifested through hostility and hate crimes, insults and discrimination, exclusion and structural inequalities resulting from "norms of whiteness" and ideas of white supremacy.
But when it comes to antisemitism, the analysis seems to stop in history.
In the past, Jews were portrayed as the killers of Jesus, as people who kidnapped Christian children and used their blood, or those who started revolutions. The result was pogroms, state violence and discrimination. Twentieth-century antisemitism instead revolved around ideas of Jewish control over governments, the media and financial systems. The result was the Holocaust.
Antisemitism after the Second World War is different, and it is certainly about more than merely "racism against Jews." Christer Mattsson, one of Sweden's leading scholars of antisemitism and violent extremism, describes contemporary antisemitism as an "Israelized antisemitism," in which traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes are no longer expressed directly about "Jews" but are instead projected onto "Israel" or "Zionists."
Thousands of people in the streets of Stockholm shout "No Zionists on our streets" on a weekly basis. This is just a new version of "Jews Out!". Their demonstration "street theatre" also portrays Israelis as bloodthirsty creatures who drink the blood of dead infants, or as people who secretly control governments.
Recently we've also witnessed court cases of Swedish so-called pro-Palestinians who have spread messages on social media destorting the Holocaust and presented images of snakes and hyenas adorned with Stars of David killing Palestinian children. Their defence strategy, which actually convinced the court, was that the Star of David represent the Zionist flag rather than rabbis and synagogues.
This is where the handbook's blind spot becomes visible, and the results are obvious.
At the end of the Left Party's handbook there are quotations from representatives of the Party that reveal the same pattern: extreme sensitivity toward every conceivable form of discrimination on the one hand, and total blindness to extremism and racism when it comes to Jews and Israel on the other.
For example, Amelia Bartholdson wrote in the handbook that combating racism requires "awareness, humility and self-awareness." Yet after October 7 she shared a video accusing her own party secretary of being a Zionist because he did not regard October 7 as a legitimate act of resistance (the post came from EPYU, an organization that spreads conspiracy theories and blood libels). She also shared an open letter decorated with a red triangle (known as a Hamas propaganda symbol) supporting Kristofer Lundberg, a well-known supporter of the PFLP, one of the organizations organizations behind the October 7 massacre. Truly a fine display of awareness, humility and self-awareness.
In other posts, Bartholdson compared the situation in Gaza to the Holocaust and supported boycotts and so-called "apartheid-free zones." This is an interesting point, because many of those quoted in the handbook support boycotts that are not directed at products from the West Bank or at far-right Netanyahu supporters, but essentially at anything connected to Israel. It is a bit like boycotting Bruce Springsteen or Beyoncé because of U.S. immigration policy. In an American context that would seem absurd, but when it comes to Israel everyone is lumped together. How does that fit with Sabrin Omar Högelius's statement in the handbook that people should be able to "simply exist, without having to defend their origins"?
"Anti-racism should permeate the party's politics and practice and build broad alliances with civil society," Anders Neergaard wrote in the handbook. Last week he was scheduled to lead a seminar celebrating an intifada (a term that in political contexts clearly implies violence against Israeli and Jewish targets). The other seminar leader was Orwa Kadoura, who was also quoted in the 2023 handbook condemning "racist behaviors, structures and organizations," yet in recent years he has repeatedly shared antisemitic and pro-Hamas material.
Another prominent former Left Party member quoted in the handbook is Lorena Delgado Varas. "Western anti-racism goes hand in hand with feminism and socialism," she wrote. A few years later, as is well known, there the "hand in hand" had an entirely different meaning as Delgado Varas shared an image on X showing a hand with the Israeli flag controlling a hand with the American flag, which in turn controlled soldiers carrying the flags of various other countries, accompanied by a text claiming that "Zionist Jews control the world" through threats, blackmail, the media, banks and control over the U.S. Congress, Senate and government.
These examples do not even include the individuals Inas Hamdan wrote about in Expressen, because the party's antisemitism problem extends far beyond 25, 50 or even 100 people. The most important lesson of the Anti-Racist Handbook is not what it says about racism, but what it does not say.
It's not about hating Jews. It is about a worldview that blames one people, one movement and one country for all the world's evils and fails to understand what contemporary antisemitism is. Or perhaps understands it perfectly well, but chooses to exploit it in order to win votes.
In recent years, we have seen what hate propaganda, conspiracy theories, and dehumanizing rhetoric can lead to — especially when it concerns Jews.
A long series of arson attacks, stabbings, and shootings has made Jewish communities around the world increasingly vulnerable. In many cases, the perpetrators were influenced precisely by hate propaganda, conspiracy theories, antisemitic incitement, and Islamist ideology portraying Jews as legitimate targets of violence.
At the same time, two recent court cases in Sweden — one in Helsingborg and one in Gothenburg — concluded in a way that shows that Sweden is beginning to understand the importance of combating extremism, while still failing to fully understand it.
The Helsingborg case concerned charges of incitement against an ethnic group involving antisemitic publications on social media, Holocaust distortion, and conspiratorial content. The defendant was convicted on several counts, including Nazi salutes, publishing antisemitic images, and spreading theories like the one claiming that “4 out of 5 American slave owners were Jewish,” equating Jews with rats, and portraying Jews as a satanic force controlling the world.
At the same time, the man was acquitted on certain counts related to Holocaust distortion — a newer component of Sweden’s incitement legislation. The prosecutor argued that the man’s statements formed part of a broader antisemitic conspiracy narrative involving references to the Illuminati and Freemasons. But the district court was not convinced. During the questioning of Christer Mattsson, an expert on violent extremism and antisemitism and director of the Segerstedt Institute, the defense demanded answers to questions about the number of people cremated in Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor, and discussed the extent to which the Israeli government does or does not “weaponize antisemitism”. Despite Mattsson’s clear answers, and instead of the court telling the defense attorney to stop wasting time on historical revisionism, the result was an acquittal. The defendant’s statements claiming that it would have been impossible to “dispose of 6 million bodies in the ovens,” and the publication of a video describing the figure six million as false, were not considered contrary to generally accepted historical facts and were not considered serious Holocaust distortion.
The problem with the verdict is that the court failed to see the forest for the trees, and the broader antisemitic context disappeared as the court got lost in details. No one has ever claimed that six million bodies were burned or that six million is an exact number. Six million is a widely accepted estimate, supported by millions of confirmed victim names, as well as Nazi documentation, demographic studies, transport records, camp archives, postwar investigations, eyewitness testimony, and forensic evidence.
No serious historian has argued that limited crematorium capacity would suggest exaggerated death tolls or inconsistencies in the history of the Holocaust. The entire debate is absurd. Anyone who has studied this kind of rhetoric knows that Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion — referred to in academic literature as Holocaust distortion — are very rarely expressed by claiming that the Holocaust never happened. It is usually about relativization, contextualization, and minimization.
This kind of denial is not merely a lie about the past — it is a precondition for genocide: minimizing, justifying, or erasing the crimes and thereby continuing the dehumanization of the victims while obstructing historical accountability and remembrance. In this case, it is not only an insult — it is a call to renew the violence.
In the Gothenburg trial, a woman was acquitted on Wednesday after being charged with incitement against an ethnic group. The images she published online contained classic antisemitic symbols: a snake with a Star of David on its head and large fangs about to attack a naked child; a snake shaped like a Star of David wrapped around a baby bottle with text describing Zionists as child murderers; and an image depicting a hyena eating a child while staring at another child hiding nearby wearing a Palestinian flag on its shirt. The hyena wears a kippah with a Star of David on it.
During police questioning, the woman claimed she had nothing against Jews. “It is Zionists I am speaking against, and what is happening in Gaza is horrific. Seeing children slaughtered every day,” she said.
Christer Mattsson, who also testified in this case, explained that research has long established that snakes and the killing of children are common antisemitic symbols. Anti-Zionism, he explained, becomes antisemitism when it adopts antisemitic stereotypes, conspiracy theories, and so-called antisemitic tropes, such as the notion that evil Jews control global media and governments. Mattsson explained that in this form of “Israelized antisemitism,” “Zionists” assume the role historically assigned to Jews in classic antisemitic ideology and are portrayed as uniquely evil, manipulative, powerful, and conspiratorial.
