I Served in the IDF — Come and Get Me!

A former Left Party MP wrote that 150 Swedish citizens who served in Israel’s military have participated in genocide. They, and others who support them, she continued, are “allowed to live among us”. I served in the Israel Defense Forces myself. Here is why I refuse to be ashamed of my service.

Originally published in Kvartal: Jag har tjänstgjort i IDF – kom och ta mig! – Kvartal

Article photograph
Photo: Private, Jehad Alshrafi/AP/TT. Collage: Felice Larsson/Kvartal.

It seems that the winning side in Sweden’s election has already identified the country’s real problems. Issues such as schools, healthcare and unemployment can wait, but when it comes to the enormous threat apparently posed by Israel’s relations with the EU, something must be done immediately.

Before a new government has even been formed, the Social Democrats have thrown themselves into the issue of the EU’s Association Agreement with Israel, and the new majority has agreed that Sweden should push to suspend its trade provisions.

But that is not enough for the Left Party. Its Member of the European Parliament, Hanna Gedin, has joined Nordic colleagues in writing to the EU’s foreign policy chief, demanding that member states be urged to investigate possible war crimes committed by European citizens who have served in the IDF. Gedin is worried about Israelis walking freely on Europe’s streets. She points to a precedent: “Eurojust has explicitly established that EU citizens who fought for the Islamic State can be held accountable for war crimes and genocide.” In her view, Israel’s military and ISIS deserve the same treatment.

Other parts of the Left Party are equally enthusiastic about going after Israeli soldiers. At the party’s Greater Stockholm district annual conference in 2025, one member proposed a campaign against Israeli soldiers in Sweden. According to the motion, service in the Israeli army should provoke disgust and rejection, both personally and at the societal level. Ahead of the 2026 party congress, another member proposed designating the IDF as a terrorist organization, so that its members could be prosecuted even without concrete evidence of war crimes. The proposals were not adopted, but their wording reveals that, for these activists, the problem is not what an individual Israeli has done, but that the person served in Israel’s armed forces.

Former Left Party MP Lorena Delgado Varas put it even more clearly. Following reports that 150 Swedish citizens had served in the IDF, she wrote on Facebook: “So there are 150 Swedish citizens who have participated in genocide, and many more who have probably known about it and supported it. And they are allowed to live among us as if nothing had happened”. No investigations or verdicts are needed here. Even people alleged to have known about or supported what happened are included. “We must not accept genocidaires walking free, without consequences”, she concluded, without explaining what she means by “genocidaires” or what consequences she thinks should befall them. Is that a threat?

It is probably pointless to reason with political fanatics. But for everyone else, we need to clarify a few concepts. The IDF is the armed forces of an internationally recognized state whose population has repeatedly been subjected to wars, rocket attacks and terrorism, including by fascist, Islamist and fundamentalist organizations and states. Israel, like many other countries, has compulsory military service. An Israeli eighteen-year-old who refuses to report for duty without a legal exemption can be convicted for doing so. Anyone who commits war crimes must, of course, be investigated and, where the evidence is sufficient, prosecuted. But military service is not evidence of criminality. Defending one’s country’s right to exist, serving in Gaza or taking part in a war is not, in itself, a war crime.

Would the same activists demand that Swedish citizens who served in the armed forces of the United States, Ukraine, Iraq or Somalia be catalogued as potential war criminals? The Left Party has indeed called for suspected war crimes in other countries to be investigated, but that is something quite different from casting suspicion on people solely because they served in a country’s armed forces. I have not found any comparable demands to catalogue former American, Ukrainian, Iraqi or Somali soldiers. This special treatment appears to be reserved for the Jewish state.

In the SVT documentary The World’s Most Hated?, representatives of the London-based Declassified UK are given considerable airtime. One says: “You could be living next door to a war criminal, taking the Underground or a bus with someone involved in the systematic destruction of an occupied people”. The association is hard to miss: people who have served in the Israeli army are portrayed as a potential threat in our midst. The same speaker says it does not matter whether the person has even been to Gaza; he must prove his innocence because “a soldier can be guilty simply by enlisting”.

It is somewhat unclear why SVT presents him as a journalist rather than an activist. But the film shows what happens when a group is subjected to collective suspicion. Israeli tourists are thrown out of restaurants and shops, spat at, disinvited from universities and cultural events, and threatened with legal action. Does anyone recognize the pattern? It does not matter whether the individuals have actually committed a crime. So-called pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Sweden and other countries have already adopted “Death, death to the IDF” as a popular slogan. Do they mean all IDF soldiers, past and present? Is the death threat a metaphor? Delgado Varas has the answer: the problem is not just those who have “participated in genocide,” but “many more who have known about it and supported it”.

So let me make things easy for her, for the activists, and for Social Democrats who intend to make themselves dependent on the Left Party’s support. I want to save you the cost of intelligence gathering and digging through old records. I am coming forward voluntarily. I served in the IDF. It was in the 1990s, but compromising photographs are available. Here's one. I am Israeli and a Zionist. Come and get me!

David Stavrou as an IDF soldier
David Stavrou as an IDF soldier in the mid-1990s. Photo: Private.

I have no intention of denying my identity just because life happened to bring me to Sweden. I understand that some people would prefer their Jews to be anti-Zionist, apologetic and perpetually ashamed. Unfortunately, I cannot provide the goods. I grew up where buses were blown up, people were torn to bits in restaurants and caffes and rockets struck people’s homes. When I came of age, I performed my compulsory military service. I committed no war crimes. I murdered no children. But neither did I believe that my country, my family or my fellow human beings had any moral obligation to voluntarily allow themselves to be killed.

There are good reasons to scrutinize Israel’s conduct of war and criticize its government. Turning nationality or past military service into evidence of criminality, however, is something entirely different. When you speak of people who are “allowed to live among us,” you have already made up your mind.

The October 7 Election Is a Battle for Israel’s Soul

For Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, October 7 is not about learning lessons and making improvements — but rather about placing the blame on the military.

Originally published in Svenska Dagbladet: Valet i Israel är ett slag om landets själ | David Stavrou | SvD Ledare

He has dominated Israeli politics for three decades. Few contemporary democratic leaders have accumulated as much experience and political skill as Benjamin Netanyahu. In Israel’s October 27 election, he is running for a seventh term as Prime Minister. But the question is, beyond the desire to hold on to power, does he have a clear plan for Israel, and in what direction does he want to take the country?

On this question, Israelis are deeply divided. Netanyahu’s critics see a skilled tactician whose main objective is political survival and who is now also trying to shape his legacy as what he himself calls “Israel’s defender.” They also argue that his political calculations cannot be separated from the ongoing corruption trial, which has now lasted six years. Netanyahu, who maintains that the charges are politically motivated, turns 77 a few days before the election and has also suffered from both cancer and heart problems. If he wins the election, it will become increasingly difficult to bring the trial to a conclusion.

His supporters, by contrast, see a leader with a long-term vision who has transformed Israel’s position in the Middle East and who has a clear strategy. In foreign policy, it's all about preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Domestically, it's about reshaping institutions that limit political power, above all the judiciary – the Supreme Court and State Prosecution, and the established media.

A couple of decades ago, Netanyahu was still a classic right-wing politician — hawkish on defense, neoliberal and conservative. Something like a Middle Eastern Margaret Thatcher. Today he is more of a populist, and his former allies on the right have turned against him. Instead, he has allied himself with ultra-Orthodox and nationalist right-wing parties. The election will therefore be less a contest between left and right than between those who support Netanyahu and those who oppose him.

For many Israelis, especially Netanyahu’s critics, it is obvious that the first election after October 7 should be about the worst catastrophe in Israel’s history, the day that claimed around 1,200 lives and left thousands wounded, 251 people taken hostage, and entire communities destroyed and abandoned. They argue that the election debate should address questions such as why the catastrophe occurred, how it was handled, and which path the country should choose going forward.

October 7 was not a single intelligence failure, but the culmination of several years of weakening Israel’s political system and security apparatus. The IDF and the Shin Bet security service became trapped in the belief that Hamas had been deterred. Warning signs from intelligence agencies, border observers, regional actors, and suspicious activity on the night before the attack were misinterpreted or failed to lead to sufficient preparations. The military was weakened by organizational rigidity and excessive faith in technology. Politicians, led by Netanyahu, allowed Qatari money to flow into Gaza and acted on the assumption that the Palestinian conflict could be “managed” indefinitely.

The brutal awakening of October 7, 2023, came almost exactly 50 years after the Yom Kippur War. Then, too, information about the enemy’s plans was available, but the Israeli leadership was locked into a rigid conception of what the enemy would do and failed to prepare. After the Yom Kippur War, then-Prime Minister Golda Meir appointed a commission of inquiry and resigned the following year.

Three years after October 7, most of Israel’s military and security leadership have left their posts. Netanyahu, however, remains and has still not appointed an independent state commission of inquiry. He chose a different path.

For Netanyahu, October 7 is not about learning lessons and improving — but rather about blaming the military. His supporters also emphasize everything that happened after the catastrophe: the wars against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Instead of taking responsibility, he is constructing a narrative that could win the “October 7 election”: everyone but him bears responsibility for the catastrophe, while he alone deserves the credit for the military successes that followed.

Are Israelis buying this account of reality? In a national security survey from June, only 20 percent described the country’s security situation as good or very good, just 29 percent said they felt a high degree of personal security, and only 15 percent believed Israel had won the war against Iran.

The dissatisfaction, however, has not translated into any clear shift in the opinion polls. Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc — Likud, nationalist right-wing parties and ultra-Orthodox parties — is relatively united. The opposition, currently led by former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, ranges from Netanyahu critics on the right through the center and the remnants of the Israeli left to Israeli-Arab parties. Much like a potential Swedish governing coalition based on the Social Democrats, Greens, Left Party and Centre Party, it would struggle to form a government because of internal red lines and major ideological differences. Unlike the opposition to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the Israeli opposition lacks a united alternative.

