I Served in the IDF — Come and Get Me!

A former Left Party MP wrote that 150 Swedish citizens who served in Israel’s military have participated in genocide. They, and others who support them, she continued, are “allowed to live among us”. I served in the Israel Defense Forces myself. Here is why I refuse to be ashamed of my service.

Originally published in Kvartal: Jag har tjänstgjort i IDF – kom och ta mig! – Kvartal

Article photograph
Photo: Private, Jehad Alshrafi/AP/TT. Collage: Felice Larsson/Kvartal.

It seems that the winning side in Sweden’s election has already identified the country’s real problems. Issues such as schools, healthcare and unemployment can wait, but when it comes to the enormous threat apparently posed by Israel’s relations with the EU, something must be done immediately.

Before a new government has even been formed, the Social Democrats have thrown themselves into the issue of the EU’s Association Agreement with Israel, and the new majority has agreed that Sweden should push to suspend its trade provisions.

But that is not enough for the Left Party. Its Member of the European Parliament, Hanna Gedin, has joined Nordic colleagues in writing to the EU’s foreign policy chief, demanding that member states be urged to investigate possible war crimes committed by European citizens who have served in the IDF. Gedin is worried about Israelis walking freely on Europe’s streets. She points to a precedent: “Eurojust has explicitly established that EU citizens who fought for the Islamic State can be held accountable for war crimes and genocide.” In her view, Israel’s military and ISIS deserve the same treatment.

Other parts of the Left Party are equally enthusiastic about going after Israeli soldiers. At the party’s Greater Stockholm district annual conference in 2025, one member proposed a campaign against Israeli soldiers in Sweden. According to the motion, service in the Israeli army should provoke disgust and rejection, both personally and at the societal level. Ahead of the 2026 party congress, another member proposed designating the IDF as a terrorist organization, so that its members could be prosecuted even without concrete evidence of war crimes. The proposals were not adopted, but their wording reveals that, for these activists, the problem is not what an individual Israeli has done, but that the person served in Israel’s armed forces.

Former Left Party MP Lorena Delgado Varas put it even more clearly. Following reports that 150 Swedish citizens had served in the IDF, she wrote on Facebook: “So there are 150 Swedish citizens who have participated in genocide, and many more who have probably known about it and supported it. And they are allowed to live among us as if nothing had happened”. No investigations or verdicts are needed here. Even people alleged to have known about or supported what happened are included. “We must not accept genocidaires walking free, without consequences”, she concluded, without explaining what she means by “genocidaires” or what consequences she thinks should befall them. Is that a threat?

It is probably pointless to reason with political fanatics. But for everyone else, we need to clarify a few concepts. The IDF is the armed forces of an internationally recognized state whose population has repeatedly been subjected to wars, rocket attacks and terrorism, including by fascist, Islamist and fundamentalist organizations and states. Israel, like many other countries, has compulsory military service. An Israeli eighteen-year-old who refuses to report for duty without a legal exemption can be convicted for doing so. Anyone who commits war crimes must, of course, be investigated and, where the evidence is sufficient, prosecuted. But military service is not evidence of criminality. Defending one’s country’s right to exist, serving in Gaza or taking part in a war is not, in itself, a war crime.

Would the same activists demand that Swedish citizens who served in the armed forces of the United States, Ukraine, Iraq or Somalia be catalogued as potential war criminals? The Left Party has indeed called for suspected war crimes in other countries to be investigated, but that is something quite different from casting suspicion on people solely because they served in a country’s armed forces. I have not found any comparable demands to catalogue former American, Ukrainian, Iraqi or Somali soldiers. This special treatment appears to be reserved for the Jewish state.

In the SVT documentary The World’s Most Hated?, representatives of the London-based Declassified UK are given considerable airtime. One says: “You could be living next door to a war criminal, taking the Underground or a bus with someone involved in the systematic destruction of an occupied people”. The association is hard to miss: people who have served in the Israeli army are portrayed as a potential threat in our midst. The same speaker says it does not matter whether the person has even been to Gaza; he must prove his innocence because “a soldier can be guilty simply by enlisting”.

It is somewhat unclear why SVT presents him as a journalist rather than an activist. But the film shows what happens when a group is subjected to collective suspicion. Israeli tourists are thrown out of restaurants and shops, spat at, disinvited from universities and cultural events, and threatened with legal action. Does anyone recognize the pattern? It does not matter whether the individuals have actually committed a crime. So-called pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Sweden and other countries have already adopted “Death, death to the IDF” as a popular slogan. Do they mean all IDF soldiers, past and present? Is the death threat a metaphor? Delgado Varas has the answer: the problem is not just those who have “participated in genocide,” but “many more who have known about it and supported it”.

So let me make things easy for her, for the activists, and for Social Democrats who intend to make themselves dependent on the Left Party’s support. I want to save you the cost of intelligence gathering and digging through old records. I am coming forward voluntarily. I served in the IDF. It was in the 1990s, but compromising photographs are available. Here's one. I am Israeli and a Zionist. Come and get me!

David Stavrou as an IDF soldier
David Stavrou as an IDF soldier in the mid-1990s. Photo: Private.

I have no intention of denying my identity just because life happened to bring me to Sweden. I understand that some people would prefer their Jews to be anti-Zionist, apologetic and perpetually ashamed. Unfortunately, I cannot provide the goods. I grew up where buses were blown up, people were torn to bits in restaurants and caffes and rockets struck people’s homes. When I came of age, I performed my compulsory military service. I committed no war crimes. I murdered no children. But neither did I believe that my country, my family or my fellow human beings had any moral obligation to voluntarily allow themselves to be killed.

There are good reasons to scrutinize Israel’s conduct of war and criticize its government. Turning nationality or past military service into evidence of criminality, however, is something entirely different. When you speak of people who are “allowed to live among us,” you have already made up your mind.

The October 7 Election Is a Battle for Israel’s Soul

For Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, October 7 is not about learning lessons and making improvements — but rather about placing the blame on the military.

Originally published in Svenska Dagbladet: Valet i Israel är ett slag om landets själ | David Stavrou | SvD Ledare

He has dominated Israeli politics for three decades. Few contemporary democratic leaders have accumulated as much experience and political skill as Benjamin Netanyahu. In Israel’s October 27 election, he is running for a seventh term as Prime Minister. But the question is, beyond the desire to hold on to power, does he have a clear plan for Israel, and in what direction does he want to take the country?

On this question, Israelis are deeply divided. Netanyahu’s critics see a skilled tactician whose main objective is political survival and who is now also trying to shape his legacy as what he himself calls “Israel’s defender.” They also argue that his political calculations cannot be separated from the ongoing corruption trial, which has now lasted six years. Netanyahu, who maintains that the charges are politically motivated, turns 77 a few days before the election and has also suffered from both cancer and heart problems. If he wins the election, it will become increasingly difficult to bring the trial to a conclusion.

His supporters, by contrast, see a leader with a long-term vision who has transformed Israel’s position in the Middle East and who has a clear strategy. In foreign policy, it's all about preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Domestically, it's about reshaping institutions that limit political power, above all the judiciary – the Supreme Court and State Prosecution, and the established media.