Despite this, the court missed the point. The fact that a message is critical of Israel does not exclude the possibility that it is simultaneously antisemitic. The Star of David, the snakes, the conspiracies, and the innocent dead children should have been enough. It seems Swedish courts will not act until someone explicitly says, “I really hate Jews and now I’m going to kill a few,” or “Auschwitz is a fictional place.”
But that is not what antisemitism sounds like today. To minimize and distort the Holocaust and spread hatred against the legitimate national movement of the Jewish people is not an exercise in free speech — it is spreading hatred and encouraging violence in disguise.
Things should be called by their proper names, and words have consequences. History gives us many examples of this and they are often associated with specific names – Capital Jewish Museum in Washington DC, the Tree of Life – Or L’Simcha Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Bondi Beach in Sydney, the Krystalgade Synagogue in Copenhagen, the Hypercacher supermarket in Paris, the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester, the Halle Synagogue in Germany, Chabad of Poway Synagogue in California, Golders Green Road in London, the Ozar Hatorah School in Toulouse, and the El Ghriba Synagogue in Tunisia.
All of these acts began with words.
We have spoken about hatred and threats for decades. Why is the state still unable to recognize them when it comes to Jews?
אטפה סבדאני נולדה באיראן למשפחה שהייתה פעילה במוג'אהדין חלק, הופרדה מהוריה והועברה למשפחת אומנה בשוודיה שקשורה לארגון. בריאיון ל"הארץ" היא מתארת את החיים בארגון הגולה שלטענתה מדכא זהות אישית, מנתק את חבריו מהתרבות הפרסית ומשתמש נגדם באלימות קשה.
אטפה סבדאני הייתה בין אלפי מפגינים שהתאספו בשבוע שעבר בסטוקהולם והביעו תמיכה במתקפה של אה"ב וישראל באיראן, ובבנו של השאה לשעבר. הם גם התנגדו בקול למשטר האיראני ולשלוחותיו במזרח התיכון, ולצד דגלי ארה"ב וישראל הניפו את דגל איראן שלפני המהפכה האסלאמית.
בדומה להפגנות אחרות של גולים איראנים ברחבי העולם, המוחים בבירת שוודיה התאחדו סביב התקווה לדמוקרטיה באיראן. סבדאני, ממארגני המחאה, נולדה באספהאן ב־1986 אך כבר כשהייתה בת שנתיים נאלצה לעזוב את מולדתה עם משפחתה ומאז לא שבה אליה. בריאיון ל"הארץ" היא מספרת כי רוב חייה הייתה קורבן להתעללות פיזית ונפשית – לא מטעם המשטר האיראני אלא דווקא מידי ארגון האופוזיציה מוג'אהדין חלק, שהוריה היו חברים בו.
"ההורים שלי נחשבו לאויבי הרפובליקה האסלאמית, וכמו אנשי מוג'אהדין אחרים הם ישבו בכלא ולאחר מכן נאלצו לעזוב את המדינה", סיפרה סבדאני. לדבריה, הוריה לקחו אותה ואת אחיה הקטן וברחו לפקיסטאן. אימה הייתה אז בהיריון ובני המשפחה חיו במדינה השכנה בלי כל רכוש או כסף.
מוג'אהדין חלק (MEK) הוקם ב־1965 על ידי סטודנטים איראנים שהתנגדו לשלטון השאה. הארגון שילב אסלאם שיעי ורעיונות מרקסיסטיים ואנטי־אימפריאליסטיים ופעל במחתרת. בשנות ה־70 הוא ביצע פיגועים נגד מטרות של המשטר האיראני וגם נגד מטרות אמריקאיות במדינה. הוא הוגדר ארגון טרור בארה"ב ובמדינות נוספות.
אף שארגון האופוזיציה האיראני סייע להפלת משטר השאה, לאחר המהפכה האסלאמית ב־1979 הוא הסתכסך עם השלטון החדש ותקף מטרות שלו ובכירים בו. השלטון, מצידו, יצא בתגובה למסע דיכוי שכלל הוצאות להורג של אלפי בני אדם. העימות בין הצדדים דחק בהנהגת מוג'אהדין חלק לצאת לגלות בעיראק, שם כונן הארגון ברית שנויה במחלוקת עם השליט העיראקי סדאם חוסיין בזמן מלחמת איראן־עיראק.
אביה של סבדאני השאיר את משפחתו בפקיסטאן והצטרף לחברי מוג'אהדין בעיראק. הם פעלו שם במחנה ששמו "אשרף", שלימים נהפך למרכז של תנועת האופוזיציה האיראנית הגולה. "כעבור זמן־מה עברנו גם אנחנו למחנה", היא מספרת. סבדאני מתארת את מחנה הארגון בעיראק מנקודת המבט של הילדה הקטנה שהסתובבה בכל פינה ופינה בו. "המחנה היה מעין עיר קטנה עם גני ילדים, פארקים ובתי ספר", היא מספרת. ואולם במבט לאחור היא מסבירה שהמחזה האידילי היה רחוק מלהיות אידיאלי. "הם הקימו הכול לצורכי תעמולה. הם רצו להראות כמה טוב במחנה כדי שאחרים יצטרפו אליו. בשבילי זה היה כמו גן עדן. הייתי עם אמא שלי והייתי מאושרת".
בשנת 1991 אמרה אימה של סבדאני לבתה, בלי שהכינה אותה מראש, שבהיותה האחות הגדולה היא בקרוב תצטרךלטפל לבדה בשני אחיה. היא הייתה אז בקושי בת חמש. באותה העת, מספרת סבדאני, החלו ילדים להיעלם מהגן שלה בלי שידעה מדוע ולאן. "המקום התרוקן מקולות של ילדים", היא אומרת, "וקולות של ילדים הם הדבר האנושי ביותר, זה גרעין החיים וזה נלקח משם".
אלא שאז הגיע תורה של אטפה הקטנה. יום אחד היא מצאה את עצמה עומדת ליד אוטובוס עם קבוצה של נשים שמיררו בבכי. כשיצא האוטובוס לדרך והיא ואחיה עליו אליו, נהפכה הילדה הקטנה לאם. "הייתי צריכה לטפל באח אחד שהיה עדיין תינוק ורצה לינוק, ובאח שני שהיה חולה מאוד", היא מספרת. לדבריה, כ־900 ילדים בסך הכול הופרדו מהוריהם והועברו למדינות אחרות. "הילדים הפריעו למנהיג הארגון, מסעוד רג'אווי", אומרת סבדאני. "המאבק האידאולוגי לשחרור איראן נהפך למאבק של מנהיג נרקיסיסט שרצה את כל הכוח בידיו. הוא רצה שהגברים והנשים יהיו בשליטתו המוחלטת – והילדים עמדו בדרכו".
"כך למעשה הפך ארגון האופוזיציה מתנועה אידאולוגית לכת", היא אומרת, ומהדהדת ביקורת שהוטחה לא פעם במוג'אהדין חלק. לאורך שנות ה־80 וה־90 נעשה מוג'אהדין חלק ריכוזי מאוד, אכף משמעת נוקשה בקרב חבריו, כפה את האידאולוגיה שלו והדיר מתנגדים שצמחו בקרבו. בה בעת הקים הארגון זרועות פוליטיות וצבאיות ואלו פעלו מבסיסים בעיראק בחסות ארגון גג פוליטי ששמו המועצה הלאומית העליונה להתנגדות באיראן (NCRI).
לסבדאני ואחיה, כאמור, לא היה מקום בארגון – לפחות לא בבסיס הפעולה המרכזי שלו. אחרי מסע בדרכים שנמשך כמה חודשים בליווי אנשי הארגון, ושכלל עצירות בירדן ובגרמניה, הגיעו שלושת האחים לעיר גטבורג שבמערב שוודיה. "כל הזמן הזה הייתי בטוחה שבקרוב נתאחד עם אימא", היא נזכרת, "ישבנו במטוסים וברכבות, ראיתי איך האקלים, השפות, המקומות והאנשים משתנים, אבל לצד ההתרגשות חששתי כל הזמן שאנחנו מתרחקים מאימא ודאגתי שהיא לא תוכל למצוא אותנו. בגטבורג אמרו לנו שתכף נפגוש אותה, והתרגשתי מאוד".