The latest opinion polls indicate that the election will be close. But it is worth remembering that for many Israelis, the election is as much about who they are as what they think. The outcome may be determined by which of Israel’s “tribes,” as former President Reuven Rivlin defined them in a famous speech, mobilizes the most voters — secular, national-religious, ultra-Orthodox or Arab Israelis.

Between and within these groups, a profound struggle is underway over the country’s democracy and welfare. Israel today has an increasingly politicized police force, extremist settler violence in the West Bank, and an ever-deepening conflict between the government and the judiciary. At the same time, liberal Israelis’ relative demographic weight is declining, while the ultra-Orthodox community’s exemption from military service and low labor-force participation are increasing the burden on the working population and public finances. The healthcare system has fewer doctors and nurses per capita than the OECD average, psychiatric services are under extreme strain from the aftermath of October 7, many schools suffer from teacher shortages, and the cost of living is high.

From a European standpoint, it's important to remember – Israel is not only about war and peace. The country is now in desperate need of healing and reconstruction. Many Israelis see the October 27 election as a decision about the country’s character and direction. For them, this may be the last realistic opportunity to change the course the country has taken.

Swedish Election Left the Blocs Closer on Policy – But Split Over Israel and Antisemitism

The center-left won Sweden's election by a slim margin, but now comes the hard part

Published in Haaretz: Swedish Election Left the Blocs Closer on Policy – But Split Over Israel and Antisemitism

Following a tight, polarized election campaign, Sweden woke up Monday morning to a result that almost couldn't be any closer. According to preliminary results, the four opposition parties – the Social Democrats, the Left Party, the Center Party and the Greens – won a combined 176 of the 349 seats in parliament, against 173 for the right-wing bloc. If the result holds, it will mark the end of the center-right government led by Ulf Kristersson and the possible return of Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson as Sweden's prime minister.

The result, however, is not yet final. More votes will be counted on Wednesday, including late-arriving early ballots and votes from abroad, and the Swedish Election Authority is expected to announce the final result only later in the week. The gap between the blocs is small enough that even a shift of a few seats could prove significant. Andersson said on election night that if the current result holds, "Sweden will get a new government." Kristersson, for his part, has not conceded.

The result largely reflects the unusual character of this campaign. Unlike the previous election, in 2022, when immigration and crime were front and center, this time no single issue dominated. The various parties tried to push the issues that suited them – the economy and taxes, healthcare, schools, crime, energy and immigration – but on several of the sharp disputes that once divided right and left, the gaps have narrowed considerably.

The dispute over immigration policy, for example, narrowed after the Social Democrats adopted a policy supporting reduced immigration and stricter requirements for integrating immigrants. Almost all the parties now back NATO membership and a significant increase in the defense budget, and there is also broad agreement on the need to step up the fight against organized crime.

It was against this backdrop that the campaign became especially polarized. Instead of a sharp argument over the direction of a single policy, much of it revolved around the question of who would sit in the next government. The right warned against a "red-green" government in which the Left Party would wield unprecedented influence, while the center-left warned against the populist right-wing Sweden Democrats entering government for the first time. Now, after the election, that question is shifting from a campaign talking point to the practical problem of forming a government.

In recent years, Sweden has been led by a center-right government headed by Kristersson of the conservative-liberal Moderates (Moderaterna). The government had no parliamentary majority and relied on two coalition partners – the Liberals and the Christian Democrats – as well as on the Sweden Democrats, which backed it from the outside and had considerable influence over its policies.

For most of the campaign, the polls gave the opposition a clear lead. At one point the gap reached around 10 percent, and an Andersson victory seemed almost certain. But in the final weeks that gap narrowed rapidly, and in the end the race stayed open almost until the very last vote.

Two senior figures in the outgoing coalition spoke to Haaretz before the election about how they saw the contest. The Social Democrats and the Center Party declined to be interviewed.

Joar Forssell of the Liberal Party (Liberalerna), a classic center-right party, who chairs the parliamentary Committee on Education, said that as far as his party was concerned, the answer to the question of what stood at the center of the election was education. The party, which has held the education portfolio for the past four years, wanted to keep it in order to improve student outcomes, strengthen the standing of teachers and continue removing smartphones and screens from schools.

The difficulty in identifying a single issue at the heart of the election, Forssell argued, was itself a sign of the outgoing government's success. "The current government has been delivering on many of the issues that have concerned Sweden in recent years," he said. "We have brought Sweden into NATO, we managed to reduce crime rates, we managed to accomplish a great deal in the schools, including new legislation banning mobile phones. Inflation is down, and economic growth is better than that of most European countries. The opposition is struggling to find an issue it can use to attack the government."

Alice Teodorescu Mawe, a member of the European Parliament for the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and a candidate for the Swedish parliament, made a similar argument. In her view, the Social Democrats have in recent years moved closer to the right on issues that once defined the fault line in Swedish politics.

"When it comes to the general direction Sweden should take, the differences are relatively small, and there is broad agreement on issues such as migration and the reform of crime policy," she said, adding that the main ambition of the Social Democrats is to return to power and that, to achieve this, they have adopted positions similar to those of the governing coalition.

Teodorescu Mawe also pointed to a paradox that became Andersson's central problem: On some of these issues, the gap between the Social Democrats and their potential partners on the left – the Left Party and the Greens – is greater than the gap between the Social Democrats and the parties of the right-wing bloc. "These parties hold completely different positions on important issues such as nuclear power, the European Union and migration, and this is also one of the reasons why, since 2010, Swedish politics has repeatedly focused more on the composition of the coalition and the identity of the prime minister than on policy itself," she said. "That in itself is symptomatic: It is easier for journalists and politicians to talk about who is playing with whom than to deal with policy, and it is a win-win situation for everyone who is too lazy to get into a discussion about how the promises that have been made can actually be fulfilled."

For most of the 20th century, Sweden was a byword for a social-democratic welfare state. The Social Democrats ruled the country almost without interruption for more than 40 years, and during that time much of what became known as the "Swedish model" was built – powerful trade unions and extensive collective bargaining that brought a very large share of the economy under collective agreements. Alongside this, the state maintained a large public sector, universal public healthcare and education systems and a generous social safety net, financed by high taxes and producing relatively low levels of inequality.

In recent decades, right-wing and left-wing governments have alternated in power, and the model has changed following tax cuts, privatizations, the opening of public services to competition and reforms to benefits and pensions. But its basic skeleton has remained in place.

Even Forssell, a man of the center-right, does not propose dismantling the Swedish model. "Schools and the healthcare system will remain, and the core activities of the welfare state will continue to be financed almost entirely by taxes," he said. "The dividing line lies elsewhere: How large can the welfare state become before it turns into a nanny state? How much welfare can we provide before people become less concerned with finding a job or less concerned with contributing to society? Our government has proposed, for example, limiting the total amount of benefits a person can receive from the state. We want lower taxes and a system that does not reduce the incentive to work."

Teodorescu Mawe described a similar consensus. "There is agreement between the right and the left that Sweden should have a stable and generous welfare system, but a country that imposes such high taxes cannot accept poor public services, and in the coming years we will also face enormous defense expenditures, because security is at the heart of the welfare state – the state must first and foremost protect its citizens and its territory," she said.

She also opposes raising taxes, and emphasized the principle on which, she says, the model was originally built: "Everyone who can work should work. Today there are people, many of them immigrants, who do not work but still receive benefits, and this is destabilizing the system. That is why, for years, I have supported tying some welfare entitlements more closely to citizenship and to contributing to the financing of the system. Such measures would make clear that the welfare state is, to some extent, like a government insurance company: Here, too, you have to pay the premium before you can demand a payout."

Forssell and Teodorescu Mawe both believe the Swedish welfare model itself is not in danger. The Social Democrats, by contrast, largely framed the election as a battle over the future of the welfare state. They argued that four years of right-wing government were marked by the underfunding of the healthcare and education systems and by tax cuts for high earners.

In her speeches, Andersson repeatedly returned to the state of the schools, the long waits in the healthcare system and the erosion of welfare services. In a televised debate with Kristersson the week before the election, she said: "We're making the least sexy election promise, but the most important one – secure basic government funding for elderly care, for the healthcare system and for schools. When costs rise, government funding will rise too."

Swedish Opposition Could Force Shift on EU-Israel Association Agreement

Sources say the Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee's new Social Democratic chair is pushing for a tougher policy toward Israel. The Center Party could determine whether a majority backs seeking suspension or termination

Published in Haaretz: Swedish Opposition Could Force Shift on EU-Israel Association Agreement

The Swedish parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee discussed Thursday whether Stockholm should advocate for suspending or terminating the European Union's association agreement with Israel, as the opposition's narrow majority may help advance the initiative.

Sweden's Left Party has in the past called for the EU-Israel Association Agreement to be terminated, while the Social Democrats and Greens have advocated for suspending it. The Center Party could therefore prove decisive: If all four parties agree on a common position, their 176-seat majority could be used to change the line the caretaker government is expected to represent at EU level.

No formal statement was made after the meeting. Representatives of the Center Party and the Social Democrats said they will release a statement in the future, while the Sweden Democrats' foreign policy spokesperson, Aron Emilsson, said he does not want to see the agreement frozen. He believes that would be harmful and would leave Sweden isolated within the EU.

Sweden's September 13 election produced an exceptionally narrow result, with the Social Democrats remaining the largest party and, together with the rest of the opposition, holding 176 of parliament's 349 seats. But the Social Democrats' majority has so far proved insufficient to form a government.

The Center Party refuses to join a government that includes the Left Party, while the parties remain divided over the composition and policies of a future coalition. Outgoing Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and his center-right government therefore remain in office in a caretaker capacity while Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson tries to find a viable parliamentary arrangement.

This leaves Sweden in an unusual situation: It may take weeks or even months before a new government is formed, but the four opposition parties that won a razor-thin parliamentary majority – 176 seats compared to the coalition's 173 – can already use it to influence government policy, particularly on the relatively few issues on which all four can agree.