A couple of decades ago, Netanyahu was still a classic right-wing politician — hawkish on defense, neoliberal and conservative. Something like a Middle Eastern Margaret Thatcher. Today he is more of a populist, and his former allies on the right have turned against him. Instead, he has allied himself with ultra-Orthodox and nationalist right-wing parties. The election will therefore be less a contest between left and right than between those who support Netanyahu and those who oppose him.

For many Israelis, especially Netanyahu’s critics, it is obvious that the first election after October 7 should be about the worst catastrophe in Israel’s history, the day that claimed around 1,200 lives and left thousands wounded, 251 people taken hostage, and entire communities destroyed and abandoned. They argue that the election debate should address questions such as why the catastrophe occurred, how it was handled, and which path the country should choose going forward.

October 7 was not a single intelligence failure, but the culmination of several years of weakening Israel’s political system and security apparatus. The IDF and the Shin Bet security service became trapped in the belief that Hamas had been deterred. Warning signs from intelligence agencies, border observers, regional actors, and suspicious activity on the night before the attack were misinterpreted or failed to lead to sufficient preparations. The military was weakened by organizational rigidity and excessive faith in technology. Politicians, led by Netanyahu, allowed Qatari money to flow into Gaza and acted on the assumption that the Palestinian conflict could be “managed” indefinitely.

The brutal awakening of October 7, 2023, came almost exactly 50 years after the Yom Kippur War. Then, too, information about the enemy’s plans was available, but the Israeli leadership was locked into a rigid conception of what the enemy would do and failed to prepare. After the Yom Kippur War, then-Prime Minister Golda Meir appointed a commission of inquiry and resigned the following year.

Three years after October 7, most of Israel’s military and security leadership have left their posts. Netanyahu, however, remains and has still not appointed an independent state commission of inquiry. He chose a different path.

For Netanyahu, October 7 is not about learning lessons and improving — but rather about blaming the military. His supporters also emphasize everything that happened after the catastrophe: the wars against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Instead of taking responsibility, he is constructing a narrative that could win the “October 7 election”: everyone but him bears responsibility for the catastrophe, while he alone deserves the credit for the military successes that followed.

Are Israelis buying this account of reality? In a national security survey from June, only 20 percent described the country’s security situation as good or very good, just 29 percent said they felt a high degree of personal security, and only 15 percent believed Israel had won the war against Iran.

The dissatisfaction, however, has not translated into any clear shift in the opinion polls. Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc — Likud, nationalist right-wing parties and ultra-Orthodox parties — is relatively united. The opposition, currently led by former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, ranges from Netanyahu critics on the right through the center and the remnants of the Israeli left to Israeli-Arab parties. Much like a potential Swedish governing coalition based on the Social Democrats, Greens, Left Party and Centre Party, it would struggle to form a government because of internal red lines and major ideological differences. Unlike the opposition to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the Israeli opposition lacks a united alternative.

The latest opinion polls indicate that the election will be close. But it is worth remembering that for many Israelis, the election is as much about who they are as what they think. The outcome may be determined by which of Israel’s “tribes,” as former President Reuven Rivlin defined them in a famous speech, mobilizes the most voters — secular, national-religious, ultra-Orthodox or Arab Israelis.

Between and within these groups, a profound struggle is underway over the country’s democracy and welfare. Israel today has an increasingly politicized police force, extremist settler violence in the West Bank, and an ever-deepening conflict between the government and the judiciary. At the same time, liberal Israelis’ relative demographic weight is declining, while the ultra-Orthodox community’s exemption from military service and low labor-force participation are increasing the burden on the working population and public finances. The healthcare system has fewer doctors and nurses per capita than the OECD average, psychiatric services are under extreme strain from the aftermath of October 7, many schools suffer from teacher shortages, and the cost of living is high.

From a European standpoint, it's important to remember – Israel is not only about war and peace. The country is now in desperate need of healing and reconstruction. Many Israelis see the October 27 election as a decision about the country’s character and direction. For them, this may be the last realistic opportunity to change the course the country has taken.

ממשלת שוודיה עשויה לפעול נגד הסכם האסוציאציה של האיחוד האירופי עם ישראל

הקפאה או ביטול של ההסכם דורשים רוב מיוחס של מדינות האיחוד, אך תמיכה של שוודיה תשנה ולו במעט את מאזן הכוחות. המהלך עשוי להתאפשר בשל מצב פוליטי ייחודי במדינה, שמעניק לגוש מפלגות האופוזיציה השפעה על מדיניות הממשלה

פורסם ב"הארץ": לכתבה המקורית

ועדת החוץ של הפרלמנט השוודי צפויה לדון מחר (חמישי) בתמיכה בהשעיה או ביטול של הסכם האסוציאציה בין האיחוד האירופי לישראל – כך אמרו מקורות ל"הארץ". חברי הוועדה לא יצביעו על כך באופן רשמי, אך יום לאחר מכן תקיים הממשלה התייעצות עם ועדת האיחוד האירופי של הפרלמנט לקראת ישיבת מועצת החוץ של האיחוד, שתתקיים ביום שני. שוודיה לא תוכל לשנות את ההסכם לבדה: השעיה או ביטול שלו דורשים את אישור האיחוד. על כן, מהלך שוודי מסוג זה ישפיע בעיקר על היחסים הבילטרלים עם ישראל.

קידום הסנקציות על ישראל עלול להתאפשר בשל המצב הפוליטי הייחודי שבו שרויה שוודיה: תוצאות הבחירות שנערכו ב־13 בספטמבר היו מהצמודות שנרשמו בתולדות המדינה. הסוציאל־דמוקרטים נותרו המפלגה הגדולה ויחד עם מפלגת השמאל, הירוקים ומפלגת המרכז הם מחזיקים ב־176 מתוך 349 המושבים בפרלמנט. ב־173 המושבים הנותרים בפרלמנט מחזיקות המפלגות המרכיבות את הקואליציה הנוכחית: מפלגת "המתונים" השמרנית, מפלגת "השוודים הדמוקרטים" הימנית, המפלגה הנוצרית־דמוקרטית והמפלגה הליברלית.

הרוב שהשיגו הסוציאל־דמוקרטים לא הספיק להקמת ממשלה. מפלגת המרכז מסרבת לשבת בממשלה שבה תהיה חברה מפלגת השמאל, והשתיים חלוקות בנוגע להרכב הקואליציה העתידית ומדיניותה. בשל כך, ראש הממשלה היוצא אולף קריסטרסון והקואליציה שלו ממשיכים לכהן כממשלת מעבר. בינתיים מנהיגת הסוציאל־דמוקרטים, מגדלנה אנדרסון, מנסה למצוא הסדר פרלמנטרי שיאפשר הקמת ממשלה בראשותה. המשמעות היא שייתכן שיעברו שבועות ואף חודשים עד שתוקם ממשלה חדשה. עם זאת, ארבע המפלגות שזכו יחד ברוב פרלמנטרי זעום יכולות לנצל אותו כדי להשפיע על מדיניות הממשלה.