סבדאני בהפגנה של המוג'הדין ח'לק ב-2005
בפועל, היא מספרת, לא חיכתה לה אימה בשום מקום. "עמדנו ברציף של רכבת ובמקום אימא הופיעו שני זרים – אישה וגבר – והם אמרו לנו 'אנחנו מעכשיו ההורים שלהם'. מאותו רגע התחיל הסיוט". בני הזוג שלקחו את סבדאני ואחיה היו אנשי מוג'אהדין שחיו בשוודיה. בנוסף לסבדאני ואחיה, היה להם ילד משלהם והם הביאו אליהם הביתה עוד שני ילדים מתוך כ־200 ילדי מוג'אהדין שהגיעו לשוודיה.
סבדאני מספרת שלימים התגלגלה לידיה רשימה ובה מאות שמות של ילדים שהוצאו ממחנה "אשרף" בעיראק והועברו למדינות אחרות, ובהן גרמניה, הולנד, נורווגיה, קנדה וארה"ב. "למשפחה שהגעתי אליה הייתה מחויבת פוליטית לקחת ילדים", היא מספרת, "זה לא שהם אהבו ילדים או רצו אותנו. עברנו אצלם אינדוקטרינציה קשה ונאלצנו לעבוד כל הזמן בשירות הארגון".
סבדאני לא חשפה בריאיון עם "הארץ" וגם לא בספר שכתבה את זהות הוריה המאמצים בשוודיה. היא מספרת שבדומה למשפחות אחרות בחו"ל שהיו חברות במוג'אהדין חלק, גם היא ובני משפחתה האלה היו מגויסים לגמרי לשרת את ארגון האופוזיציה האיראני, ובין היתר עסקו בגיוס חברים וכספים, בארגון הפגנות, במאבק במתנגדים ובהצקה ובאיומים נגד מי שעזבו את הארגון.
סבדאני טוענת שבמוג'אהדין חלק עשו כל שביכולתם כדי למחוק את הזהות האיראנית של חבריו. "אנשי הארגון שנאו כל דבר איראני שלא היה קשור למוג'אהדין חלק, ונלחמו נגדו", היא מספרת. "נאסר עליהם, למשל, להאזין למוזיקה פרסית למעט זו שיצרו אנשי המוג'אהדין עצמם. "לא קראתי ספרים בפרסית, לא הייתה אצלנו תרבות פרסית", היא אומרת, "הכול היה כפוף לארגון, ומשפחת האומנה שלי עבדה בו במשרה מלאה".
לדברי סבדאני, התנהלות הארגון שמזכירה כת נמשכת עד היום. "למוג'אהדין חלק יש עדיין משרדים בכמה מדינות ונוכחות ברשתות החברתיות", היא אומרת. "יש לו למשל מפקדה בצרפת, ששוהים בה מנהיגים וחברים בארגון שכל חייהם מוקדשים לתנועה". סבדאני אומרת שמחנה הארגון באלבניה, "אשרף 3", משמש "חוות טרולים" שמייצרת חשבונות רבים ומפיצה תעמולה בפרסית ובאנגלית. "הם כותבים כתבות על עצמם, משמיצים את מתנגדיהם ויוצרים רושם שיש תמיכה בתנועה, למרות שאין להם שום תמיכה אמיתית", היא אומרת.
על פי הערכות, ארגון מוג'אהדין חלק מונה בין 2,500 ל־3,000 חברים. רובם עברו למחנה "אשרף 3" בשנים 2013 עד 2016 בתמיכת ארה"ב, האו"ם וממשלת אלבניה. המעבר ההמוני לאלבניה נעשה משום שלאחר נפילת סדאם חוסיין מהשלטון בעיראק, אנשי מוג'אהדין חלק כבר לא היו מוגנים במדינה. בשעתו נודע ארגון האופוזיציה בפיגועי טרור ובפגיעה במטרות של המשטר האיראני, ואילו כיום הפעילות שלו מתמקדת בעיקר בפן הפוליטי והתקשורתי. ועדיין, כפי שטוענת סבדאני, הוא מתנהל ככת סגורה ודכאנית. "זה מקום שהכניסה אליו והיציאה ממנו אינם חופשיים. בזמנו גם הוטלו עונשים פיזיים על אנשים שרצו לעזוב אותו, והיו כאלה שגם עברו עינויים", מספרת הפעילה החברתית ממוצא איראני.
"אני מכירה סיפורים על אנשים שנעלמו ועל חובת וידויים על בסיס יומיומי, על 'מחשבות מלוכלכות' ומעשים לא ראויים, למשל מחשבות מיניות ואוננות. אסור לך אפילו לחשוב על הילדים שלך או לדבר עם בני המין השני בלי אישור", היא מספרת. "כיום, כשיש רשתות חברתיות וסיפורים של פורשים, הארגון כבר לא יכול להרשות לעצמו להשתמש בשיטות כאלה".
עטיפת ספרה של סבדאני "ידי בידי" שיצא לאור ב־2024 צילום: Mili Malinovic
סבדאני אינה היחידה שמטיחה האשמות מסוג זה במוג'אהדין חלק. העיתון הצרפתי לה מונה ראיין ב־2024 פעילים שעזבו את הארגון וכיום חיים באירופה. אמיר ופא ואמין גולמרימי היו שניים מהם. ואפא סיפר שהוא וחבריו נאלצו להשתתף בכל שבוע בווידויים פומביים שבהם חויבו כולם לתאר את הפנטזיות המיניות שלהם. ועוד סיפר שקשרי החברות בתוך הארגון היו בפיקוח נוקשה. "אסור היה לאכול ארוחת צהריים עם אותו חבר פעמיים ברציפות", הוא אמר.
גולמרימי סיפר שבעימותים אלימים עם כוחות ביטחון עיראקיים ב־2011, שלחו אותו מנהיגי מוג'אהדין חלק עם חבריו לצאת "מול הכדורים של העיראקים כדי להעלות את מספר ההרוגים". הוא טען שהם עשו זאת כדי "להפעיל לחץ על אירופה ועל ארה"ב, שיסירו את הארגון מרשימת ארגוני הטרור ויסייעו בהעברת חבריו למדינה אחרת".
חבר אחר בארגון האופוזיציה האיראני, רזא טורבי, סיפר ללה מונד כי כשהיה בן 17 הוא היה חבר נלהב בארגון והוטלה עליו משימה לקבל את פניהם של מצטרפים חדשים צעירים. "המשימה שלנו הייתה לעשות להם שטיפת מוח, לגרום להם לשכוח את חייהם הקודמים ולהטמיע בהם את האידאולוגיה של מוג'אהדין חלק", הוא סיפר. "הייתי מסור לכך בלי עוררין". במבט לאחור אמר טורבי כי הוא סבור שגם הוא נפל קורבן למניפולציה, והביע חרטה על "הנזק שגרם מתוך מילוי תפקידיו".
זאת ועוד, דו"ח של ארגון זכויות האדם Human Rights Watch מ־2005, שהתבסס על ראיונות עומק עם פורשי הארגון, תיאר מציאות של מכות, התעללות מילולית ופסיכולוגית, וידויים בכפייה, איומים בהוצאה להורג ועינויים שבשני מקרים אף גרמו למוות.
"אם לוקחים למשל אנשים כמו אבא שלי, רואים אדם שנכנס לארגון כשהיה בן 20 וחי בו כל חייו", מספרת סבדאני. "הוא מעולם לא שילם חשבונות או חיפש עבודה, בהכול טיפל הארגון. הוא לא יודע איך לקנות כרטיס טיסה או לנהוג לקצה הרחוב. המוג'אהדין עשה אינפנטיליזציה לאנשים האלה, ואין מי שיטפל בהם אם הם יעזבו אותו".