Sources familiar with the details have told Haaretz that Former Social Democrat Deputy Prime Minister Morgan Johansson, who has taken over as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is pushing for a change in Sweden's policy towards Israel. According to the sources, when the committee meets tomorrow, October 8, it is expected to discuss whether Sweden should advocate suspending or terminating the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

Although the Foreign Affairs Committee itself will not formally vote to suspend the agreement, a more consequential stage comes the next day.

On Friday, the Swedish government will consult Sweden's Committee on European Union Affairs, ahead of a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on Monday. A parliamentary majority could then establish a new Swedish position, potentially requiring the caretaker government to advocate suspending or terminating the EU-Israel agreement despite it not being the government's own policy.

One issue which may delay the process is the fact that the four parties which hold the current parliamentary majority do not yet appear to have agreed on a common formulation, with some calling to suspend the agreement and another to terminate it.

"Now the Center Party must show its hand: Will it follow the left's lead and collectively punish all Israelis, or will it safeguard Sweden's relations with Israel?" a government source told Haaretz.

Any actual suspension or termination of the agreement would ultimately have to be decided at the EU level, which means that the Swedish move will affect Sweden's bilateral relations with Israel rather than Israel-EU relations.

However, a new Swedish position could also make a difference on a European level, since it will mean that another significant European country joins Spain, Ireland and other governments pushing for measures against Israel under the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The European Commission has already proposed suspending some of the trade preferences Israel receives under the agreement, a measure that can be approved by a qualified majority of EU member states, but the proposal has so far failed to secure sufficient support in the Foreign Affairs Council. A Swedish shift would alter the balance among EU governments and add political weight to efforts to turn the Commission's proposal into EU policy.

The last time a Social Democratic government came to power in Sweden, in 2014, one of its first major foreign-policy decisions was to recognize the State of Palestine, making Sweden the first Western European EU member to do so while already a member of the Union.

The move was followed by years of some of the worst relations between Israel and Sweden in decades, including repeated diplomatic confrontations and periods in which senior-level contacts were severely strained. Relations gradually improved in the years that followed, particularly after Sweden's then-foreign minister Ann Linde visited Israel in 2021, and improved further under the center-right government that took office in 2022.

A new Swedish push to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement would therefore risk reversing a decade-long process in which the two countries slowly rebuilt their political relationship.

'At Least Google Their Names': Sweden's Left Party Scrutinized Over Solidarity Letters to Palestinian Terrorists

Sweden's Left Party has come under intense scrutiny after two of its senior lawmakers sent letters of support to Palestinian prisoners convicted of deadly terror attacks weeks before a general election.

Published in Haaretz: 'At Least Google Their Names': Sweden's Left Party Scrutinized Over Solidarity Letters to Palestinian Terrorists – Europe

With just over a month to go before Sweden's general election, the country's Left Party has come under criticism following new revelations that senior party figures sent letters of solidarity to Palestinian prisoners convicted of terrorism or murder.

The letters were part of a solidarity initiative involving the Left Party and Palestinian prisoner advocates. In the space of a few days earlier in August, three Swedish journalists exposed several such cases.

Journalist Sofie Löwenmark wrote in daily newspaper Expressen that Left Party Member of Parliament Ilona Szatmári Waldau had written last year to Ahmad al-Moghrabi, a senior commander of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. He is serving multiple life sentences in Israel for his role in planning deadly terrorist attacks in Jerusalem, including an attack on a bar mitzvah celebration that killed 11 people and an attack on a supermarket that killed two. In the letter she sent him, Szatmári Waldau commended his "courage and perseverance."

Szatmári Waldau later explained in a Facebook post that she had not known about al-Moghrabi's background and that the information about the prisoners had been provided by the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden.

"None of the prisoners were supposed to have carried out violence against civilians or have human lives on their conscience. In this case, the fact-checking was flawed, which is not acceptable. I have taken down the post. Terrorism and violence against civilians is not something I support or encourage," she wrote.

Later, the Left Party acknowledged that its fact-checking had failed. Party leader Nooshi Dadgostar described the letters as a mistake and said the campaign had been withdrawn, while defending the MPs involved, saying to the Aftonbladet daily of Szatmári Waldau: "I have complete confidence in her values."

Nathalie Rothschild, a journalist at the Swedish online current-affairs magazine Kvartal, subsequently reported that the party's parliamentary group leader, Samuel Gonzalez Westling, had written a letter of solidarity to Ibrahim Abu Mokh, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping and murdering 19-year-old Israeli soldier Moshe Tamam in 1984.

Rothschild also reported that the party had organized a seminar in which former Palestinian prisoner Hussam Shaheen, who was sentenced to 27 years imprisonment for attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder, participated by video link. His conviction had been challenged in Israel's High Court, where his lawyer argued that he had been wrongly identified and that the investigation had suffered from serious omissions. The state acknowledged some investigative errors, although the conviction was not overturned.

"This is a party that aspires to sit in government after the election, and eight of its MPs have taken part in a solidarity campaign with prisoners without even considering that they should at least Google their names," Rothschild tells Haaretz. "It's incompetent at best, and a security risk at worst."

Following this, Expressen investigative journalist Inas Hamdan published a complete list of 24 Palestinian prisoners who were supposedly included in the campaign. Several had been convicted of murder or terrorism-related offenses. The Left Party denied all had been involved in the campaign and rather only a "handful," according to Hamdan's reporting.

"As a Swedish journalist of Palestinian background, I think it's important that politicians are clear about where they stand," Hamdan told Haaretz. "In Sweden, we have seen enormous demonstrations where there have been slogans in support of terrorism or flags representing terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Threats against Sweden's Jewish minority are a threat to Swedish democracy. That's why it's incredibly important that we show what these threats look like."

The controversy comes at a sensitive moment for the Left Party, known in Swedish as Vänsterpartiet. The party, which has profiled itself in recent years as a socialist and feminist party, originates from Sweden's Communist Party, which split from the Social Democratic Party in 1917. Today, it sits to the left of the Social Democrats, advocating for a strong welfare state, greater economic equality, expanded public ownership and workers' rights.

Its leader, 41-year-old Nooshi Dadgostar, the daughter of Iranian immigrants who grew up in Gothenburg, has led the Party since 2020. It currently holds 22 of the 349 seats in the Swedish parliament.

The party has never participated in a Swedish national government, though it has frequently provided parliamentary support for Social Democratic governments. Ahead of this year's election, Dadgostar has made clear that the party expects formal cabinet posts if its support is required to form a center-left government.

The letters to the Palestinian prisoners are only the latest chapter in the party's engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Over the past three years, Israel, Gaza and the wars in the Middle East have become an increasingly prominent part of Swedish politics. While all of the country's major political parties have taken positions on the issue, the Left Party has made it a central part of its political identity.

This was particularly clear during the 2024 European Parliament election campaign, when party leader Dadgostar described the vote as a "Palestine election," arguing that a united European Union could put pressure on Israel. "We are not finished until we have liberated Palestine," she says. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict occupied a prominent place in her campaign, and some analysts cite the party's position on Gaza as one of the factors that contributed to its strong electoral performance.

The issue has also extended beyond the party leadership. Many Left Party members and activists have participated in Sweden's pro-Palestinian protest movement that has become a regular feature of Swedish public life. Some of these demonstrations have featured slogans, symbols and political theater that have been described by Jewish community leaders as supporting terrorism or having antisemitic elements. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has consequently become not merely a foreign policy question for the party, but an issue increasingly shaping its activist base, electoral strategy and internal politics.

In 2023, Swedish public broadcaster SVT reported that aid money from the party's international organization had gone to a project linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, whose armed wing took part in the October 7 massacre.

The following year, prominent Left Party figure Kristofer Lundberg was expelled from the party after openly supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is an EU-designated terrorist organization. During Lundberg's time as chairman of the party's Angered branch, a Popular Front representative also participated in the branch's annual meeting.

In Malmö, Orwa Kadoura, then vice-chairman of the local Left Party branch in what is Sweden's third-largest city, left the party following criticism over antisemitic messages. In 2025, MP Lorena Delgado Varas shared a classic antisemitic conspiracy image and was made to leave the party too. And as recently as June this year, the party removed more than 20 candidates from its municipal electoral lists after investigations found that they had praised Hamas' October 7 attack, spread Holocaust denial and promoted antisemitic conspiracy theories.

Hamdan says the reaction to her reporting has been mixed. "On the one hand, there are threats against me as a journalist," she says, "but there's also confusion about how things came to this. Knowledge about terrorist organizations such as Hamas is very limited among Swedes, because it's not something they have had to deal with very much".

"From the party, we have been met either with silence or with attacks. This is, of course, an incredibly difficult issue for them," Hamdan says. "They have some voters who are attracted by expressions of support for terrorism, while they have other voters who oppose it. They are trying to play both sides."

Löwenmark, who first reported about Szatmári Waldau's letter, describes the reactions as "strong and widespread." She tells Haaretz, "The fact that he was a Palestinian prisoner was enough for him to be praised for his courage and his struggle. No one had even bothered to find out what he had been convicted of."

Löwenmark added that there are almost always strong reactions when investigations concern pro-Palestinian activism and the Left Party. "The pattern is predictable", she said. "Instead of discussing what has been revealed, they attack the person who revealed it. The focus shifts from the facts themselves to the journalist, the newspaper or the alleged motive behind the investigation."

Rothschild, who has also published revelations about the party, says that she too had been met with silence from party officials. "When I tried to get more information from the party, one MP wrote that she won't grant interviews about this topic, while the party's parliamentary group leader confirmed he sent the letter to Abu Mokh but didn't have time to talk when I asked if he knew about the charges against him." Rothschild says that further attempts to contact the party's lawmakers and the party's press service went unanswered.

It remains to be seen whether the controversy will affect the party's support in the polls. These revelations add to a series of controversies over the positions of individual party members that, as the party seeks a formal role in Sweden's next government, puts renewed focus on its position on Israel as a whole.

The Left Party did not respond to Haaretz's request for an interview or comment.