הפרלמנט האירופי. תמונה: דיויד סטברו

הקשרים עם ישראל, כך נראה, הם אחת הסוגיות שסביבן יוכלו הסוציאל־דמוקרטיים לאחד את שלוש המפלגות האחרות בגוש הפרלמנטרי שלהם. מורגן יוהנסון, ששימש כסגן ראש הממשלה מטעם הסוציאל־דמוקרטיים, מונה כעת ליו"ר ועדת החוץ של הפרלמנט. מקורות ששוחחו עם "הארץ" אמרו כי הוא פועל לשינוי מדיניות שוודיה כלפי ישראל. רוב פרלמנטרי יוכל לגבש עמדה חדשה שעלולה לחייב את ממשלת המעבר לפעול בהתאם במסגרת האיחוד האירופי, למרות התנגדותה של הקואליציה.

ואולם המהלך עשוי להתעכב בשל אי־הסכמה של ארבע המפלגות באשר לנוסח עמדתן המשותפת. בעוד שמפלגת השמאל קראה בעבר לביטול ההסכם, הסוציאל־דמוקרטים והירוקים תמכו בהשעייתו בלבד. מפלגת המרכז, אם כן, עשויה להיות הגורם המכריע. "עכשיו מפלגת המרכז חייבת לחשוף את הקלפים שלה", אמר ל"הארץ" מקור בממשלה. "האם היא תלך בעקבות השמאל ותתמוך בענישה קולקטיבית של כל הישראלים, או שתפעל לשמירה על יחסיה של שוודיה עם ישראל?"

הנציבות האירופית הציעה בעבר להשעות חלק מהטבות הסחר שישראל נהנית מהן במסגרת הסכם האסוציאציה, אך צעד כזה יוכל להתממש רק עם רוב מיוחס של מדינות באיחוד יתמכו בו. עד כה ההצעה לא זכתה לתמיכה מספקת במועצה. ואולם, אם שוודיה תצטרף לשורת המדינות שבעד הסנקציות, ובהן אירלנד וספרד, היא תשנה ולו במעט את מאזן הכוחות באיחוד.

הפרלמנט השוודי בסטוקהולם תמונה: דיויד סטברו

הפעם האחרונה שעלתה לשלטון ממשלה סוציאל־דמוקרטית בשוודיה הייתה ב־2014, ואחת מהחלטותיה הראשונות הייתה להכיר במדינה פלסטינית. בכך, שוודיה הייתה למדינה הראשונה במערב אירופה שעשתה זאת בעת שהייתה חברה באיחוד האירופי. בעקבות זאת היחסים בין ישראל לשוודיה הידרדרו לשפל ואף הגיעו לכדי עימותים דיפלומטיים ופגיעה קשה בקשרים שבין הבכירים במדינות. מאז היחסים השתפרו בהדרגה, ושרת החוץ השוודית לשעבר, אן לינדה, ביקרה בישראל ב־2021. המגמה נמשכה ואף התעצמה תחת ממשלת המרכז־ימין שנבחרה שנה לאחר מכן. קידום השעיית ההסכם יהווה רגרסיה רצינית בשיקום היחסים המדיניים בין שוודיה לישראל.

Swedish Election Left the Blocs Closer on Policy – But Split Over Israel and Antisemitism

The center-left won Sweden's election by a slim margin, but now comes the hard part

Published in Haaretz: Swedish Election Left the Blocs Closer on Policy – But Split Over Israel and Antisemitism

Following a tight, polarized election campaign, Sweden woke up Monday morning to a result that almost couldn't be any closer. According to preliminary results, the four opposition parties – the Social Democrats, the Left Party, the Center Party and the Greens – won a combined 176 of the 349 seats in parliament, against 173 for the right-wing bloc. If the result holds, it will mark the end of the center-right government led by Ulf Kristersson and the possible return of Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson as Sweden's prime minister.

The result, however, is not yet final. More votes will be counted on Wednesday, including late-arriving early ballots and votes from abroad, and the Swedish Election Authority is expected to announce the final result only later in the week. The gap between the blocs is small enough that even a shift of a few seats could prove significant. Andersson said on election night that if the current result holds, "Sweden will get a new government." Kristersson, for his part, has not conceded.

The result largely reflects the unusual character of this campaign. Unlike the previous election, in 2022, when immigration and crime were front and center, this time no single issue dominated. The various parties tried to push the issues that suited them – the economy and taxes, healthcare, schools, crime, energy and immigration – but on several of the sharp disputes that once divided right and left, the gaps have narrowed considerably.

The dispute over immigration policy, for example, narrowed after the Social Democrats adopted a policy supporting reduced immigration and stricter requirements for integrating immigrants. Almost all the parties now back NATO membership and a significant increase in the defense budget, and there is also broad agreement on the need to step up the fight against organized crime.

It was against this backdrop that the campaign became especially polarized. Instead of a sharp argument over the direction of a single policy, much of it revolved around the question of who would sit in the next government. The right warned against a "red-green" government in which the Left Party would wield unprecedented influence, while the center-left warned against the populist right-wing Sweden Democrats entering government for the first time. Now, after the election, that question is shifting from a campaign talking point to the practical problem of forming a government.

In recent years, Sweden has been led by a center-right government headed by Kristersson of the conservative-liberal Moderates (Moderaterna). The government had no parliamentary majority and relied on two coalition partners – the Liberals and the Christian Democrats – as well as on the Sweden Democrats, which backed it from the outside and had considerable influence over its policies.

For most of the campaign, the polls gave the opposition a clear lead. At one point the gap reached around 10 percent, and an Andersson victory seemed almost certain. But in the final weeks that gap narrowed rapidly, and in the end the race stayed open almost until the very last vote.

Two senior figures in the outgoing coalition spoke to Haaretz before the election about how they saw the contest. The Social Democrats and the Center Party declined to be interviewed.

Joar Forssell of the Liberal Party (Liberalerna), a classic center-right party, who chairs the parliamentary Committee on Education, said that as far as his party was concerned, the answer to the question of what stood at the center of the election was education. The party, which has held the education portfolio for the past four years, wanted to keep it in order to improve student outcomes, strengthen the standing of teachers and continue removing smartphones and screens from schools.

The difficulty in identifying a single issue at the heart of the election, Forssell argued, was itself a sign of the outgoing government's success. "The current government has been delivering on many of the issues that have concerned Sweden in recent years," he said. "We have brought Sweden into NATO, we managed to reduce crime rates, we managed to accomplish a great deal in the schools, including new legislation banning mobile phones. Inflation is down, and economic growth is better than that of most European countries. The opposition is struggling to find an issue it can use to attack the government."

Alice Teodorescu Mawe, a member of the European Parliament for the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and a candidate for the Swedish parliament, made a similar argument. In her view, the Social Democrats have in recent years moved closer to the right on issues that once defined the fault line in Swedish politics.

"When it comes to the general direction Sweden should take, the differences are relatively small, and there is broad agreement on issues such as migration and the reform of crime policy," she said, adding that the main ambition of the Social Democrats is to return to power and that, to achieve this, they have adopted positions similar to those of the governing coalition.