סבדאני אומרת כי מוג'אהדין חלק הוא "תנועה של מבוגרים", כזאת שאין לה מצטרפים חדשים. "אבל הם משלמים לאנשים צעירים כדי שיפגינו. אם הולכים להפגנות של מוג'אהדין מוצאים שם פולנים ואוקראינים שאינם מדברים פרסית ושאין להם מושג על מה הם מפגינים, לצד שוודים שאין להם קשר לארגון אבל שילמו להם כדי שיצטרפו".
היא טוענת שהכסף לארגון האופוזיציה הגולה מגיע מתרומות, אבל לא כאלה שניתנו מרצון כפי שאפשר להניח. "ממה שראיתי, המונים משלמים למוג'אהדין מדי חודש בחודשו כדי שלא יציקו להם", אומרת סבדאני. "מדובר בהעברות כספים על בסיס קבוע, של איראנים בגלות שמפעילים עליהם תעמולה, חנופה ולחץ חברתי".
כספים אחרים, לדבריה, מגיעים לידי הארגון ממערכות רווחה במדינות בעולם, למשל למשפחות אומנה כמו זו שבה היא גדלה. "ויש גם תרומות פוליטיות וכספים של ארגוני זכויות אדם שמושפעים מהתעמולה ומהפעילות הפוליטית של הארגון". סבדאני מספרת שבמשך כל השנים שבהן חיה במשפחה אומנת בשוודיה, שוחחו היא ואחיה בטלפון עם אימה הביולוגית פעם בשנה – ובמשך חמש דקות בלבד. בכלל, היא מספרת, כשם שלא הייתה דרך לעזוב את מוג'אהדין חלק, לא הייתה לה אפשרות לעזוב את משפחת האומנה שלה, והיא חיה באיום מתמיד. "מגיל חמש עברתי במשפחת האומנה התעללות מינית, התעללות פיזית והתעללות נפשית", אומרת סבדאני, "אבל לא יכולתי להגיד כלום כי איימו להפריד אותי מהאחים שלי. הדבר הראשון שקרה לי במשפחת האומנה הוא שהאבא התחיל להביע עניין בגוף שלי ורצה שאעשה דברים בשבילו. הרגשתי שזה היה רע ומפחיד אבל לא ידעתי כלום על מין או מיניות. אחר כך זה נהיה רק יותר גרוע, וזה קרה גם עם אחי בעידוד אם המשפחה האומנת".
"לא הייתה לי ילדות, רק הישרדות", מתארת סבדאני את שנותיה הראשונות בשוודיה, שלטענתה היו רצופות עונשים, ניצול והונאה של רשויות הרווחה המקומיות. "אני הייתי זו שמנקה, שמסדרת, שצריכה להיות תלמידה טובה, וגם זו שיוצאת להפגנות ונוסעת לכנסים של מוג'אהדין בכל העולם".
בסופו של דבר, בבגרותה עזבה סבדאני את משפחת האומנה שלה. היא עברה להתגורר בבירה סטוקהולם, למדה הנדסה ועבדה בחברת מיקרוסופט. כיום היא נשואה ויש לה שלושה ילדים. גם אימה הביולוגית ואחיה עזבו את מוג'אהדין חלק ומתגוררים באירופה.לאחר משבר אישי קשה שעברה, החלה סבדאני לספר בפומבי על חייה בחסות ארגון האופוזיציה. ב־2024 היא הוציאה לאור את ספרה Min hand i min (בתרגום לעברית: "ידי בידי") בהוצאת הספרים Albert Bonniers Förlag. לצד הראיונות וההרצאות על עברה בארגון שנהפך למעין כת, הייתה סבדאני לפעילה חברתית ופוליטית בכל הקשור לנעשה באיראן. היא נחשבת למשל לתומכת בבנו של השאה לשעבר, רזא פהלווי, ואף פגשה אותו בכנס בפריז בהשתתפות ילדי מוג'אהדין אחרים.
סבדאני בפגישה עם בנו של השאה האיראני לשעבר רזא פהלווי בכנס של ילדי מוג'אהדין בפריז, בחודש שעבר צילום: Mili Malinovic
The weekly so-called pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Stockholm often include an element of street theatre. These street shows are usually extremely untasteful and they’re often defamatory. Some of the greatest hits include actors dressed as a blood-stained Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and KD party leader Ebba Busch holding a Falun sausage in an implied sexual position. There’s President Trump dressed as an SS officer, Prime Minister Kristersson dancing around with a dead baby, Netanyahu in devil horns, and characters wiping their behinds with an Israeli flag.
This weekend a new show hit the streets of Stockholm – a character who appears to be a religious Jew because of the kippah on his head holding a glass of blood beside a Palestinian woman being hanged. Those who follow Middle East politics were probably supposed to understand that the Jewish character is Israeli right-wing extremist minister Itamar Ben Gvir celebrating the legislation of the new Israeli death penalty law.
There’s a lot to be said about the Israeli law, but before that’s done the obvious should be pointed out. For those who don’t follow Middle East politics, what happened on Saturday is that Swedish police blocked streets, SL cancelled buses, and taxpayer money was spent in order to allow a group of activists to act out an antisemitic blood libel hundreds of years old, in which a Jew is using the blood of a non-Jewish innocent victim.
The activists will no doubt claim that their protest is legitimate. The character they acted is not all Jews, they’ll say, it’s only Ben Gvir, or only Israeli Jews, or only Zionists. However, the red-stained glass, the grotesque nature of the Jewish characteristics, and the timing make that claim laughable. The performance took place during Passover, the holiday that European Jews have been blamed since the Middle Ages for using Christian children’s blood for making their special holiday bread. The context of their other shows is that Israel controls the world, the American president and Sweden’s government are maneuvered by the Zionists – Israel’s Prime Minister and Jeffrey Epstein (both Jews of course). They relativize the Holocaust and they mock every Israeli symbol by attaching it to blood and money. Sure, they’re not antisemitic, just anti-Zionists. If anyone is so naive as to think that there’s a difference, perhaps they can explain it to Swedish Jewish children who may have passed by in central Stockholm and wondered why they’re being accused of hanging innocent Palestinians. Again.
Still, the new Israeli legislation deserves a serious discussion, even if those who demonstrated against it in Stockholm are on the wrong side of history. Israel’s new “death penalty for terrorists” law was passed in the Israeli parliament in March. The bill stipulates that the death penalty will be imposed on a terrorist who killed a person “with the intent of denying the existence of the State of Israel.” This wording creates a distinction that effectively designates the law almost exclusively for Palestinian terrorism. However, the court will be authorized to impose a life sentence instead of the death penalty if it finds “special reasons” for doing so or if “exceptional circumstances” are present.
It’s important to point out that the Israeli opposition voted against the law, and many in Israel hope that it will be cancelled if a new government takes over after the next elections. This may be the case because the law, which was pushed through by the most extreme Israeli politicians, was also opposed by other Israeli authorities. An official in the Ministry of Justice said that establishing the death penalty in the West Bank through civilian legislation is “highly problematic”. IDF representatives said that the law contradicts international conventions to which Israel is committed, and officials from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council opposed it.
The objections are not only technical. Israeli parliamentarian Gilad Kariv (The Democrats, former Labor Party) said that the law contradicts the values of the State of Israel and that it is disgraceful both in its substance and in the political manner in which it was approved. He also said that the party will bring the constitutional question before the High Court of Justice. This is an important point because the law is indeed expected to be reviewed by the High Court of Justice, and there is a possibility that it will be changed, amended, or cancelled.
However, apart from the extreme right, parts of Israeli society who used to be against such legislation in the past have become more positive towards it because of the 251 Israelis who were kidnapped on October 7th. They argue that many of the people who led and participated in the massacre, including Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, were prisoners who were released from Israeli jails. If they had been executed for their previous crimes, the most horrific crime in Israeli history could have been avoided. Perhaps the main point supporters of the law point to is the possibility of prisoner exchanges which in Israel’s reality have always been an incentive for Palestinian terrorists to commit more attacks. Capital punishment could, according to the law’s supporters, prevent future Israeli kidnapped civilians from being used as bargaining leverage.