The Swedish Left Party’s letters reveal what amateurs they are

The first objection to Swedish MPs sending romantic letters of solidarity to people convicted of murder and terrorism is, of course, a moral one. The second concerns poor judgment. But the third is about something else: amateurism, writes Israeli journalist David Stavrou.

Published in Swedish in Kvartal: V:s brev avslöjar vilka amatörer de är – Kvartal

In the space of just a few days, journalists Sofie Löwenmark, Nathalie Rothschild and Inas Hamdan published investigations showing how members of the Swedish parliament had sent letters of solidarity to Palestinian prisoners convicted of very serious terrorism offenses and had participated in an organized campaign in which several of the recipients are serving life sentences for attacks against civilians.

In 2023, SVT revealed that aid money from the Left Party’s international organization had gone to a project with links to the DFLP, an organization that participated in the October 7 massacre. The following year, prominent Left Party figure Kristofer Lundberg was expelled after expressing support for the terrorist-designated PFLP. In Malmö, Orwa Kadoura left the party following criticism over antisemitic messages. In 2025, MP Lorena Delgado Varas shared a classic antisemitic conspiracy image, and as recently as June this year, the Left Party removed a large number of candidates who had praised Hamas’s October 7 attack, spread Holocaust denial and promoted antisemitic conspiracy theories.

All of this is, of course, serious. By now, it is clear that the Left Party has a problem with romanticizing terrorism and spreading antisemitism and conspiracy theories. This can no longer be dismissed as anecdotal. Every time you think rock bottom has been reached, another investigation appears with new revelations. But precisely for that reason, it is almost no longer interesting to discuss this as a question of values. Left Party members are free to believe whatever they want. The truly interesting issue is something else.

Politics is not merely an ideological arena. Politics is a profession. There are laws, practices, institutions and rules of the game. And then there is what in British politics is sometimes described as simply not done – things that may not actually be prohibited but that politicians nevertheless know not to do. It is like any other profession. Surgeons do not operate on gut feeling. Judges do not rule according to whom they instinctively like best. Even a passionate politician is expected to be able to control that passion long enough to do the job.

The first objection to Swedish MPs sending romantic letters of solidarity to people convicted of murder and terrorism is, of course, a moral one. The second concerns poor judgment. But the third is about something else: amateurism.

The Left Party’s explanation in the latest affair illustrates the problem. The party secretary has said that the names came from the Palestinian Association of Sweden and that the Left Party carried out no checks of its own. “There had been a mistake in the fact-checking,” MP Ilona Szatmári Waldau wrote. Nooshi Dadgostar has repeatedly resorted to variations of the same defense during the scandals of recent years. In June, she referred to the large number of Left Party representatives – more than 4,000 – and stressed that those exposed represented only a small proportion. She then said that “there are occasions when people turn up whom you haven’t kept track of.” She promised to tighten the party’s procedures, but that is clearly an almost impossible task, since many other Left Party members defend people who have expressed support for terrorist organizations.

If a blue-haired 17-year-old activist sends a love letter to an ideologically motivated murderer he saw on TikTok, perhaps he can get away with shrugging his shoulders or shouting along with Rage Against the Machine: “Fuck you, I won’t do what you tell me!” But members of parliament are not teenagers. They are adults, and adults are expected to evaluate their sources critically and ask questions. What does it look like when we become fixated on prisoners from a single international conflict while ignoring others? What diplomatic, trade-policy and security-policy consequences could our statements have? Which people and organizations are we legitimizing?

Is that boring? Does it involve compromise? Perhaps even moral coruption? Perhaps – if you live in a syndicalist collective, eat out of tin cans beneath posters of “freedom fighters” and say that “when the forest is felled, the chips will fly”. But the Left Party’s MPs are well-paid public officials who participate in – and enjoy all the privileges and perks that come with – professional politics.

That means it is part of the job to investigate the people and organizations you cooperate with, read court judgments, speak to embassies, diplomats, experts and lawyers, ask what is disputed and what has been established, and understand the consequences of your own symbolic politics. For example, when a professional politician becomes involved in another country’s prison system by writing a letter, they must understand how the people they are writing to are perceived by their victims, as well as understand another society’s sensitivities and collective trauma.

To a Swede, Ahmad al-Moghrabi or Ibrahim Abu Mokh may be unfamiliar names on a list of “Palestinian prisoners.” To an Israeli, those same names may signify deadly suicide attacks against civilians, murdered children or a young conscript who was kidnapped on his way home and never returned. You do not have to accept Israel’s policies in the West Bank or agree with the Israeli courts. You only need to be able to imagine the reverse situation. Imagine if foreign parliamentarians wrote to Jackie Arklöv and praised his “courage and perseverance” without checking the judgment against him. The first Swedish response wouldn't be a complex debate about Scandinavian geo-politics, it would be: Have you even bothered to find out who this person is?

This kind of disregard for the rules of politics – in which passionate conviction is allowed to cloud judgment and consequences and basic due diligence are ignored – has a name. It is called populism.

For many years, the Sweden Democrats have struggled with a similar transition – from a protest movement to a party with influence over the state. As part of that process, the party has run internal training programs under the title The Road to Power (Vägen till makten), although there is, of course, no reason to romanticize the results. SD continues to be plagued by recurring scandals. A training course cannot magically erase a political culture.

And this is where the parallel with the Left Party becomes even more uncomfortable. V has already tried the educational route. Following several antisemitism scandals, in the spring of 2025 the party invited its members to a two-hour training session on antisemitism. Every member received an invitation. Yet one year later, the party found itself with 25 candidates removed from its lists following revelations involving, among other things, precisely antisemitism. As the Swedish elections draw closer, the party is finding it increasingly difficult to convince voters that sympathy for terrorists, conspiracy theories and antisemitism among its politicians and activists is a bug. In its case, it seems much more like a feature.


She Grew Up in an Exiled Iranian Opposition Group, That Turned Into a Brutal Cult

Atefeh Sebdani was born in Iran to parents active in the MEK but was torn from them and sent for molding to a family in Sweden. In an interview, she describes life in the exiled cult and its rejection of Persian culture.

Published in Haaretz: She Grew Up in an Exiled Iranian Opposition Group, That Turned Into a Brutal Cult – Middle East News

At a protest in Stockholm in April, alongside the Lion and Sun flags representing pre-revolution Iran, Israeli and American flags were also waved. As in similar events around the world, the demonstrators praised the Israeli-American attack on Iran and expressed support for Reza Pahlavi, son of the shah who was deposed in 1979, as Iran's future leader.

The rule of the ayatollahs unites many Iranian exiles against the regime, and threatens political activists operating against it in Europe. However, one of the women who helps the organizers of the Stockholm demonstrations, Atefeh Sebdani, has suffered for most of her life from another Iranian group – an organization that was once part of the Islamic Revolution but later became its enemy.

Mujahedin-e Khalq was founded in 1965 by a group of Iranian students who opposed the shah's rule. The organization combined elements of Shiite Islam with Marxist and anti-imperialist ideas and operated underground during the 1970s. During this period, it attacked regime targets and gained support as an opposition organization.

When the Islamic Revolution emerged in the late 1970s, MEK even joined Khomeini on his path to power. Yet after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, conflict arose between it and the new regime and by the early 1980s, the MEK was attacking government targets. That was countered with brutal repression that included the execution of thousands. The MEK leadership fled into exile in Iraq, where it formed a controversial alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.

Atefeh Sebdani in Stockholm, 2026. Photo: David Stavrou

Atefeh Sebdani's story begins in the clash between the ayatollahs' regime and the MEK. "My parents were imprisoned after the revolution because of their rivalry with the new regime. They were considered enemies of the state and like other MEK members, after they were released, they were forced to leave," she says.

She was two years old at the time. Sebdani recounts that she, her younger brother, her father and her pregnant mother fled to Pakistan and lived there destitute on the streets. Her father continued from Pakistan onto Iraq, where he joined other MEK members in a camp called Ashraf, which later became the movement's center.

"After some time, we also moved to the camp. By that stage it had become a kind of small town with kindergartens, parks, and schools – mainly for propaganda purposes. They wanted to show how good things were there so others would join," she says. "For me, it was like paradise. I had everything; it was idyllic. I was with my mother and I was happy."

Then, without warning, everything ended at once. She hadn't even turned five yet but her mother told her she would have to take care of her two brothers by herself. She didn't explain why or how, but when the day came, Sebdani found herself standing by a bus with a group of crying women. When the bus departed, five-year-old Sebdani became a mother in practice.

"On the way, I had to take care of one brother who was still a baby and wanted to breastfeed, and another who was very ill," she recalls. She adds that the expulsion of the children from Camp Ashraf was a process. She doesn't know exactly how long it took, but she remembers children disappearing from kindergarten without knowing why or where they were going.

Eventually, all the roughly 900 children in the camp were separated from their parents and transported to other countries.

"The place was emptied of children's voices," she says. "And children's voices are the most human thing there is – the core of life – and that was taken away."

Why were the children expelled?

"The children were an element that disturbed the organization's leader, Massoud Rajavi. The ideological struggle to liberate Iran turned into the struggle of a narcissistic leader who wanted all the power in his hands. He wanted the men and women in the movement to be under his absolute control, and the children stood in his way. The movement began as an ideological movement, but it became a cult."

What Sebdani describes aligns with what is known from other sources about the MEK. During the 1980s and 1990s, the organization became highly centralized, developing political and military branches that operated from bases in Iraq. At the same time, the National Council of Resistance of Iran was established as a political umbrella organization.

'The family I came to was politically obligated to take children. It's not that they loved children or wanted us. We underwent heavy indoctrination and were forced to constantly work for the organization.'

During this period, allegations indeed emerged about cult-like characteristics such as strict internal discipline, ideological control, and exclusion of dissenters.

However, the organization's leader, Rajavi, has not been seen in public since the early 2000s, and his fate remains unclear, as the organization has not disclosed information about his whereabouts nor announced his death. Meanwhile, his wife, Maryam Rajavi, serves as the public face of the organization – contributing to an atmosphere of secrecy and uncertainty regarding its structure and decision-making.