Teodorescu Mawe also pointed to a paradox that became Andersson's central problem: On some of these issues, the gap between the Social Democrats and their potential partners on the left – the Left Party and the Greens – is greater than the gap between the Social Democrats and the parties of the right-wing bloc. "These parties hold completely different positions on important issues such as nuclear power, the European Union and migration, and this is also one of the reasons why, since 2010, Swedish politics has repeatedly focused more on the composition of the coalition and the identity of the prime minister than on policy itself," she said. "That in itself is symptomatic: It is easier for journalists and politicians to talk about who is playing with whom than to deal with policy, and it is a win-win situation for everyone who is too lazy to get into a discussion about how the promises that have been made can actually be fulfilled."

For most of the 20th century, Sweden was a byword for a social-democratic welfare state. The Social Democrats ruled the country almost without interruption for more than 40 years, and during that time much of what became known as the "Swedish model" was built – powerful trade unions and extensive collective bargaining that brought a very large share of the economy under collective agreements. Alongside this, the state maintained a large public sector, universal public healthcare and education systems and a generous social safety net, financed by high taxes and producing relatively low levels of inequality.

In recent decades, right-wing and left-wing governments have alternated in power, and the model has changed following tax cuts, privatizations, the opening of public services to competition and reforms to benefits and pensions. But its basic skeleton has remained in place.

Even Forssell, a man of the center-right, does not propose dismantling the Swedish model. "Schools and the healthcare system will remain, and the core activities of the welfare state will continue to be financed almost entirely by taxes," he said. "The dividing line lies elsewhere: How large can the welfare state become before it turns into a nanny state? How much welfare can we provide before people become less concerned with finding a job or less concerned with contributing to society? Our government has proposed, for example, limiting the total amount of benefits a person can receive from the state. We want lower taxes and a system that does not reduce the incentive to work."

Teodorescu Mawe described a similar consensus. "There is agreement between the right and the left that Sweden should have a stable and generous welfare system, but a country that imposes such high taxes cannot accept poor public services, and in the coming years we will also face enormous defense expenditures, because security is at the heart of the welfare state – the state must first and foremost protect its citizens and its territory," she said.

She also opposes raising taxes, and emphasized the principle on which, she says, the model was originally built: "Everyone who can work should work. Today there are people, many of them immigrants, who do not work but still receive benefits, and this is destabilizing the system. That is why, for years, I have supported tying some welfare entitlements more closely to citizenship and to contributing to the financing of the system. Such measures would make clear that the welfare state is, to some extent, like a government insurance company: Here, too, you have to pay the premium before you can demand a payout."

Forssell and Teodorescu Mawe both believe the Swedish welfare model itself is not in danger. The Social Democrats, by contrast, largely framed the election as a battle over the future of the welfare state. They argued that four years of right-wing government were marked by the underfunding of the healthcare and education systems and by tax cuts for high earners.

In her speeches, Andersson repeatedly returned to the state of the schools, the long waits in the healthcare system and the erosion of welfare services. In a televised debate with Kristersson the week before the election, she said: "We're making the least sexy election promise, but the most important one – secure basic government funding for elderly care, for the healthcare system and for schools. When costs rise, government funding will rise too."

Swedish Opposition Could Force Shift on EU-Israel Association Agreement

Sources say the Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee's new Social Democratic chair is pushing for a tougher policy toward Israel. The Center Party could determine whether a majority backs seeking suspension or termination

Published in Haaretz: Swedish Opposition Could Force Shift on EU-Israel Association Agreement

The Swedish parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee discussed Thursday whether Stockholm should advocate for suspending or terminating the European Union's association agreement with Israel, as the opposition's narrow majority may help advance the initiative.

Sweden's Left Party has in the past called for the EU-Israel Association Agreement to be terminated, while the Social Democrats and Greens have advocated for suspending it. The Center Party could therefore prove decisive: If all four parties agree on a common position, their 176-seat majority could be used to change the line the caretaker government is expected to represent at EU level.

No formal statement was made after the meeting. Representatives of the Center Party and the Social Democrats said they will release a statement in the future, while the Sweden Democrats' foreign policy spokesperson, Aron Emilsson, said he does not want to see the agreement frozen. He believes that would be harmful and would leave Sweden isolated within the EU.

Sweden's September 13 election produced an exceptionally narrow result, with the Social Democrats remaining the largest party and, together with the rest of the opposition, holding 176 of parliament's 349 seats. But the Social Democrats' majority has so far proved insufficient to form a government.

The Center Party refuses to join a government that includes the Left Party, while the parties remain divided over the composition and policies of a future coalition. Outgoing Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and his center-right government therefore remain in office in a caretaker capacity while Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson tries to find a viable parliamentary arrangement.

This leaves Sweden in an unusual situation: It may take weeks or even months before a new government is formed, but the four opposition parties that won a razor-thin parliamentary majority – 176 seats compared to the coalition's 173 – can already use it to influence government policy, particularly on the relatively few issues on which all four can agree.

Sources familiar with the details have told Haaretz that Former Social Democrat Deputy Prime Minister Morgan Johansson, who has taken over as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is pushing for a change in Sweden's policy towards Israel. According to the sources, when the committee meets tomorrow, October 8, it is expected to discuss whether Sweden should advocate suspending or terminating the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

Although the Foreign Affairs Committee itself will not formally vote to suspend the agreement, a more consequential stage comes the next day.

On Friday, the Swedish government will consult Sweden's Committee on European Union Affairs, ahead of a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on Monday. A parliamentary majority could then establish a new Swedish position, potentially requiring the caretaker government to advocate suspending or terminating the EU-Israel agreement despite it not being the government's own policy.

One issue which may delay the process is the fact that the four parties which hold the current parliamentary majority do not yet appear to have agreed on a common formulation, with some calling to suspend the agreement and another to terminate it.

"Now the Center Party must show its hand: Will it follow the left's lead and collectively punish all Israelis, or will it safeguard Sweden's relations with Israel?" a government source told Haaretz.

Any actual suspension or termination of the agreement would ultimately have to be decided at the EU level, which means that the Swedish move will affect Sweden's bilateral relations with Israel rather than Israel-EU relations.

However, a new Swedish position could also make a difference on a European level, since it will mean that another significant European country joins Spain, Ireland and other governments pushing for measures against Israel under the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The European Commission has already proposed suspending some of the trade preferences Israel receives under the agreement, a measure that can be approved by a qualified majority of EU member states, but the proposal has so far failed to secure sufficient support in the Foreign Affairs Council. A Swedish shift would alter the balance among EU governments and add political weight to efforts to turn the Commission's proposal into EU policy.

The last time a Social Democratic government came to power in Sweden, in 2014, one of its first major foreign-policy decisions was to recognize the State of Palestine, making Sweden the first Western European EU member to do so while already a member of the Union.

The move was followed by years of some of the worst relations between Israel and Sweden in decades, including repeated diplomatic confrontations and periods in which senior-level contacts were severely strained. Relations gradually improved in the years that followed, particularly after Sweden's then-foreign minister Ann Linde visited Israel in 2021, and improved further under the center-right government that took office in 2022.

A new Swedish push to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement would therefore risk reversing a decade-long process in which the two countries slowly rebuilt their political relationship.