Israeli security officials, including several chiefs of staff of the IDF and heads of the Shin Bet, Israel’s security agency, objected to this reasoning and claimed that terrorism is not meaningfully deterred by the threat of execution because attackers who carry out suicide or high-risk operations are often not motivated by personal survival. Increasing the severity of punishment does not change behavior. Instead, capital punishment could escalate tensions, increase incentives for revenge attacks, and complicate intelligence cooperation and prisoner-management strategies.
Other objections, made by Israeli NGOs, are purely ideological. The Zulat Institute for Human Rights, for example, stated that the legislation “is fundamentally based on racial discrimination, is illegitimate, and has existed in the darkest regimes of modern history.” This is, in short, a very controversial issue in Israel, in many ways it’s another part of the bloody aftermath of October 7th and the regional war that is still going on, and the last word hasn’t been said yet.
Back to Stockholm. Considering the complexities of the Israeli legislation isn’t high on the agenda of the Swedish activists. This is a classic situation of a clock being correct twice a day even if it stopped working. Yes, they’re entirely right in their objection to the Israeli death penalty, but they are the last people in the world to preach on this subject.
First, recently more and more Iranian flags are seen at their demonstrations. The regime in Teheran executes over 1,000 people a year. Still, in the Iranian example, Swedish activists prefer demonstrating in support of the bloodthirsty regime against the “imperialist American-Israeli attack” while conveniently ignoring the institutionalized public hangings of women, homosexuals and regime critics from cranes. Other countries which have had the death penalty for years, from the US, China, and Japan to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are never mentioned in any demonstration. Only Jewish executions, it seems, are morally wrong as far as they’re concerned.
Second, believe it or not, the Palestinian Authority, the same Palestinians the demonstrations are all about, has a death penalty law. In the West Bank it was used in the past and death sentences are not carried out in practice in recent years, but in Gaza, Palestinians have been executed by Hamas on a large scale, both officially and unofficially. Whoever is really worried about the legal execution of Palestinians should have been demonstrating against Hamas long before demonstrating against Israel.
And the finally, for many Israelis (including the one writing this text), the new law is a source of embarrassment and deep concern. It’s like many Swedes see things like NMR, or Swedish volunteers to the SS, or Swedish imams preaching about Jews engaging in black magic. The fact that in Israel a similar phenomenon is powerful enough to legislate is terrible. Still, the ones who will fix this are democratic and liberal Israelis, not a bunch of extremist wannabe actors from Sweden who believe that Israel never had a right to exist whether it has a death penalty law or not.
The Swedish discourse on the war in Iran has been dominated by the question of its legality. In recent weeks, international law scholars, academics, politicians, and columnists have explained why the American and Israeli attack is “illegal under international law.” There is much to say about this reasoning, but a reasonable question is what the point really is. In the real world, the legality of war matters very little, because international law, in general, has hardly had any real significance over the past decades.
The main reason is simply that it doesn't work. International law has been used by some of the world’s worst despots, from Gaddafi to Assad, to delay international action against their crimes, and when it was finally used for intervention—in many cases, it made the situation even worse and led to more violence and failed states.
International law has also given legitimacy to regimes such as Qatar and Somalia, which have gained seats on the UN Human Rights Council despite their total lack of such rights. Terrorist organizations have used it in their propaganda to avoid the consequences of their actions, and China’s and Russia’s veto rights in the UN Security Council ensure that aggressive dictators go unpunished.
“If the U.S. illegally invades other countries, Russia will do the same” is a common argument against the American offensive. But the truth is rather the opposite: Russia did not wait for the Americans to attack Georgia or Ukraine, and—like Turkey in Syria, Azerbaijan in Armenia, and Eritrea in Ethiopia—has ignored international law for decades. No country is waiting for Israel or the U.S. to legitimize their actions according to the “law of the jungle”.
For a country that has not been at war since 1814, the question of the legality of military interventions may seem like the most important one. Theoretically, even a superpower like the U.S. should be concerned with issues of limiting its global power. But for a country like Israel, which is constantly threatened by real enemies who want to annihilate it and kill its population, this question appears fairly academic.
There is, however, another question that from an Israeli perspective is extremely important. It is simple but crucial, and it should concern other countries as well—it is not whether the war is legal, but whether it is effective. Or more broadly: can military power by itself solve Israel’s problems with Iran and other enemies?
“When all you have is a hammer,” as the well-known saying goes, “every problem looks like a nail.” Israel undoubtedly has a powerful hammer. Could it be that the country has become accustomed to solving all its problems with it? Previously, Israel used many forms of power to strengthen its security and international standing. Diplomats engaged in creating complex alliances, its soft power included outstanding achievements in culture, art, agriculture, science, and technology, and governments were willing to participate in peace negotiations and consider compromises.
The Hamas massacre on October 7 and Iran’s persistence in combining nuclear ambitions with threats to wipe Israel off the map changed all of this. The Israeli foreign service has been marginalized; the country’s artists and scientists are boycotted around the world, and its enemies are blown to pieces rather than invited to ceremonies on the White House lawn. Considering that many of Israel’s enemies are ruthless killers, this is hardly surprising. Anyone who sees value in human life should not shed tears for people like Hassan Nasrallah, Yahya Sinwar, and Ali Khamenei. But do military operations improve reality if they are not accompanied by other measures such as diplomacy, economic development, and new creative political alliances? This is not only an Israeli question. A new world order is taking shape before our eyes, and if we are not heading toward total anarchy, the question of limiting military power and understanding what it can and cannot achieve is crucial.
One indication is the situation in Gaza. After more than two years of extensive military force and enormous destruction, the reality is that Hamas not only still exists, it is armed and controls many state functions. In Lebanon, Israel may have achieved significant military successes against Hezbollah, but the Israeli are still spending far too much time in bomb shelters, and despite everything, Hezbollah is still alive and kicking. Both militarily and politically.
Israelis are once again deprived of basic necessities—schools are closed, workplaces shut down, flights canceled, thousands have lost relatives, been forced from their homes, and suffered injuries and trauma. Not to mention that Israel is deeply divided on issues concerning its democracy, which can only be resolved when the shooting stops. Meanwhile, Israel has also, without justification, become the punching bag of the international community. All the world’s power seems to be of little use in solving this.
And then there is Iran. Now that the war has begun, it should, for the sake of both Iranians and Israelis, end with a regime change—and no regime change is possible without the use of force. The Iranian people themselves, who ultimately must liberate themselves, have asked for foreign intervention, and giving it to them is the right thing to do. But what then?
“From the moment we decided that only here, in the land of Israel, could the Jewish state arise, we accepted that more than a hundred million people from the Arab world, from the Arab nations, and from the Palestinians would be our neighbors,” said Israel’s former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin a few years before he was assassinated in 1995. “There are now only two possibilities: either a serious and determined effort is made to achieve peace—peace and security—or the sword will always rule.” In the 1990s, Rabin chose the first option, but since then, leaders across the region, including Israeli leaders, have developed a dependence on using force. Perhaps even an adiction.
When the war in Iran is over, Israel will face a choice. Previously, the country combined pragmatic diplomacy, careful alliance-building, and visionary openings toward the Arab world. In a region like the Middle East, this is risky. Israel will always need to keep a sword ready, but with security guarantees and economic support instead of anachronistic laws and self-righteous moralism from other countries, peace may once again become an option.
אחרי מלחמת העולם השנייה הוקמו באירופה רשתות סודיות שנועדו להוביל את ההתנגדות במקרה שהסובייטים יכבשו את היבשת. כעת עולה הטענה שאחת מהן היתה מעורבת ברצח אולוף פלמה.
בשישי בערב, 28 בפברואר 1986, יצא ראש ממשלת שוודיה אולוף פלמה עם רעייתו ליסבת לסרט קולנוע במרכז סטוקהולם. זה היה ערב חורפי קר בבירה הסקנדינבית, ופלמה שיחרר את מאבטחיו כפי שעשה פעמים רבות בעבר. בני הזוג נסעו שלוש תחנות ברכבת התחתית ומחוץ לקולנוע פגשו את בנם מורטן בן ה–25 ואת בת זוגו. הם קנו כרטיסים ונכנסו פנימה. זה היה הדבר האחרון שפלמה עשה בחייו.