After several months and a long journey that included stops in Jordan and Germany, Sebdani and her two younger brothers arrived in Gothenburg in western Sweden.

"For all that time, I was sure we would soon be reunited with my mother," she recalls. "We sat on planes and trains, I saw things I didn't know, I saw climates and people change, there were new languages and places – but alongside the excitement, I constantly feared we were moving further away from my mother and worried she wouldn't be able to find us."

In Gothenburg, they were told they would soon meet their mother. "I was very excited. But what actually happened was different – we stood on a train platform, and instead of my mother, two other people I didn't know arrived, a woman and a man, and we were told: these are your mother and father. That's when the nightmare began."

Atefeh and her two brothers

The people who took Sebdani and her brothers were MEK members living in Sweden and working for the movement. They also had a child of their own, and took in two other children out of roughly 200 MEK children who arrived in Sweden. Sebdani says she later traced the fate of hundreds of other children who were "exported" from Camp Ashraf and that she obtained a document listing their destinations – including Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and the United States.

"The family I came to was politically obligated to take children," she says. "It's not that they loved children or wanted us. We underwent heavy indoctrination and were forced to constantly work for the organization." She does not reveal the identities of her foster parents, but her childhood memories expose the nature of the organization as it became a cult.

According to her, MEK families abroad were completely mobilized. They engaged in recruiting members and funds, organizing demonstrations, fighting opponents, and harassing defectors. She describes this society as oikophobic (one that is hostile, dislikes and rejects its own "home" culture, country and traditions). "They hated anything Iranian that wasn't related to the MEK. We weren't allowed, for example, to listen to Persian music unless it was the music of MEK members. I didn't read books in Persian. There was no Persian culture—everything was subordinated to the organization."

As far as you know, is this still the case?

"Yes. They still have offices in different countries and a strong presence on social media. The headquarters is in Auvers-sur-Oise, a suburb northwest of Paris, where political leadership members and full-time 'soldiers' are based. At the same time, there are activists like my foster family, and MEK members in Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania. That camp is essentially a 'troll factory' that produces large numbers of accounts and spreads propaganda in Persian and English. They write articles about themselves, smear their opponents, and create the impression of support – even though they have no real support."

Camp Ashraf 3 is the fortified camp to which most MEK members – estimated at 2,500 to 3,000 – were transferred from Iraq between 2013 and 2016. The move was carried out with the support of the United States, the United Nations, and the Albanian government. It took place because after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK was no longer protected in Iraq, and international actors worked to evacuate them. Although the organization had been designated a terrorist organization in the U.S. for many years, it was removed from the list in 2012 as a result of pressure applied by the movement, and some American and other actors even saw it as a partner in opposing the Iranian regime. According to reports, the MEK no longer engages in military activity, but the camp in Albania has become a center of political and media activity with a highly centralized and controlled structure.

"It's a place where entry and exit are not free, and in the past there were physical punishments and torture of those who wanted to leave," says Sebdani. "I know stories of people who disappeared and of mandatory daily confessions about 'dirty thoughts' – for example, sexual thoughts and masturbation. You weren't even allowed to think about your children or speak with members of the opposite sex without permission. Today, with defectors speaking out and social media, the movement can no longer allow itself to use such methods."

Sebdani is not alone in her claims about the MEK. The French newspaper Le Monde conducted interviews in 2024 with former members of the organization living in Europe, including two named Amir Vafa and Amin Golmaryami. Vafa described how he and others were forced to participate in public confession sessions in which, once a week, everyone had to describe their sexual fantasies. He added that friendships were closely monitored: "It was forbidden to have lunch with the same friend twice in a row."

Golmaryami added that during clashes with Iraqi security forces in 2011, MEK leaders sent him and his comrades to go "in front of Iraqi bullets to increase the number of casualties." He claims they did this in order to "put pressure on Europe and the United States to remove the organization from the list of terrorist organizations and facilitate the relocation of its members to another country."

Another MEK member, Reza Torabi, said that at the age of 17 he was a zealous member and was assigned the role of "welcoming" young newcomers. "Our objective was to brainwash them, make them forget their previous lives, and instill in them the ideology of the Mujahedeen," he said. "My dedication was unwavering." In hindsight, he believes that he too fell victim to manipulation and regrets "the harm [he] caused in the course of his duties."

A 2005 report by Human Rights Watch, based on in-depth interviews with former members, also described a reality of beatings, verbal and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution, and torture.

How do you believe control of MEK member is maintained today?

"If you look at people like the father, you see someone who joined in his twenties and spent his entire life inside this system. He never paid a bill or looked for a job – everything was handled by the organization. He doesn't know how to buy a plane ticket or even drive to the end of a street. The MEK infantilized these people, and there is no one to take care of them if they leave."

Does that mean there are no new members?

"That's right. There are no new members. It's a movement of older people – but they pay young people to attend demonstrations. If you go to MEK protests, you'll find Poles and Ukrainians who don't speak Persian and don't know what they're protesting about, alongside Swedes with no connection to the organization who were paid to join."

Who pays for all this?

"From what I saw and was part of, many people pay the MEK monthly so they won't harass them – Iranians in exile subjected to pressure, propaganda, flattery, and social coercion. There are also welfare funds, for example for foster families, as well as political donations and funding from human rights organizations influenced by the group's propaganda."

Beyond the political activity, the period that Sebdani stayed with her foster family, had another aspect. She talks about indoctrination and the constant threat that was used to make her stay.

"From the age of five, I experienced sexual abuse, physical abuse and psychological abuse in the foster family," she says, "but I couldn't say anything because they threatened to separate me from my brothers. I was not allowed to be a child. The first thing that happened to me in the foster family was that my father began to show interest in my naked body. He wanted me to do things. I felt it was wrong and frightening, but I knew nothing about sex or sexuality and I didn't understand.

"Over time, it only got worse, and my foster brother abused me too, encouraged by my foster mother. I had no childhood; it was just survival. I was the one who cleaned and tidied, I had to be a good student, and also the one who went out to demonstrations and went to Mujahideen conferences around the world". Talking to Sebdani she describes a reality full of exploitation, punishment, crying at night, and deception of Swedish welfare services.

As an adult, she eventually left, moved to Stockholm, became an engineer, and worked for Microsoft. After a personal crisis, she began telling her story and wrote a book (Min hand i min, "My Hand in Mine", published by Albert Bonniers förlag, 2024). Today she is married and has three children.

Politically, Sebdani is active among supporters of Reza Pahlavi. "I saw the difference between the two leaders," she says. "I met Maryam Rajavi as a child, and recently I met Pahlavi in Paris with a group of other former MEK children. I support the Iranian people, and the people support Pahlavi. He is exactly what Iran needs – a secular, humane person, with a family, who knows what living a normal life is, who listens and can unite people."

After Sebdani's meeting with Reza Pahlavi and other "MEK children" she became the target of an online campaign against her. Sebdani says that this isn't the first time and she has been targeted by a smear campaign led by the MEK on several previous occasions before.

Sebdani's book

"This kind of harassment happens to everyone who has left the organization and spoken out," she says. This time, the MEK website denied Sebdani's account through a letter it claimed was written by her biological father. "For me, as a father, seeing 'Atefeh Sebdani' at a gathering of the Shah's son was painful… Atefeh is the same person who, by spreading defamation against the organization under the false pretext of being part of a group of 'child soldiers,' has for many years become a full servant of Iranian intelligence."

The text claims that Sebdani was never part of the MEK and accuses her and her associates of collaborating with the regime in Tehran. Sebdani does not know whether her father actually wrote the text, but she says that everything in it is false and that she is familiar with other examples of letters that MEK members were forced to write under coercion.

Following the letter, a senior figure in the organization, Freydoun Salimi, also spoke out, accusing Sebdani of never having been a member of the group and of acting as an agent of the regime. In responses to his claims on X, supporters of the organization repeat the accusations and insult Sebdani. On other social media platforms, she is also accused of assisting Israel, betraying Iran, and supporting Americans attacking her country.

Sebdani's personal MEK story has a positive ending – she escaped, her siblings left, and even her mother eventually left the organization. The organization itself, however, is still very much alive. It even claims to still have networks inside Iran, though most analysts believe its influence there is limited. "The MEK is more of a European problem than an Iranian one," Sebdani concludes. "In Iran, they have no real support, not even with regime critics. But after the 'Woman, Life, Freedom' protests, it's clear that a unifying leader is needed, otherwise, there will be no change – and I have no doubt that Pahlavi is the right person."

Did a Secret Resistance Network Assassinate Sweden's Prime Minister?

For 40 years, the assassination of Sweden's prime minister, Olof Palme, has remained unsolved. Now, some are revisiting a dark possibility: not a lone gunman, but a covert network embedded deep within Swedish society – part of a secret Europe-wide effort to resist a Soviet invasion

Published in Haaretz: 40-year Mystery: Did a Secret Resistance Network Assassinate Sweden's Prime Minister? – Europe

The most shocking event in the history of modern Sweden occurred almost exactly 40 years ago. On the evening of Friday, February 28, 1986, Prime Minister Olof Palme and his wife, Lisbet, went to see a movie in central Stockholm. It was a cold winter evening in the capital. As he often did, Palme dismissed his bodyguards and the couple travelled three subway stations to the theater without a security escort. When they emerged onto the street, they met up with their 25-year-old son, Mårten, and his partner. The four bought tickets and went in.

Shortly after 11:20 P.M., while the prime minister and his wife were walking back home along a main street in the city, a man approached them from behind and fired a gun at close range. Palme was hit and collapsed on the frozen pavement. A second shot was fired immediately afterward, lightly wounding Lisbet. Bystanders attempted to help but it was in vain. Palme died on the spot. An ambulance was called and evacuated his body and his wife to a hospital, arriving less than 20 minutes after the shots were fired.