'At Least Google Their Names': Sweden's Left Party Scrutinized Over Solidarity Letters to Palestinian Terrorists

Sweden's Left Party has come under intense scrutiny after two of its senior lawmakers sent letters of support to Palestinian prisoners convicted of deadly terror attacks weeks before a general election.

Published in Haaretz: 'At Least Google Their Names': Sweden's Left Party Scrutinized Over Solidarity Letters to Palestinian Terrorists – Europe

With just over a month to go before Sweden's general election, the country's Left Party has come under criticism following new revelations that senior party figures sent letters of solidarity to Palestinian prisoners convicted of terrorism or murder.

The letters were part of a solidarity initiative involving the Left Party and Palestinian prisoner advocates. In the space of a few days earlier in August, three Swedish journalists exposed several such cases.

Journalist Sofie Löwenmark wrote in daily newspaper Expressen that Left Party Member of Parliament Ilona Szatmári Waldau had written last year to Ahmad al-Moghrabi, a senior commander of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. He is serving multiple life sentences in Israel for his role in planning deadly terrorist attacks in Jerusalem, including an attack on a bar mitzvah celebration that killed 11 people and an attack on a supermarket that killed two. In the letter she sent him, Szatmári Waldau commended his "courage and perseverance."

Szatmári Waldau later explained in a Facebook post that she had not known about al-Moghrabi's background and that the information about the prisoners had been provided by the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden.

"None of the prisoners were supposed to have carried out violence against civilians or have human lives on their conscience. In this case, the fact-checking was flawed, which is not acceptable. I have taken down the post. Terrorism and violence against civilians is not something I support or encourage," she wrote.

Later, the Left Party acknowledged that its fact-checking had failed. Party leader Nooshi Dadgostar described the letters as a mistake and said the campaign had been withdrawn, while defending the MPs involved, saying to the Aftonbladet daily of Szatmári Waldau: "I have complete confidence in her values."

Nathalie Rothschild, a journalist at the Swedish online current-affairs magazine Kvartal, subsequently reported that the party's parliamentary group leader, Samuel Gonzalez Westling, had written a letter of solidarity to Ibrahim Abu Mokh, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping and murdering 19-year-old Israeli soldier Moshe Tamam in 1984.

Rothschild also reported that the party had organized a seminar in which former Palestinian prisoner Hussam Shaheen, who was sentenced to 27 years imprisonment for attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder, participated by video link. His conviction had been challenged in Israel's High Court, where his lawyer argued that he had been wrongly identified and that the investigation had suffered from serious omissions. The state acknowledged some investigative errors, although the conviction was not overturned.

"This is a party that aspires to sit in government after the election, and eight of its MPs have taken part in a solidarity campaign with prisoners without even considering that they should at least Google their names," Rothschild tells Haaretz. "It's incompetent at best, and a security risk at worst."

Following this, Expressen investigative journalist Inas Hamdan published a complete list of 24 Palestinian prisoners who were supposedly included in the campaign. Several had been convicted of murder or terrorism-related offenses. The Left Party denied all had been involved in the campaign and rather only a "handful," according to Hamdan's reporting.

"As a Swedish journalist of Palestinian background, I think it's important that politicians are clear about where they stand," Hamdan told Haaretz. "In Sweden, we have seen enormous demonstrations where there have been slogans in support of terrorism or flags representing terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Threats against Sweden's Jewish minority are a threat to Swedish democracy. That's why it's incredibly important that we show what these threats look like."

The controversy comes at a sensitive moment for the Left Party, known in Swedish as Vänsterpartiet. The party, which has profiled itself in recent years as a socialist and feminist party, originates from Sweden's Communist Party, which split from the Social Democratic Party in 1917. Today, it sits to the left of the Social Democrats, advocating for a strong welfare state, greater economic equality, expanded public ownership and workers' rights.

Its leader, 41-year-old Nooshi Dadgostar, the daughter of Iranian immigrants who grew up in Gothenburg, has led the Party since 2020. It currently holds 22 of the 349 seats in the Swedish parliament.

The party has never participated in a Swedish national government, though it has frequently provided parliamentary support for Social Democratic governments. Ahead of this year's election, Dadgostar has made clear that the party expects formal cabinet posts if its support is required to form a center-left government.

The letters to the Palestinian prisoners are only the latest chapter in the party's engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Over the past three years, Israel, Gaza and the wars in the Middle East have become an increasingly prominent part of Swedish politics. While all of the country's major political parties have taken positions on the issue, the Left Party has made it a central part of its political identity.

This was particularly clear during the 2024 European Parliament election campaign, when party leader Dadgostar described the vote as a "Palestine election," arguing that a united European Union could put pressure on Israel. "We are not finished until we have liberated Palestine," she says. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict occupied a prominent place in her campaign, and some analysts cite the party's position on Gaza as one of the factors that contributed to its strong electoral performance.

The issue has also extended beyond the party leadership. Many Left Party members and activists have participated in Sweden's pro-Palestinian protest movement that has become a regular feature of Swedish public life. Some of these demonstrations have featured slogans, symbols and political theater that have been described by Jewish community leaders as supporting terrorism or having antisemitic elements. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has consequently become not merely a foreign policy question for the party, but an issue increasingly shaping its activist base, electoral strategy and internal politics.

In 2023, Swedish public broadcaster SVT reported that aid money from the party's international organization had gone to a project linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, whose armed wing took part in the October 7 massacre.

The following year, prominent Left Party figure Kristofer Lundberg was expelled from the party after openly supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is an EU-designated terrorist organization. During Lundberg's time as chairman of the party's Angered branch, a Popular Front representative also participated in the branch's annual meeting.

In Malmö, Orwa Kadoura, then vice-chairman of the local Left Party branch in what is Sweden's third-largest city, left the party following criticism over antisemitic messages. In 2025, MP Lorena Delgado Varas shared a classic antisemitic conspiracy image and was made to leave the party too. And as recently as June this year, the party removed more than 20 candidates from its municipal electoral lists after investigations found that they had praised Hamas' October 7 attack, spread Holocaust denial and promoted antisemitic conspiracy theories.

Hamdan says the reaction to her reporting has been mixed. "On the one hand, there are threats against me as a journalist," she says, "but there's also confusion about how things came to this. Knowledge about terrorist organizations such as Hamas is very limited among Swedes, because it's not something they have had to deal with very much".

"From the party, we have been met either with silence or with attacks. This is, of course, an incredibly difficult issue for them," Hamdan says. "They have some voters who are attracted by expressions of support for terrorism, while they have other voters who oppose it. They are trying to play both sides."

Löwenmark, who first reported about Szatmári Waldau's letter, describes the reactions as "strong and widespread." She tells Haaretz, "The fact that he was a Palestinian prisoner was enough for him to be praised for his courage and his struggle. No one had even bothered to find out what he had been convicted of."

Löwenmark added that there are almost always strong reactions when investigations concern pro-Palestinian activism and the Left Party. "The pattern is predictable", she said. "Instead of discussing what has been revealed, they attack the person who revealed it. The focus shifts from the facts themselves to the journalist, the newspaper or the alleged motive behind the investigation."