מעט אחרי השעה 23:20, כשצעדו חזרה לביתם לאורך רחוב ראשי במרכז העיר, התקרב אליהם אדם מאחור וירה באקדח מטווח קצר. פלמה נפגע ונפל על המדרכה הקפואה. ירייה שנייה פצעה את אשתו. עוברי אורח ניסו להגיש עזרה אך ללא הועיל. פלמה מת במקום.
השעות שלאחר מכן היו דרמטיות. ידיעות על הרצח התפרסמו בתקשורת, המדינה נכנסה לכוננות, וסגן ראש הממשלה, אינגבר קארלסון, כינס את השרים. בהמשך, בחמש בבוקר, כונסה מסיבת עיתונאים, דגלים הורדו לחצי התורן, פרחים ונרות הונחו במקום הרצח ותחושה של אבל לאומי ומשבר עמוק התפשטה בשוודיה.
מבחינת חקירת הרצח נעשו כל הטעויות האפשריות. האדם שירה בפלמה נמלט מהמקום. המשטרה לא הקימה מחסומים ולא סגרה את האזור. התיאום בין הכוחות בשטח היה לקוי, לא הוקם מרכז בקרה וגביית העדויות לא היתה יסודית ושיטתית. את הטעויות האלו איש לא הצליח לתקן. למרות עשרות חשודים, חקירות מפותלות וחשוד אחד שהורשע וזוכה בערעור, הרצח נותר עד היום בלתי מפוענח. אבל כעת חוקרים ועיתונאים סבורים כי יש לחקור את האפשרות שמאחורי ההדק לא עמד אדם בודד, אלא ארגון מחתרתי שפעל בצללים עמוק בתוך החברה השוודית.
בשנים שאחרי הרצח הושקעו משאבים רבים בחקירתו. תחילה התמקדה החקירה בארגון ה–PKK הכורדי. לאחר מכן הועלו השערות לגבי מעורבות של מדינות שונות, בהן דרום אפריקה (פלמה פעל רבות נגד משטר האפרטהייד). נבדקה גם האפשרות שמדובר בארגוני טרור מהמזרח התיכון או ממזרח אירופה. ב–1988 הורשע ברצח עבריין מקומי בשם כריסטר פטרסון, בעיקר על בסיס זיהוי מעורר מחלוקת של ליסבת פלמה, אך הוא זוכה שנה לאחר מכן בערעור מחוסר ראיות.
ביוני 2020, 34 שנים אחרי הרצח, הודיעה התביעה שהחשוד ברצח הוא אדם בשם סטיג אנגסטרום, שנכח לכאורה בזירה בליל הירי והתראיין לתקשורת כעד לרצח. אנגסטרום מת בשנת 2000 ולכן לא ניתן היה להעמידו לדין. בדצמבר 2025 הודיעה התביעה שבחינה מחודשת של חומר החקירה הובילה למסקנה שאין די ראיות נגד אנגסטרום.
"החוקרים חשדו כל הזמן שאנגסטרום לא פעל לבדו", אומר גונאר ואל, עיתונאי וסופר שהקדיש שנים למחקר על הרצח וכתב כמה ספרים בנושא. ואל מבסס את דבריו על ראיונות שקיים עם החוקרים עצמם ועם עדים נוספים, ועל עיון במסמכים, דוחות וחומרי חקירה רבים. "ההשערה המרכזית שלהם היתה שפעילים של רשת שוודית סודית עמדו מאחורי הרצח והם ניסו לקשור את אנגסטרום לגורמים האלו", הוא אומר. "כשלא הצליחו לעשות זאת, הם זנחו את ההשערה בדבר קנוניה ואנגסטרום נותר החשוד היחיד. חמש שנים מאוחר יותר, כיוון שהראיות נגדו היו חלשות, זה הסתיים ללא הרשעה וללא חשוד".
ראיות חותכות שקושרות בין רשת סודית לרצח אמנם אין, אך קיומה של רשת חשאית שעשויה היתה לרצות במותו של פלמה נראה כיום כאפשרות סבירה. במשך עשורים, הרחק מעיני הציבור, פעלו בשוודיה ובמדינות אחרות רשתות סודיות שנקראו "Stay Behind". הרשתות האלו הוקמו בעקבות לקחי מלחמת העולם השנייה, מתוך מחשבה לאפשר למדינה שנכבשה להתנגד לכובש באמצעות פעילות מחתרתית, קיום קשר עם ממשלה גולה והתנגדות אקטיבית מבפנים.
השם Stay Behind הוא העיקרון המכונן — הישארות מאחורי קווי האויב ומאבק מתוך האזור הכבוש. הרשתות הללו חיברו בין כוחות צבא, משטרה, ארגוני מודיעין וחברה אזרחית. הכוונה הראשונית היתה להיערך לפלישה רוסית, אך עם השנים חלק מהרשתות החלו לקיים פעילות נוספת שחרגה מהסתרת נשק ואימוני גרילה. יש הטוענים שפעילות זו כללה גם פעילות בתוך המדינה נגד כוחות פרו־סובייטיים ואפילו פעילויות False Flag, כלומר ביצוע פעולה עוינת תוך הפללה של גורם אחר כדי להצדיק תגובה צבאית או פוליטית נגדו.
הדוגמה הידועה ביותר היא הרשת האיטלקית "גלאדיו", שנחשפה ב–1990 בנאום ראש ממשלת איטליה ג'וליו אנדראוטי בפרלמנט. ועדות חקירה פרלמנטריות בדקו את פעילות הרשת ואת קשריה עם שירותי מודיעין זרים כמו ה–CIA ונאט"ו. הוועדות חשפו שהרשת קיימה אימוני גרילה, בנתה תשתיות קשר, מודיעין וחבלה, איחסנה נשק ושיתפה פעולה עם ארגונים זרים. מעבר לכך עלה חשד שחלק מאנשי הרשת פעלו גם בזירה הפנימית, בין השאר במעורבות בפעולות טרור רבות נפגעים בשנות ה–70 וה–80 כדי לחזק את הימין האיטלקי ולהטיל את האשמה על השמאל.
רשתות דומות נחשפו גם בבלגיה ובשווייץ. בצרפת ובגרמניה נמצאו עדויות לקיומן של רשתות Stay Behind, אם כי לא הוכח כי נקטו פעולות אלימות כלשהן. גם ביוון ובטורקיה עלו השערות לגבי מעורבות של רשתות אלו בקשירת קשר להפיכות צבאיות ולאלימות פוליטית.
ביוני 2020, 34 שנים אחרי הרצח, הודיעה התביעה שהחשוד ברצח הוא אדם בשם סטיג אנגסטרום, שנכח לכאורה בזירה בליל הירי והתראיין לתקשורת כעד לרצח. אנגסטרום מת בשנת 2000 ולכן לא ניתן היה להעמידו לדין. בדצמבר 2025 הודיעה התביעה שבחינה מחודשת של חומר החקירה הובילה למסקנה שאין די ראיות נגד אנגסטרום.
בשוודיה עצמה, אחרי שנים של שמועות והכחשות רשמיות לגבי קיומה של הרשת, הופיע ב–2013 מאמר באחד העיתונים החשובים במדינה, "Dagens Nyheter", שכתבה אינגה־בריט אלניוס, עובדת ציבור שוודית ששירתה במשרד האוצר, במשרד הביקורת הלאומי ובאו"ם.
אלניוס ביקשה לשפוך אור על הרשת, שהוזכרה בעבר בשורה של מחקרים וטקסטים של עיתונאים והיסטוריונים. אחד החשובים שבהם הוא מיקאל הולמסטרום, עיתונאי בכיר שעוסק בענייני צבא, ביטחון ומודיעין, שחשף את קיומה של הרשת השוודית. פרטים נוספים הופיעו בממואר של ראש ממשלת שוודיה לשעבר טאגה ארלנדר. אולם לפי אלניוס, "חשיפת רשתות ה–Stay Behind עדיין מטופלת יותר כסיפור הרפתקאות רומנטי של סוכנים מאשר כעובדה היסטורית מבוססת". לכן, לדבריה, החליטה להביא לידיעת הציבור את קיומה של "תנועת התנגדות חשאית שהוקמה בשוודיה, תוך קשרים הדוקים עם המעצמות המערביות".