The hours that followed were dramatic. News of the murder spread in the Swedish media and overseas. The country went on high alert, and Deputy Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson convened the cabinet. At 5 A.M. Saturday morning a press conference was held. Flags were subsequently lowered to half-mast, flowers and candles were placed at the murder site, and an atmosphere of national mourning and crisis permeated the country. At the same time, it emerged that almost every possible mistake was made in the investigation of the murder: The shooter immediately fled; police arriving at the scene failed to apprehend him. They also did not set up roadblocks or cordon off the area. Coordination between law enforcement forces at the site was poor; no situation room was established, and testimonies from eyewitnesses were neither systematically collected nor fully documented. These errors were never corrected in the intervening four decades.

Olof Pale's Murder Site on Sveavägen in Cenral Stockholm

In the years following the murder, what is referred to by Swedish authorities as "the largest and longest-running murder investigation in the world" was launched, but despite significant resources, it was marred by disputes and conflicts and did not lead to any definitive outcome. Many investigative directions were pursued but no one was charged. In the first year, the Kurdish PKK organization was a central focus. Later, theories involving possible actors from various countries, such as South Africa – which allegedly had both a motive and the capability for executing a political assassination abroad – were explored but did not result in indictments. Such was also the case following investigations of theories involving terrorist organizations from the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

In 1988, a local criminal named Christer Pettersson was convicted of the murder, mainly based on a controversial identification by Lisbet Palme; a year later he was acquitted on appeal due to lack of evidence. In June 2020, the Swedish prosecution announced that the investigation was closed, declaring that a man named Stig Engström was the probable suspect. Engström had allegedly been present at the scene on the night of the shooting and had been interviewed as a witness in later years, but he died in 2000 and therefore could not be prosecuted. His motive was unclear, and the evidence against him was circumstantial and unconvincing. Nevertheless, this was enough for the prosecution to close the case.

But this was not the end of the story: In December 2025, the prosecution reversed its position. In a surprising development, it announced that a renewed examination of the investigative material had concluded that there was insufficient evidence against Engström, and thus he was no longer officially considered to be the suspect. At the same time, no other names were suggested, nor was the investigation formally reopened. Thus, 40 years later, the Swedish public still does not know who killed its prime minister or why. Meanwhile, on the margins of these developments, a discussion has surfaced about another historical phenomenon, which – like the identity of the man who pulled the trigger – was heretofore unknown to the Swedish public and kept in the shadows for decades.

"Today, we know no more about the murder than we did the day after it happened," says Gunnar Wall, a journalist and author who has dedicated years to researching and writing books about the Palme assassination. "We do not know if it was a lone assassin or an organized group, we do not know the motive, how the killer escaped, whether he was Swedish or foreign, or whether he is still alive today and, if so, is he in Sweden or abroad. Given this situation, there are countless speculations and theories."

Wall, recipient of the 1998 and 2024 Guldspaden (Golden Spade) award, Sweden's most prestigious prize for investigative journalism, for books he wrote about the incident, notes that while there are those who claim to know who the murderer was, despite years of research, he himself does not.

Gunnar Wall

However, Wall points to an interesting issue. The decision not to reopen the investigation late last year is strange, in his view, because about 15 years ago Sweden changed its legislation regarding statutes of limitations. Serious inquests into crimes such as murder, under the new law, are no longer closed after 25 years as was previously the case, and can remain open indefinitely. The prosecutor who last December chose not to resume the whole process justified that by saying there were no conditions for doing so – even though he admitted that he had examined only the Engström lead and not other possibilities.

When the previous prosecutor closed the case in 2020, it was possible to say that happened because he had reached a dead end – but the same cannot be said about his successor's decision, since he said he had not even attempted to evaluate materials that did not concern Engström. And yet, he seemed determined to leave the case closed nonetheless.

Olof Palme, Photo:Bert Verhoeff / Anefo / Nationaal Archief (CC BY-SA3.0 NL)

"The investigators of the Palme murder examined, almost until the very last moment, indications of [involvement by] a larger group that went beyond Engström alone," says Wall, who bases his claims on interviews he conducted with the investigators themselves and with additional witnesses, as well as on reviews of countless documents, reports and other materials. "Their main hypothesis was that forces within a secret Swedish network were behind the murder, and they tried to link Engström to these actors. When they failed, they abandoned the hypothesis and Engström remained the sole suspect. Five years later, because the evidence against him was weak, it all ended with no conviction and no suspect."

Suggestions about some secret entity having been behind the Palme assassination may sound like far-fetched conspiracy theories – but they are not. For decades, underground organizations called stay-behind networks existed in Sweden and many other European countries. While a direct link between the Swedish stay-behind network and Palme's assassination has not been proven, the existence of the group is an established fact. These clandestine bodies were created after World War II as a way for countries to prepare for a possible invasion and hostile occupation. Their work included drafting blueprints for underground resistance groups, maintaining contact with a government-in-exile and actively opposing an occupier.

In the early days of the Cold War, following World War II, the threat of Soviet aggression was tangible. Across Europe, secret networks were created in various countries, in order to forge connections between the military, police, intelligence services and civil society. Initially, these organizations were intended to prepare for a Soviet invasion, but over time some engaged in other activities, sometimes even conducting covert operations within their own borders, including false flag operations – designed to appear as if carried out by others to justify certain political or military reactions.

The most famous example is the Italian network and operation code named Gladio, whose existence was revealed to parliament in 1990 by Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Some claimed that this stay-behind network participated in domestic acts of political terrorism in the 1970s and '80s. Parliamentary inquiries looked into its operations and ties with foreign actors and intelligence bodies such as the CIA and NATO, and exposed its involvement in guerrilla training, communications networks, weapons storage and sabotage. There were also suspicions that Italy's network operatives engaged in domestic political activity, including terrorism designed to strengthen the Italian right and diminish the left. Similar underground groups have been documented in Belgium and Switzerland, and evidence of same exists in France and Germany, although without confirmation of domestic violence. There are also hypotheses about the involvement of such networks in coups and politically motivated violence in Greece and Turkey.

The investigators' hypothesis was that forces within a secret Swedish network were behind the murder, and they tried to link Engström to these actors. When they failed, they abandoned the hypothesis.

The whole phenomenon remains highly controversial and difficult to research due to the secrecy and compartmentalization surrounding it, yet there is general agreement that stay-behind networks have existed across Europe, operating without parliamentary oversight and known to only a small circle of decision-makers.

After years of rumors and official denials of such bodies existing underground in Sweden, in 2013, one of the country's major newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, published an article by Inga-Britt Ahlenius, a civil servant who worked at the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office and the United Nations. Based on evidence and research that had emerged since the 1990s, Ahlenius wrote: "While the initial disclosure of Sweden's institutional but unofficial Cold War connections with Western powers was met with denials and outrage, it was eventually accepted as the new truth. Thus, the revelation of stay-behind networks is often treated more like a romantic spy adventure than a historical fact." She noted that the secret resistance movement established in Sweden, and closely linked with Western powers, was likely initiated by Prime Minister Tage Erlander (Palme's predecessor) along with several ministers.

"[It was] initially led by Alvar Lindencrona, CEO of Thule insurance, three department heads and regional/local 'cells' operated under him," she wrote and added, "meetings occurred in secret rooms in Lindencrona's house or Thule's offices, and funding came from secret sources. Between 1951 and 1953, the CIA under William Colby, stationed in Stockholm and later CIA director, helped establish the network in Sweden, although the Swedes retained top-level control."

Journalist Wall adds some background information: Experience from World War II, he says, showed that countries that were occupied had been unprepared for such an eventuality – there were no resistance movements and they in essence had to be improvised. Thereafter, it was in the interest of those countries and others to prepare properly for the threat of military occupation; in Sweden, various actors dealt with this scenario at an early stage. Immediately after the war, a secret, state-level initiative was launched by the prime minister; the CIA entered the picture in the 1950s. Before that certain extremist elements had worked toward similar aims – among them war veterans who supported the Nazis during the war and volunteered to fight alongside them in the Continuation War in Finland. In the end, these three trajectories evolved into the Sweden's stay-behind network, although it is unclear exactly what remained of them in its final iteration.

"Unlike in other places, despite the cooperation with American and other actors, the Swedish network was established and organized by Swedes," says historian Mats Deland, a senior lecturer at Mid Sweden University (Mittuniversitetet) in Sundsvall. "Sweden did not participate in World War II, but it could learn from the Nazi invasion of Norway in 1940. The Norwegians sank the Blücher, one of the German ships on its way to capture the Norwegian capital in the Oslo fjord, which delayed the Germans and caused them heavy losses, while at the same time giving the Norwegians time to evacuate the royal family and their government northward.

"This experience was important for both the Norwegians and the Swedes who learned from it and came up with the idea to establish an organization that could evacuate the Swedish royal family and the government, but also 'stay behind' and protect the country. This goal of staying behind was the result of another experience from World War II: the NKVD, the Soviet security service under Stalin, who remained behind and became partisans in the German-occupied areas."

So, in the Swedish case, the stay-behind network was not controlled by the Americans or by NATO?

Deland: "Correct, in Sweden this was a local initiative. The Americans arrived a little after the network was established, and even then, they did not take control; they only integrated needs arising from NATO doctrine, which was based on the fact that only the United States had nuclear weapons. In the case of a Soviet invasion and the need for American aircraft to fly over Sweden, the idea was, like the French resistance – and to some extent the Belgian and Dutch resistance – to create escape lines that could smuggle out downed crews. But the United States did not establish the network and did not manage it. This may have changed in 1965, when Swedish security services were reorganized [when the Cold War-era external intelligence agency, T-kontoret, and internal intelligence agency, B-kontoret, merged into a single, secret organization], partly with the involvement of Olof Palme. It is possible that American involvement increased then."

How much was the Swedish stay behind network controlled by the state, and how much of its activity was conducted by civilian or military actors without the knowledge or control of the political leadership?

"Between 1947 and 1951, there were many volunteers in the network, including people who had served alongside the Germans during World War II, some of whom were highly problematic. Because of these types, the secret police discovered the network even though they were not supposed to know about it. Only the people directly involved – Prime Minister Erlander and a small part of the security apparatus – were meant to be 'in the loop.' Following this discovery, which angered Erlander and the security apparatus greatly, the network was reorganized, removing the problematic elements and incorporating trade union members and the business sector."