Rothschild, who has also published revelations about the party, says that she too had been met with silence from party officials. "When I tried to get more information from the party, one MP wrote that she won't grant interviews about this topic, while the party's parliamentary group leader confirmed he sent the letter to Abu Mokh but didn't have time to talk when I asked if he knew about the charges against him." Rothschild says that further attempts to contact the party's lawmakers and the party's press service went unanswered.

It remains to be seen whether the controversy will affect the party's support in the polls. These revelations add to a series of controversies over the positions of individual party members that, as the party seeks a formal role in Sweden's next government, puts renewed focus on its position on Israel as a whole.

The Left Party did not respond to Haaretz's request for an interview or comment.

Hélène Cixous: ‘I Accept Israel’s Existence, but I Don’t Identify With It’

The pioneering French feminist thinker returns to her family’s roots in Germany and Algeria in her Berman Prize-winning book. In an interview with Haaretz, she discusses Netanyahu’s government and why she still wants Israel to survive.

Published in Haaretz: Hélène Cixous: 'I Accept Israel's Existence, but I Don't Identify With It' – Art & Culture

Three years after Hélène Cixous was born in Algeria, she recounts in an interview with Haaretz, “I was dispossessed of my Frenchness” as part of the anti-Jewish legislation of the Vichy regime in 1940. “My father was a doctor and was forbidden to practice medicine. Our rights were stripped from us by the French government. Was I French? No. I despised France, and some of my suspicion toward it still exists.

“France has still not truly managed to confront its sins. This continues to rot French politics to this day. At least Germany had the courage to confront the horror for which it was responsible. That is important. When I was a child, racism and antisemitism raged around me, and I directed myself to oppose these dark forces.”

Zero Jews

“And zero at the end of the war. Zero, that’s enormous, and according to the Nazis, too much, an innumerable number… It had been a long time since Osnabrück was without a Jew, there were zero Jews in the charming streets and around the solid, square body of the cathedral of Zerosnabrück”.

This passage from Hélène Cixous’s book Osnabrück Station to Jerusalem captures the essence of her latest work. Part memoir, part family history, the book combines the great Jewish tragedy with philosophical reflections on Jewish existence.

As is her custom, Cixous employs her creative powers in writing not only in relation to her characters but also toward language itself. Osnabrück, the German city from which her mother’s family originated, becomes “Zerosnabrück” after it is emptied of its Jews. In 1934, 435 Jews lived there, Cixous writes; after the war, the number was zero.

Both historically and magically, the city is linked to Jerusalem: both become landscapes of memory and longing, both are inhabited by the living and the dead and stand at the center of the attempt to understand what it means to be Jewish when one’s world is shaped by displacement, catastrophe and the search for a home.

Osnabrück acquires an almost mythical status throughout the book. For Cixous, it is not just “Zerosnabrück”; it is also “the Paris of Lower Saxony.” Like Jerusalem, it is both real and a surreal dream where living characters meet the dead, and where the book itself becomes a character and speaks with its author. All of this occurs across timelines and locations that jump between the Holocaust in Europe and Algeria and the Middle East, incorporating biblical references, Greek mythology, European classics and Shakespearean tragedy.

All of this greatly resonated with the Swedish Berman Prize for Literature committee, which selected Cixous and her book – published in French in 2016 and in English in 2020, and not yet translated into Hebrew – as the 2026 prize winner. The award ceremony will take place in October. It is one of the most prestigious literary prizes, including a cash award of one million Swedish kronor, approximately 320,000 shekels, and is awarded to writers whose work illuminates Jewish life while also addressing universal human questions.

The prize was founded in 2020 by Swedish philanthropists Thomas and Catharina Berman, through a private donation intended to support Jewish culture and strengthen Jewish literary tradition. Thomas Berman said that the rise in antisemitism was one of the reasons for establishing the prize.

The first recipient was David Grossman, for his body of work, and other recipients include Hungarian author Péter Nádas, Russian-Jewish author, poet and journalist Maria Stepanova, and Jewish-Guatemalan author Eduardo Halfon. This year, the prize committee praised Osnabrück Station to Jerusalem, describing it as a work that “traces the void left by the displaced, maps absence and gives voice to those who can no longer speak.”

A Wonderful, Mysterious Place

“Osnabrück is like Jerusalem: one must go there, one must present oneself before its faces, one must let it speak and advance toward its language as before the monster Behemoth about which God boasts to Job, one must touch it with one’s fingers, one’s feet; one cannot know it from a distance. It’s like the sea: even from two yards away one doesn’t know it, one must throw oneself into its arms yelling.”

Cixous was born in Oran, Algeria, in 1937 to a German-Jewish mother who was a midwife and a Sephardi-Jewish father. For more than six decades, she has addressed questions of identity, language and memory. She is best known as the author of the essay The Laugh of the Medusa (1975), one of the foundational texts in modern feminist literary theory, which established her status as an influential thinker and one of the mothers of post-structuralist feminism.

Cixous worked closely with Jacques Derrida, who referred to her as “the greatest living writer in our language.” In her early 30s, in 1968, she participated in the Paris student revolt and in the founding of Paris 8 University, an institution intended to serve as an alternative to the traditional French academic environment. In 1974, the university became home to a center for women’s studies founded by Cixous, the first of its kind in Europe. She also maintained a lifelong interest in questions concerning her Jewish history. These questions are at the heart of Osnabrück Station to Jerusalem.

Is her book intended to give voice to those who can no longer speak? “When I write, it’s not I who has intentions, it’s the book,” she replies. “The book has its urgency and it doesn’t aim at this or that consideration. It’s true that it gives a voice to the void, like everything else that has been written, because of the huge field of tragic events. But writing is always giving a voice.

“In this case, it’s all somehow in the title, it’s a singular experience, of my relation to history, to politics, to tragedy. The voice of my writing is a mixture of tragedy and comedy and my material is partly autobiographical, partly theater and the obsession that led me to the book was going to Osnabrück.”

The obsession she describes is preservation through family dialogue, fantasy and therapy. Throughout Osnabrück Station to Jerusalem, the dead refuse to disappear, and the book seems full of ghosts – mothers, grandmothers, murdered relatives and those born long after the war, vanished neighbors and destroyed communities. All reappear in dreams, conversations, fragments of language and works of art. The living and the dead merge into one another. The visit to Osnabrück thus becomes not only a journey to a specific place but an encounter with the voices of a lost world.

The city that gives the book its title occupies a remarkable place in Cixous’s imagination. “It’s a place that no one knows. Even the Germans don’t know it,” she says, “but it’s a historic city, one of the two where the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648, ending the Thirty Years’ War. It’s a wonderful, mysterious, fantastic place which fascinated me as a child. I was born to a mother who came from Osnabrück and lived in Oran, an Algerian city which was then part of a French colony. I saw Osnabrück as kind of a light in the distance, just like Jerusalem is seen by so many people.”

She recalls visiting Germany repeatedly with her mother and grandmother while carefully avoiding the city itself. “We went to Berlin, to Cologne, to Bonn, but never Osnabrück. It became something I wondered about – what’s wrong with Osnabrück? Why do we never go there?” She remembers how an official invitation from the city itself arrived for her mother and aunt to come back to the city for a visit. A discussion then began between the two women, which started as a conversation about hotels but became an argument about history and forgiveness.