"הדבר לא נעשה ביוזמת הממשלה כמוסד רשמי", כתבה, "אך ככל הנראה ביוזמתו של ראש הממשלה טאגה ארלנדר (קודמו של אולוף פלמה — ד.ס), לצד כמה שרים נוספים. בראש הרשת עמד בתחילה אלוואר לינדנקרונה, שבחייו האזרחיים היה מנכ"ל חברת הביטוח Thule. תחתיו פעלו שלושה ראשי מחלקות וכמה תאים ברחבי המדינה. הפגישות של הרשת התקיימו בחדר סודי בביתו של לינדנקרונה, במשרד חשאי בבניין חברת הביטוח, או במקומות מסתור בבתי הקיץ של המנהיגים. המימון הגיע ממקורות חשאיים.
"בניגוד למקומות אחרים ולמרות שיתוף הפעולה עם גורמים אמריקאיים, הרשת השוודית היתה התארגנות מקומית", טוען ד"ר מאטס דלנד, היסטוריון באוניברסיטת מרכז שוודיה בסונדסוואל. "שוודיה לא השתתפה במלחמת העולם השנייה, והיא יכלה ללמוד מהפלישה הנאצית לנורבגיה ב–1940. הנורבגים הטביעו את הבליכר, אחת האוניות הגרמניות שהיו בדרכן לכיבוש הבירה הנורבגית. זה עיכב את הכובשים, גרם להם אבידות קשות ואיפשר לנורבגים לפנות את משפחות המלוכה והממשלה צפונה. בשוודיה למדו מהניסיון הנורבגי, והרעיון היה להקים ארגון שיוכל לפנות את משפחת המלוכה ואת הממשלה. הם למדו גם ממה שקרה ברוסיה כאשר אנשי ה–NKVD, שירות הביטחון הסובייטי בימי סטלין, הפכו לפרטיזנים באזורי הכיבוש הגרמני".
אם כך, במקרה השוודי, לא ניתן לדבר על שליטה של האמריקאים או של נאט"ו ברשת?
"נכון. האמריקאים הגיעו קצת אחרי שהרשת הוקמה, וגם אז הם לא השתלטו עליה, אלא שילבו את הצרכים שלהם שנבעו מהדוקטרינה של נאט"ו. הדוקטרינה התבססה על כך שבמקרה של פלישה סובייטית היה צורך שמטוסים אמריקאיים יטוסו מעל שוודיה. הרעיון היה, בדומה למחתרת הצרפתית — ובמידה מסוימת גם למחתרות הבלגית וההולנדית — ליצור נתיבי מילוט שיוכלו להבריח החוצה אנשי צוות שמטוסיהם הופלו. אבל ארה"ב לא הקימה את הרשת ולא ניהלה אותה. ייתכן שהדבר השתנה ב–1965 כאשר שירותי הביטחון השוודיים התארגנו מחדש, ייתכן שהמעורבות האמריקאית התגברה אז".
עד כמה נשלטה רשת Stay Behind השוודית על ידי המדינה ועד כמה התנהלה על ידי גורמים אזרחיים או צבאיים ללא ידיעה או שליטה של הדרג הפוליטי?
"בין 1947 ל–1951 היו ברשת הרבה מתנדבים, ביניהם אנשים ששירתו לצד הגרמנים במלחמת העולם השנייה, חלקם אנשים בעייתיים מאוד. בגלל הטיפוסים האלו, המשטרה החשאית (SÄPO) גילתה על קיום הרשת. רק המעורבים עצמם, ראש הממשלה ארלנדר ואנשים אחדים ממערכת הביטחון היו אמורים להיות שותפי סוד. בעקבות הגילוי הזה, שהכעיס מאוד את ארלנדר ומערכת הביטחון, היתה התארגנות מחדש, ובמקום הגורמים הבעייתיים הצטרפו לרשת אנשי האיגודים המקצועיים והמגזר העסקי. כך הובלה הרשת על ידי אנשים כמו מנהל חברת הביטוח אלוואר לינדנקרונה, איש עסקים בעל השקפות חברתיות פרוגרסיביות למדי לזמנו, וגויסו אליה כוחות מקרב האיגודים המקצועיים שתמיד היו קרובים למפלגת השלטון הסוציאל־דמוקרטית. בספר שיצא לאחרונה התפרסם מסמך מעניין —החלטת הממשלה משנות ה–50 שמצביעה על כך שהרשת היא חוקית ורשמית. גם היומנים של ראש הממשלה טאגה ארלנדר מצביעים על כך שהוא אישר את העניין כבר ב–1947".
הספר שדלנד מתייחס אליו הוא ספרו של יוהאן ונסטרום "Sveriges sak var vår: den hemliga svenska motståndsrörelsen" (עניינה של שוודיה היה ענייננו: תנועת ההתנגדות השוודית הסודית). ונסטרום קורא לארגון ה–Stay Behind השוודי "תנועת התנגדות", והוא מגלה שהשם האמיתי של הארגון, זה שהיה בשימוש של חבריו בזמן אמת, היה "מטרו".
על פי ונסטרום, מטרו לא הוקמה, לא נשלטה ולא עבדה עבור נאט"ו, אך הוא מאשר שהיה שיתוף פעולה עם ה–MI6 ובמידה מסוימת עם ה–CIA. בעיקר סביב תוכניות כמו פינוי מקבלי ההחלטות השוודים לאנגליה במקרה הצורך. על פי ונסטרום, הארגון כלל ככל הנראה כמה מאות אנשים וגם מעין "ארגון לוחם בלתי נראה" שיכול היה לכלול כ–3,000 בני אדם ושהתבסס על כך שחברי מטרו נדרשו במקרה הצורך לגייס חברים נוספים מסביבתם הקרובה.
ונסטרום מראה שמבנה הארגון היה קואופרטיבי למדי עם נציגות של מגזרים שונים של החברה השוודית, והפצת המידע בו היתה על בסיס "נדרש לדעת בלבד". הארגון הפך לרשמי עם החלטת הממשלה מ–1955 ופעילויותיו הטיפוסיות היו התארגנות להתנגדות והגנה אזרחית דוגמת מיפוי דרכי מילוט, היערכות לפיצוץ תשתיות מרכזיות, חילוץ אנשי ממשל ואחסון נשק. ונסטרום לא יודע לומר מתי הארגון הפסיק להתקיים ואם הוא קיים גם היום.
כאשר מדובר במדינות אחרות שהיו בהן רשתות Stay Behind, ברור גם מספרו של ונסטרום וגם ממקורות אחרים שהטרוגניות היא מילת המפתח. כל מדינה בנתה את הרשת שלה בצורה שונה בהתאם לתפיסת האיום, למערכת הפוליטית ולסטטוס הפוליטי שלה. גם במדינות שהיו חברות בנאט"ו, הרשתות לא היו בהכרח תחת שליטה מלאה של נאט"ו. הפיקוח הפרלמנטרי או הציבורי היה מינימלי בכל המדינות, וישנם סימני שאלה וחילוקי דעות לגבי המעורבות של הרשתות בפעילות פנימית שחורגת מהיערכות לפלישה סובייטית.
הסופר והחוקר השווייצרי דניאל גנסר חשף את הרשתות שפעלו ברחבי אירופה. בספרו מעורר המחלוקת מ–2005, "NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe" (הצבאות הסודיים של נאט"ו: מבצע גלאדיו וטרור במערב אירופה), הוא עוסק ברשתות שקמו באיטליה, בלגיה, צרפת, גרמניה, שווייץ, הולנד וטורקיה. דלנד עבד יחד עם גנסר על הגרסה השוודית של ספרו, והגרסה כוללת גם פרק על הקשר האפשרי לרצח אולוף פלמה.