,Olof Palme, Tage Erlander, Sten Andersson and Ingvar Carlsson (1968) Photo: Lennart Nygren / SvD / Scanpix

According to Deland – and in keeping with Ahlenius' observations, as mentioned – the network was indeed led by executives such as Alvar Lindencrona, the head of the Thule company, a businessman with relatively progressive social views for his time, and it recruited forces from the trade unions that had a traditional affinity to the ruling Social Democratic Party. "These were ordinary people," he says, "not former soldiers. Although they needed training, they could be trusted, and the network remained secret until the 1990s." In other words, even though neither the Swedish parliament nor the rest of the government knew about the network, it was indeed an official entity. Indeed Deland notes that a recent book revealed an interesting document: an official government decision from the 1950s forming Sweden's stay-behind network, showing that it was legal and above board. The diaries of Prime Minister Erlander show that he may have given it a green light as early as 1947.

The book Deland refers to is Johan Wennström's "Sweden's Cause Was Our Cause: The Secret Swedish Resistance Movement" (2023). Wennström calls his country's stay-behind underground a "resistance movement," and reveals that the organization's code name, used by its members at the time, was Metro. Wennström says Metro was not established or controlled by NATO and it did not act on the latter's behalf, although he confirms there was cooperation with MI6 in Britain and, to some extent, with the CIA, mainly concerning programs such as evacuating Swedish decision-makers to England if necessary.

Furthermore, Wennström writes, Metro likely included several hundred people, as well as a sort of "invisible combat unit" that could expand to as many as 3,000. The underlying principle was that the network's members would recruit additional people from their immediate circle if necessary. The author also describes the group's structure was fairly cooperative, with representation from various sectors of Swedish society; information about its activities, he says, was distributed on a strict "need-to-know" basis. The organization was formally legalized in 1955, having been mandated by an earlier government decision. Typically, it was involved in organizing potential resistance and civil defense activities, such as mapping escape routes, planning acts of sabotage of critical infrastructure that could fall into Soviet hands, rescuing government officials and storing weapons. Wennström does not know when the organization ceased to exist, or if it exists today.

The phenomenon remains highly controversial and difficult to research, yet there's general agreement that stay-behind networks existed in Europe, operating without parliamentary oversight and known to few decision-makers.

Regarding other countries that had stay-behind networks, it is clear, both from Wennström's book and other sources, that heterogeneity was the keyword. Each country built its organization differently depending on perceived threat and the nature of the country's political, military and industrial power structures. Even in NATO member states, the networks were not necessarily under that organization's control. Parliamentary or public oversight was generally minimal, and there is still controversy over what their involvement was in domestic activity beyond preparing for a possible Soviet invasion during the Cold War era.

One of those who has focused on the phenomenon at the European level is Swiss author and researcher Daniele Ganser, whose controversial 2005 book – "NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe" – is one of the best-known on the subject. It received praise but also criticism by some who claim that it is based on an unsubstantiated conspiracy. In it Ganser claims that Western intelligence networks operated secretly in Allied countries during the postwar era, sometimes beyond the bounds of proper legal and political oversight. He cites Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Turkey, emphasizing that in some of these countries the stay-behind networks were indeed involved in terrorism, false-flag operations and political manipulation.

Mats Deland collaborated with Ganser on the Swedish edition of the book, which includes a chapter on the possible connection to the Palme assassination.

Did Prime Minister Olof Palme know about the network?

Deland: "We know he was aware of it during the tenure of his predecessor, Erlander, because he worked on it as one of Erlander's people in the 1950s. What he knew later, we do not know for certain. But it is reasonable to assume that all prime ministers knew about the network, although there are no official documents on the matter."

What can be said, to the best of your knowledge, about the Swedish stay-behind network in the 1980s, during Palme's second government?

"We don't know. We have some information about the network in the 1950s, but very little about the 1980s."

When did suspicions arise about a connection between the network and Palme's assassination?

"These were suspicions that arose from the very beginning. There was an investigative attempt as part of the official inquiry, and there were also discussions about people from the Stockholm police who could have been involved in the murder, but these are speculations and I do not deal with them."

Sometimes it's difficult to know whether a fact uncovered in an investigation is the key to solving a (murder) mystery or just a coincidence. The last person suspected of killing Prime Minister Palme, Stig Engström, who died 26 years ago, was nicknamed the "Scandia Man" because his workplace was in a building called the Scandia building. The building had previously housed the headquarters of the above-mentioned Thule insurance company Thule merged with Scandia in the 1960s and was run by Alvar Lindercrona who, as said, apparently headed country's the stay-behind network; indeed some of its meetings took place in that same building. In other words, if Engström murdered Palme, he did so while leaving a place where in the past – and possibly as late as the 1980s – meetings of senior members of the country's stay-behind network were held. Is this a coincidence? And even though there is no evidence that Engström was actually connected to the underground organization, is there any logic to the claim that it was involved in Palme's murder?

Wall, the journalist, is not unequivocal on this matter, but he does suggest some key historical points that should be taken into account. "One of the things that happened during Palme's second term as prime minister in the 1980s was a series of alleged Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish territorial waters," he explains. "These incidents caused a severe security crisis, and some argued that they were preparations for an invasion and the establishment of espionage infrastructure. Within the Swedish security establishment, there were claims that Palme did not take the threat seriously and that, because of this, he posed a security risk to Sweden.

"Furthermore, Palme was supposed to travel to Moscow to meet Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1986. Palme, who returned to serve as prime minister in 1982, was active on the international stage on issues of arms reduction and nuclear disarmament. His opponents argued that he had close and controversial ties to the Soviet Union, although a more balanced description would be that he was open to discussions with Soviet leaders about disarmament – something that went against both NATO's view and the opinions of senior Swedish military officials. The assassination on February 28, 1986, meant that it was Palme's successor, Ingvar Carlsson, who met Gorbachev."

As far as is known, the issue of disarmament was not on the agenda at that Swedish-Soviet summit.

Wall adds that there were a number of people who claimed to have received offers to kill Olof Palme; in several cases, it was suggested that Swedish intelligence services were behind those offers. But no one known to have actually belonged to any of these secret services has ever come forward to confirm that they were approached. Wall also provided Haaretz with documents he's collected showing that evidence indicating that people with radio devices were present in the area on the night of the assassination was not taken seriously by the investigators. He does not claim that there is proof that the murder was organized by political actors, but argues that it is certainly a line of inquiry worthy of serious examination.

And he is not alone: Ahead of the 40th anniversary of the assassination, a public appeal was launched to encourage the Swedish government and parliament to establish a "truth commission" to finally resolve any outstanding questions.

"On February 28, 1986, Olof Palme fell victim to a brutal attack on an open street in central Stockholm," the appeal begins. "The assassination of the prime minister of Sweden was a unique attack on our democracy. In a country governed by the rule of law like Sweden, everything possible should have been done to solve this murder. The fact that it remains unsolved 40 years later is unacceptable, especially when not all possibilities for an indisputable and absolute solution have been investigated."

The text cites problems that may have prevented discovery of the truth – still-classified archives, false answers given to the investigators by secret service personnel and investigative files that have disappeared. Possible involvement of the Swedish stay-behind network is also mentioned, and the conclusion is: "This is the only assassination of a political leader in modern Europe that may remain unsolved. Clarifying all the circumstances surrounding Olof Palme's murder will strengthen Sweden."

Still, at this rate, it is doubtful whether the mystery will ever be solved. Even if it is, the relatively recent revelations regarding stay-behind networks in Europe are just another example of how, even if and when the public discovers the truth, it sometimes comes decades too late, in the form of very old news.

Sweden Fails to Protect its Jews From Incitement

We have spoken about hatred and threats for decades. Why is Sweden still unable to recognize them when it comes to Jews?
Published in Sweden in Svenska Dagbladet: Rättegång om hets mot judar missar målet | David Stavrou | SvD Ledare

In recent years, we have seen what hate propaganda, conspiracy theories, and dehumanizing rhetoric can lead to — especially when it concerns Jews.

A long series of arson attacks, stabbings, and shootings has made Jewish communities around the world increasingly vulnerable. In many cases, the perpetrators were influenced precisely by hate propaganda, conspiracy theories, antisemitic incitement, and Islamist ideology portraying Jews as legitimate targets of violence.

At the same time, two recent court cases in Sweden — one in Helsingborg and one in Gothenburg — concluded in a way that shows that Sweden is beginning to understand the importance of combating extremism, while still failing to fully understand it.

The Helsingborg case concerned charges of incitement against an ethnic group involving antisemitic publications on social media, Holocaust distortion, and conspiratorial content. The defendant was convicted on several counts, including Nazi salutes, publishing antisemitic images, and spreading theories like the one claiming that “4 out of 5 American slave owners were Jewish,” equating Jews with rats, and portraying Jews as a satanic force controlling the world.

At the same time, the man was acquitted on certain counts related to Holocaust distortion — a newer component of Sweden’s incitement legislation. The prosecutor argued that the man’s statements formed part of a broader antisemitic conspiracy narrative involving references to the Illuminati and Freemasons. But the district court was not convinced. During the questioning of Christer Mattsson, an expert on violent extremism and antisemitism and director of the Segerstedt Institute, the defense demanded answers to questions about the number of people cremated in Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor, and discussed the extent to which the Israeli government does or does not “weaponize antisemitism”.
Despite Mattsson’s clear answers, and instead of the court telling the defense attorney to stop wasting time on historical revisionism, the result was an acquittal. The defendant’s statements claiming that it would have been impossible to “dispose of 6 million bodies in the ovens,” and the publication of a video describing the figure six million as false, were not considered contrary to generally accepted historical facts and were not considered serious Holocaust distortion.