Eventually, her mother decided to go. “This generation is not our enemy,” Cixous recalls her mother saying. “We don’t have to forgive them. We have to go on and accept the reality of history”. Years later, when Cixous suggested to her mother that they return to Algeria together, her mother refused, explaining: “In Germany, they invited me and asked me for forgiveness. In Algeria, I was kicked out after helping thousands of Algerians come into this world as a midwife.” Only after her mother’s death at the age of 103 did Cixous herself finally travel to Osnabrück.

Since then, she says, she has become “a kind of honorary citizen” there. When she spoke there, she reminded the city’s residents that peace itself can never be taken for granted, and that her own presence is conditional. “If in twenty years you become Nazi, as it sometimes happens,” she said, “it won’t be possible.” This remark captures the central tension in her book: the best and worst possibilities remain simultaneously present.

Does the book represent a return to Jewish roots after decades primarily spent on gender and feminist theory?

“Things are not that simple. The Jewish theme has always been there in a way,” she says and adds, smiling, that “I have a history in resisting the forces of evil. I grew up in colonial Algeria in a family opposed to racism and colonialism, while simultaneously becoming victims of antisemitism. I have, of course, always been on the side of the colonized.

“This wasn’t easy in Algeria where the colonizers were French. I hated the French since I was born. My family was in a situation of being part of a small minority of those who were strictly hostile to racism and colonialism. But this was not perceived in Algeria. From their perspective, we were supposed to be French.

“Later, when I was 18, I arrived in France, and I became ‘re-Frenched,’ although I doubt if one can really become re-Frenched and the truth is that I feel like I never really arrived in France. Then the social and political landscape changed, it was totally foreign, and gradually in two or three years, I started to think that antisemitism isn’t the question any more. On the other hand, I got this horrible feeling that they hate women here".

“It wasn’t an issue of class – it was men against women. Everywhere in society. The urgent fight wasn’t for Jews; it was for women. This is a fight of thousands of years. It’s still that way and it will go on. But every now and then, there’s another cause that becomes the main one for a specific period, and you have to decide, like a general of an army, where your forces are most needed. In the last few years, for example, it happened with Ukraine. And then Israel and Gaza came back again. Sometimes, you need to divide your strength.”

Hesitation Is Food for Fascism

“I can be many things, but being Jewish is always there,” Cixous says. She explains that she can easily make peace with her identity as a woman. “It may be divided into all kinds of tendencies but it’s basic, it’s primitive.” Her Jewish identity and her relation to Zionism and Israel is a different matter.

“It goes back to my mother,” she says. “She grew up in the days of a ‘beautiful Zionism’ – the dreams of young socialist Jews. But she resisted because of her story, which was against anything nationalist. Her father was enrolled in the German army and was killed as a German Jew, and so her way of looking at history was very rational.

“I was a girl when Israel was created, and I saw in Algiers the first emissaries trying to get Jews to go to Israel. I was prudent to that. I immediately thought that I wasn’t going to feel at home with a movement that unfraternally became colonialist. It was unavoidable. So, of course, I understand the creation of Israel, of course I was moved by it. But it couldn’t escape colonialism. “I came from a country where the Arabs were colonized. So, I just watched Israel. I never thought that belonging to what they called ‘the Diaspora,’ which we’re not, is negative. It is a way of being a citizen of the universe. My mother went to Israel to visit the part of her family that moved there. I refrained from doing that. I thought that I shouldn’t go if I don’t identify with Israel. I didn’t want to just be an observer. I like to be involved.”

Couldn’t what you call colonialism also be understood as Jews returning to their homeland?

“I could understand that the emissaries thought that they are returning to their homeland. I could also understand those like the members of my family who escaped the destruction of the Holocaust to Palestine which later became Israel. But for me, this wasn’t the only way. I thought we could be free and choose, and we had many ways to react to these terrible events. I accept Israel, but don’t identify with it. And this is the case for many people”.

Cixous’s attitude to Israel is complex. She doesn’t accept Jewish nationalism, but also doesn’t deny the tragic dimension of Jewish history and the antisemitism that led to Zionism and the establishment of the Jewish state. She is also well aware of how people react to disasters, and in this case, it is a central part of the story of the exodus from Europe and the establishment of Israel.

One of the most powerful themes in your book is the inability to recognize an approaching disaster – as happened in Osnabrück with the rise of the Nazis. How can this be understood?

“The hesitation when a radical change in one’s life is involved is common. In our days this mechanism of the human psyche is obvious when we’re facing the possibility that extreme right fascism will win the presidential elections in France. France is a very political place so everywhere I see people talking to each other about our next elections saying things like ‘next year in hell.’ They discuss what they will do on election day. Some say it’s not going to happen, others say it will happen if we don’t unite. All these discussions are taking place everywhere, and you can see the human soul hesitating”. For her, this hesitation is dangerous. “It’s the food for fascism,” she says.

The contrast within her own family remains instructive. “My grandmother stayed and didn’t leave Osnabrück until after Kristallnacht. My mother, who was a young woman, left the moment she smelled the stink of fascism. She never hesitated.” Other family members perished.

In Israel’s current war, there is a place where gender, sexual violence, and Middle Eastern politics collide in a tragic way: the sexual violence committed during the Hamas attacks of October 7. Many Israelis felt deeply alienated and outraged by the way parts of the international feminist movement appeared unwilling to express sympathy for Jewish victims. What do you think about this?

“This is a monstrous event. It will remain in history and the consequences go deeper and further than can be imagined. To the horror of my kind of people, it divided even the feminists. There was something hideous about the fact that when French Jews reacted passionately to that horrible event, some parts of the French feminist movement were so anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian that they had no sympathy for the Jewish women who were affected.”

Cixous described this as a moral failure. “These are the perversions of the way people identify with one cause and exclude others. It’s horrible.” Her own position, she says, was unequivocal. “For me, of course, there were no hesitations. This was a terrible crime. Hamas is a cruel, hateful movement like many other movements in the Arab world. The whole world is a victim of Hamas. But now, so many people, countries and movements are also victims to the blindness and craziness of the Netanyahu government.

“The time has come, and it came a long time ago, to stop being colonial and accept the fact that others also have rights. History has decided that this piece of the planet Earth should be shared by Jews and Palestinians.” She worries that Israel is exhausting reservoirs of international goodwill built over generations. “They’re self-destructing and they’re destroying the capital, the inheritance of sympathy and understanding from others.”

This is criticism stemming from concern rather than detachment. “I would like Israel to survive,” she concludes, “but it’s alienating the countries that support it. It’s tragic”.

For Cixous, Israel is not only its politics; it is also the story of exile and migration. “Each migration has its own structure. It requires such courage. It requires giving up and starting again. That’s one of the reasons that I understand the creation of Israel, and literature gives these experiences their deepest human meaning. I really admire Israeli literature which deals with this and the great writers who give these events their deep humanity.” When asked for examples, Cixous says that she loves the works of Aharon Appelfeld and enormously admires David Grossman.