האם ראש הממשלה אולוף פלמה הכיר את הרשת?
דלנד: "אנחנו יודעים שהוא הכיר אותה בתקופתו של קודמו, טאגה ארלנדר, כי הוא עסק בזה כאחד מאנשיו של ארלנדר בשנות ה–50. מה הוא ידע אחר כך, אנחנו לא יודעים בוודאות. אפשר להניח שכל ראשי הממשלה הכירו את הרשת, אם כי אין מסמכים רשמיים בנושא".
מתי החלו החשדות בדבר קשר בין הרשת לבין רצח אולוף פלמה?
"אלו חשדות שעלו כבר בהתחלה. היה כיוון בדיקה כזה כחלק מהחקירה הרשמית והיו גם דיבורים על גורמים מתוך המשטרה בסטוקהולם שיכולים היו להיות מעורבים ברצח".
לעתים קשה לדעת אם עובדה שמתגלה בחקירה היא מפתח לפיצוח תעלומת רצח או סתם צירוף מקרים. החשוד האחרון ברצח אולוף פלמה, סטיג אנגסטרום, כונה "איש סקנדיה" מכיוון שעבד בבניין ששמו היה בניין סקנדיה. שם כזכור התקיימו גם פגישותיה של הרשת הסודית. האם זהו צירוף מקרים, והאם למרות שאין ראיות לכך שאנגסטרום קשור לרשת יש היגיון בטענה שהרשת עצמה קשורה לרצח פלמה?
ואל איננו חד־משמעי בעניין זה. אך הוא מצביע על נקודות מפתח היסטוריות שכדאי להביא בחשבון כשחושבים על סיבות לרצח של פלמה. "בזמן כהונתו השנייה של פלמה כראש ממשלה בשנות ה–80 היו כמה תקריות חדירה של צוללות, לכאורה סובייטיות, למים הטריטוריאליים של שוודיה", הוא אומר. "תקריות אלו עוררו משבר ביטחוני חמור והיו שטענו שאלו הכנות לפלישה ולהכנת תשתיות של ריגול. בממסד הביטחוני השוודי היו טענות על כך שפלמה לא לוקח את האיום ברצינות ושלכן הוא מהווה איום ביטחוני על שוודיה.
מעבר לכך, באפריל 1986 פלמה היה אמור לנסוע למוסקבה כדי להיפגש עם מנהיג ברה"מ, מיכאיל גורבצ'וב. פלמה צידד בפירוק נשק ובפירוז גרעיני ומתנגדיו טענו שהיו לו קשרים קרובים מדי עם ברית המועצות. הרצח ב–28 בפברואר 1986 גרם לכך שהמנהיג השוודי שפגש את גורבצ'וב היה מחליפו של פלמה, אינגבר קארלסון".
ואל מספר גם על עדויות של אנשים שטענו שקיבלו הצעה לרצוח את ראש הממשלה, ובכמה מקרים טענו ששירותי המודיעין השוודיים עמדו מאחוריהן. עם זאת, בידיו של ואל ישנם גם מסמכים רשמיים המעידים על כך שבליל הרצח נכחו בזירה אנשים עם מכשירי קשר שלא זכו ליחס רציני מצד החוקרים. הוא אינו טוען שיש הוכחות לכך שהרצח אורגן על ידי גורמים פוליטיים, אבל טוען שזה בהחלט נתיב ששווה חקירה רצינית.
והוא לא היחיד. לקראת יום השנה ה–40 לרצח עולים יותר ויותר קולות שדנים ברצינות באפשרות שכוחות שונים בשוודיה היו מעוניינים בהסתלקותו של פלמה מהזירה הפוליטית ויכולים היו להיות מעורבים ברצח. מאמרים בעיתונות, פודקאסטים וספרים חדשים מתפרסמים בנושא זה, ובניגוד לעבר, התזה על קשר אפשרי לרשת Stay Behind אינה נדחית אוטומטית כהזויה ומופרכת.
לאחרונה אף התפרסמה פנייה ציבורית המיועדת לעודד את ממשלת שוודיה ואת הפרלמנט להקים "ועדת אמת" בנושא שתפתור סוף־סוף את התעלומה. "ב–28 בפברואר 1986 נפל אולוף פלמה קורבן למתקפה ברוטלית ברחוב פתוח במרכז סטוקהולם", נאמר בפנייה. "הרצח של ראש ממשלת שוודיה היה התקפה ייחודית על הדמוקרטיה שלנו. במדינת חוק כמו שוודיה היה צריך לעשות הכל כדי לפתור את הרצח הזה. המצב שבו הרצח עדיין לא נפתר, 40 שנה לאחר מכן, הוא בלתי מקובל, במיוחד כאשר לא נבדקו כל האפשרויות למציאת פתרון בלתי מעורער ומוחלט".
בהמשך מצוינות בעיות שמונעות את גילוי האמת — ארכיונים חסויים, תשובות שקריות שניתנו לחוקרי הרצח על ידי אנשי השירותים החשאיים ותיקי חקירה שנעלמו. גם המעורבות האפשרית של רשת Stay Behind השוודית מוזכרת. "זהו הרצח היחיד של מנהיג פוליטי באירופה המודרנית שעלול להישאר לא מפוענח", נכתב בסיום הפנייה. "הבהרת כל הנסיבות סביב רצח אולוף פלמה תחזק את שוודיה".
Norwegian police said they are searching for suspects and added that they were reinforcing security measures to protect both the Iranian diaspora and the Norway's Jewish communities
The U.S. embassy in Oslo was hit by a loud explosion overnight into Sunday, causing minor damage but not injuries, Norwegian police said, as the justice minister said a thorough investigation had been launched. The blast at the embassy compound in western Oslo occurred at around 1 A.M. local time, sending thick smoke into the street by the entrance of the consular section, eyewitnesses said.
The explosion was caused by some sort of incendiary device, Oslo police representative Frode Larsen said during a news conference Sunday. Investigators believe the embassy was the target and are searching for one or more potential perpetrators and their motive. Justice Minister Astri Aas-Hansen added they had deployed "considerable resources" to the investigation.
"One of our hypothesis is that this is terrorism, but we are also exploring other options," Larsen later told public broadcaster NRK. Police added that they were reinforcing security measures to protect both the Iranian diaspora and the country's Jewish communities. "This is an unacceptable incident that is being treated with the utmost seriousness," said Astri Aas-Hansen, Norway's justice and public security minister. "The police have stated that they are investigating the case with significant resources, and that nothing indicates the situation poses any danger to the public," she said.
PST, the Norwegian police security service, called in additional personnel following the incident but has not changed the country's terror threat level, according to communication adviser Martin Bernsen. The blast occurred at the entry to the consular section, Oslo police said, and witnesses said the entrance had been damaged.
"There was a very thick layer of smoke on the street," said Sebastian Toerstad, 18, a high school student who drove past the embassy at the time of the explosion. "There was some damage to the entrance," he added. Police said no further explosive devices had been found in the area. "Investigations have been carried out at the scene with the aid of dogs, drones and a helicopter, searching for one or more potential perpetrators," the Oslo police department said in a statement.
The U.S. Embassy in Oslo referred media queries to the U.S. State Department, which did not immediately return a request for comment. Nor did Oslo police. Other details were not available.
Leif Knutsen, a Norwegian Jewish activist and chairman of the newly founded Jewish Community of Norway umbrella organization, said security around Jewish institutions across Norway has been elevated since October 7. Knutsen noted that armed police with assault rifles have been stationed around the synagogues in Oslo and Trondheim and near the Israeli embassy.
The local Jewish community generally trusts the Norwegian Police Security Service, known as PST, and cooperation between security services and Jewish institutions is strong, according to Knutsen. He said, however, that many people feel more vulnerable on their way to and from synagogues, when they "become visible" outside the protected perimeter.
He expressed that the broader concern is what the situation represents. "What's wrong with a society when its most heavily guarded and fortified installations are not government offices or military bases, but two synagogues and the embassy of a country that Norway is supposed to have a friendly relationship with?" Knutsen said, adding that the situation was "unsustainable" in the long term.
דיויד סטברו 