The problem with the verdict is that the court failed to see the forest for the trees, and the broader antisemitic context disappeared as the court got lost in details. No one has ever claimed that six million bodies were burned or that six million is an exact number. Six million is a widely accepted estimate, supported by millions of confirmed victim names, as well as Nazi documentation, demographic studies, transport records, camp archives, postwar investigations, eyewitness testimony, and forensic evidence.

No serious historian has argued that limited crematorium capacity would suggest exaggerated death tolls or inconsistencies in the history of the Holocaust. The entire debate is absurd. Anyone who has studied this kind of rhetoric knows that Holocaust denial and Holocaust distortion — referred to in academic literature as Holocaust distortion — are very rarely expressed by claiming that the Holocaust never happened. It is usually about relativization, contextualization, and minimization.

This kind of denial is not merely a lie about the past — it is a precondition for genocide: minimizing, justifying, or erasing the crimes and thereby continuing the dehumanization of the victims while obstructing historical accountability and remembrance. In this case, it is not only an insult — it is a call to renew the violence.

In the Gothenburg trial, a woman was acquitted on Wednesday after being charged with incitement against an ethnic group. The images she published online contained classic antisemitic symbols: a snake with a Star of David on its head and large fangs about to attack a naked child; a snake shaped like a Star of David wrapped around a baby bottle with text describing Zionists as child murderers; and an image depicting a hyena eating a child while staring at another child hiding nearby wearing a Palestinian flag on its shirt. The hyena wears a kippah with a Star of David on it.

During police questioning, the woman claimed she had nothing against Jews. “It is Zionists I am speaking against, and what is happening in Gaza is horrific. Seeing children slaughtered every day,” she said.

Christer Mattsson, who also testified in this case, explained that research has long established that snakes and the killing of children are common antisemitic symbols. Anti-Zionism, he explained, becomes antisemitism when it adopts antisemitic stereotypes, conspiracy theories, and so-called antisemitic tropes, such as the notion that evil Jews control global media and governments. Mattsson explained that in this form of “Israelized antisemitism,” “Zionists” assume the role historically assigned to Jews in classic antisemitic ideology and are portrayed as uniquely evil, manipulative, powerful, and conspiratorial.

Despite this, the court missed the point. The fact that a message is critical of Israel does not exclude the possibility that it is simultaneously antisemitic. The Star of David, the snakes, the conspiracies, and the innocent dead children should have been enough. It seems Swedish courts will not act until someone explicitly says, “I really hate Jews and now I’m going to kill a few,” or “Auschwitz is a fictional place.”

But that is not what antisemitism sounds like today. To minimize and distort the Holocaust and spread hatred against the legitimate national movement of the Jewish people is not an exercise in free speech — it is spreading hatred and encouraging violence in disguise.

Things should be called by their proper names, and words have consequences. History gives us many examples of this and they are often associated with specific names – Capital Jewish Museum in Washington DC, the Tree of Life – Or L’Simcha Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Bondi Beach in Sydney, the Krystalgade Synagogue in Copenhagen, the Hypercacher supermarket in Paris, the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester, the Halle Synagogue in Germany, Chabad of Poway Synagogue in California, Golders Green Road in London, the Ozar Hatorah School in Toulouse, and the El Ghriba Synagogue in Tunisia.

All of these acts began with words.

We have spoken about hatred and threats for decades. Why is the state still unable to recognize them when it comes to Jews?

Once again, hatred and incitement by “pro-Palestinian” demonstrators in Stockholm — this time while they are rightly opposing a new Israeli law

Published in Swedish in Kvartal: Bisarrt judehat – mot en skamlig israelisk lag – Kvartal

The weekly so-called pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Stockholm often include an element of street theatre. These street shows are usually extremely untasteful and they’re often defamatory. Some of the greatest hits include actors dressed as a blood-stained Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and KD party leader Ebba Busch holding a Falun sausage in an implied sexual position. There’s President Trump dressed as an SS officer, Prime Minister Kristersson dancing around with a dead baby, Netanyahu in devil horns, and characters wiping their behinds with an Israeli flag.

This weekend a new show hit the streets of Stockholm – a character who appears to be a religious Jew because of the kippah on his head holding a glass of blood beside a Palestinian woman being hanged. Those who follow Middle East politics were probably supposed to understand that the Jewish character is Israeli right-wing extremist minister Itamar Ben Gvir celebrating the legislation of the new Israeli death penalty law.

There’s a lot to be said about the Israeli law, but before that’s done the obvious should be pointed out. For those who don’t follow Middle East politics, what happened on Saturday is that Swedish police blocked streets, SL cancelled buses, and taxpayer money was spent in order to allow a group of activists to act out an antisemitic blood libel hundreds of years old, in which a Jew is using the blood of a non-Jewish innocent victim.

The activists will no doubt claim that their protest is legitimate. The character they acted is not all Jews, they’ll say, it’s only Ben Gvir, or only Israeli Jews, or only Zionists. However, the red-stained glass, the grotesque nature of the Jewish characteristics, and the timing make that claim laughable. The performance took place during Passover, the holiday that European Jews have been blamed since the Middle Ages for using Christian children’s blood for making their special holiday bread. The context of their other shows is that Israel controls the world, the American president and Sweden’s government are maneuvered by the Zionists – Israel’s Prime Minister and Jeffrey Epstein (both Jews of course). They relativize the Holocaust and they mock every Israeli symbol by attaching it to blood and money. Sure, they’re not antisemitic, just anti-Zionists. If anyone is so naive as to think that there’s a difference, perhaps they can explain it to Swedish Jewish children who may have passed by in central Stockholm and wondered why they’re being accused of hanging innocent Palestinians. Again.

Still, the new Israeli legislation deserves a serious discussion, even if those who demonstrated against it in Stockholm are on the wrong side of history. Israel’s new “death penalty for terrorists” law was passed in the Israeli parliament in March. The bill stipulates that the death penalty will be imposed on a terrorist who killed a person “with the intent of denying the existence of the State of Israel.” This wording creates a distinction that effectively designates the law almost exclusively for Palestinian terrorism. However, the court will be authorized to impose a life sentence instead of the death penalty if it finds “special reasons” for doing so or if “exceptional circumstances” are present.

It’s important to point out that the Israeli opposition voted against the law, and many in Israel hope that it will be cancelled if a new government takes over after the next elections. This may be the case because the law, which was pushed through by the most extreme Israeli politicians, was also opposed by other Israeli authorities. An official in the Ministry of Justice said that establishing the death penalty in the West Bank through civilian legislation is “highly problematic”. IDF representatives said that the law contradicts international conventions to which Israel is committed, and officials from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council opposed it.

The objections are not only technical. Israeli parliamentarian Gilad Kariv (The Democrats, former Labor Party) said that the law contradicts the values of the State of Israel and that it is disgraceful both in its substance and in the political manner in which it was approved. He also said that the party will bring the constitutional question before the High Court of Justice. This is an important point because the law is indeed expected to be reviewed by the High Court of Justice, and there is a possibility that it will be changed, amended, or cancelled.

However, apart from the extreme right, parts of Israeli society who used to be against such legislation in the past have become more positive towards it because of the 251 Israelis who were kidnapped on October 7th. They argue that many of the people who led and participated in the massacre, including Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, were prisoners who were released from Israeli jails. If they had been executed for their previous crimes, the most horrific crime in Israeli history could have been avoided. Perhaps the main point supporters of the law point to is the possibility of prisoner exchanges which in Israel’s reality have always been an incentive for Palestinian terrorists to commit more attacks. Capital punishment could, according to the law’s supporters, prevent future Israeli kidnapped civilians from being used as bargaining leverage.

Israeli security officials, including several chiefs of staff of the IDF and heads of the Shin Bet, Israel’s security agency, objected to this reasoning and claimed that terrorism is not meaningfully deterred by the threat of execution because attackers who carry out suicide or high-risk operations are often not motivated by personal survival. Increasing the severity of punishment does not change behavior. Instead, capital punishment could escalate tensions, increase incentives for revenge attacks, and complicate intelligence cooperation and prisoner-management strategies.

Other objections, made by Israeli NGOs, are purely ideological. The Zulat Institute for Human Rights, for example, stated that the legislation “is fundamentally based on racial discrimination, is illegitimate, and has existed in the darkest regimes of modern history.” This is, in short, a very controversial issue in Israel, in many ways it’s another part of the bloody aftermath of October 7th and the regional war that is still going on, and the last word hasn’t been said yet.

Back to Stockholm. Considering the complexities of the Israeli legislation isn’t high on the agenda of the Swedish activists. This is a classic situation of a clock being correct twice a day even if it stopped working. Yes, they’re entirely right in their objection to the Israeli death penalty, but they are the last people in the world to preach on this subject.

First, recently more and more Iranian flags are seen at their demonstrations. The regime in Teheran executes over 1,000 people a year. Still, in the Iranian example, Swedish activists prefer demonstrating in support of the bloodthirsty regime against the “imperialist American-Israeli attack” while conveniently ignoring the institutionalized public hangings of women, homosexuals and regime critics from cranes. Other countries which have had the death penalty for years, from the US, China, and Japan to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are never mentioned in any demonstration. Only Jewish executions, it seems, are morally wrong as far as they’re concerned.

Second, believe it or not, the Palestinian Authority, the same Palestinians the demonstrations are all about, has a death penalty law. In the West Bank it was used in the past and death sentences are not carried out in practice in recent years, but in Gaza, Palestinians have been executed by Hamas on a large scale, both officially and unofficially. Whoever is really worried about the legal execution of Palestinians should have been demonstrating against Hamas long before demonstrating against Israel.

And the finally, for many Israelis (including the one writing this text), the new law is a source of embarrassment and deep concern. It’s like many Swedes see things like NMR, or Swedish volunteers to the SS, or Swedish imams preaching about Jews engaging in black magic. The fact that in Israel a similar phenomenon is powerful enough to legislate is terrible. Still, the ones who will fix this are democratic and liberal Israelis, not a bunch of extremist wannabe actors from Sweden who believe that Israel never had a right to exist whether it has a death penalty law or not.