The Gatekeepers

Toward the end of the interview, Cixous reflects on the present moment. “Very often I think that what is happening now, I have already lived through as a young girl, in the 1930s,” she says, but adds that history never repeats itself exactly. “Obviously, technology, the fact that we may be dispossessed by ourselves with AI, is unimaginable. We – who read, who still want to think, the guardians of art – we have to strengthen that part of mankind. Whenever a European country goes the way that Hitler’s Germany went, it contaminates everything, it becomes possible, it seduces other countries. We can be thrown into a period like the one of the plague.

“People keep saying that Europe is weak, divided and ungenerous. That’s why Europe needs to have an army. In the past, it went against its humanistic principles, but this pacifism doesn’t work. It’s not enough to just be on the side of peace and diplomacy. No, when arms are used, you have to resist with arms.”

And beside an army, what’s the role of public intellectuals in such times?

“The concept of public intellectuals is a recent invention. It started with the Dreyfus affair – and it’s extinct. There are no important public intellectuals. There may be media intellectuals. It doesn’t mean that it won’t happen again. I don’t know. Something may come back, but these wonderful moments of light, like the one in 1968, are extinct.”

Cixous’s concern about recurring patterns of extremism and hatred, and the temptation to underestimate danger, runs like a thread throughout Osnabrück Station to Jerusalem, which deals with how people remember and how they forget. The Berman Prize jury praised the book for giving voice to the silenced. In fact, it does more than that. It revives lost worlds – like those of Osnabrück and Jerusalem. In doing so, Cixous poses a long series of questions about memory, reality, exile and belonging. Most remain open. At 89, she offers no definitive answers.

The Swedish Left Party’s letters reveal what amateurs they are

The first objection to Swedish MPs sending romantic letters of solidarity to people convicted of murder and terrorism is, of course, a moral one. The second concerns poor judgment. But the third is about something else: amateurism, writes Israeli journalist David Stavrou.

Published in Swedish in Kvartal: V:s brev avslöjar vilka amatörer de är – Kvartal

In the space of just a few days, journalists Sofie Löwenmark, Nathalie Rothschild and Inas Hamdan published investigations showing how members of the Swedish parliament had sent letters of solidarity to Palestinian prisoners convicted of very serious terrorism offenses and had participated in an organized campaign in which several of the recipients are serving life sentences for attacks against civilians.

In 2023, SVT revealed that aid money from the Left Party’s international organization had gone to a project with links to the DFLP, an organization that participated in the October 7 massacre. The following year, prominent Left Party figure Kristofer Lundberg was expelled after expressing support for the terrorist-designated PFLP. In Malmö, Orwa Kadoura left the party following criticism over antisemitic messages. In 2025, MP Lorena Delgado Varas shared a classic antisemitic conspiracy image, and as recently as June this year, the Left Party removed a large number of candidates who had praised Hamas’s October 7 attack, spread Holocaust denial and promoted antisemitic conspiracy theories.

All of this is, of course, serious. By now, it is clear that the Left Party has a problem with romanticizing terrorism and spreading antisemitism and conspiracy theories. This can no longer be dismissed as anecdotal. Every time you think rock bottom has been reached, another investigation appears with new revelations. But precisely for that reason, it is almost no longer interesting to discuss this as a question of values. Left Party members are free to believe whatever they want. The truly interesting issue is something else.

Politics is not merely an ideological arena. Politics is a profession. There are laws, practices, institutions and rules of the game. And then there is what in British politics is sometimes described as simply not done – things that may not actually be prohibited but that politicians nevertheless know not to do. It is like any other profession. Surgeons do not operate on gut feeling. Judges do not rule according to whom they instinctively like best. Even a passionate politician is expected to be able to control that passion long enough to do the job.

The first objection to Swedish MPs sending romantic letters of solidarity to people convicted of murder and terrorism is, of course, a moral one. The second concerns poor judgment. But the third is about something else: amateurism.

The Left Party’s explanation in the latest affair illustrates the problem. The party secretary has said that the names came from the Palestinian Association of Sweden and that the Left Party carried out no checks of its own. “There had been a mistake in the fact-checking,” MP Ilona Szatmári Waldau wrote. Nooshi Dadgostar has repeatedly resorted to variations of the same defense during the scandals of recent years. In June, she referred to the large number of Left Party representatives – more than 4,000 – and stressed that those exposed represented only a small proportion. She then said that “there are occasions when people turn up whom you haven’t kept track of.” She promised to tighten the party’s procedures, but that is clearly an almost impossible task, since many other Left Party members defend people who have expressed support for terrorist organizations.

If a blue-haired 17-year-old activist sends a love letter to an ideologically motivated murderer he saw on TikTok, perhaps he can get away with shrugging his shoulders or shouting along with Rage Against the Machine: “Fuck you, I won’t do what you tell me!” But members of parliament are not teenagers. They are adults, and adults are expected to evaluate their sources critically and ask questions. What does it look like when we become fixated on prisoners from a single international conflict while ignoring others? What diplomatic, trade-policy and security-policy consequences could our statements have? Which people and organizations are we legitimizing?

Is that boring? Does it involve compromise? Perhaps even moral coruption? Perhaps – if you live in a syndicalist collective, eat out of tin cans beneath posters of “freedom fighters” and say that “when the forest is felled, the chips will fly”. But the Left Party’s MPs are well-paid public officials who participate in – and enjoy all the privileges and perks that come with – professional politics.

That means it is part of the job to investigate the people and organizations you cooperate with, read court judgments, speak to embassies, diplomats, experts and lawyers, ask what is disputed and what has been established, and understand the consequences of your own symbolic politics. For example, when a professional politician becomes involved in another country’s prison system by writing a letter, they must understand how the people they are writing to are perceived by their victims, as well as understand another society’s sensitivities and collective trauma.

To a Swede, Ahmad al-Moghrabi or Ibrahim Abu Mokh may be unfamiliar names on a list of “Palestinian prisoners.” To an Israeli, those same names may signify deadly suicide attacks against civilians, murdered children or a young conscript who was kidnapped on his way home and never returned. You do not have to accept Israel’s policies in the West Bank or agree with the Israeli courts. You only need to be able to imagine the reverse situation. Imagine if foreign parliamentarians wrote to Jackie Arklöv and praised his “courage and perseverance” without checking the judgment against him. The first Swedish response wouldn't be a complex debate about Scandinavian geo-politics, it would be: Have you even bothered to find out who this person is?

This kind of disregard for the rules of politics – in which passionate conviction is allowed to cloud judgment and consequences and basic due diligence are ignored – has a name. It is called populism.

For many years, the Sweden Democrats have struggled with a similar transition – from a protest movement to a party with influence over the state. As part of that process, the party has run internal training programs under the title The Road to Power (Vägen till makten), although there is, of course, no reason to romanticize the results. SD continues to be plagued by recurring scandals. A training course cannot magically erase a political culture.

And this is where the parallel with the Left Party becomes even more uncomfortable. V has already tried the educational route. Following several antisemitism scandals, in the spring of 2025 the party invited its members to a two-hour training session on antisemitism. Every member received an invitation. Yet one year later, the party found itself with 25 candidates removed from its lists following revelations involving, among other things, precisely antisemitism. As the Swedish elections draw closer, the party is finding it increasingly difficult to convince voters that sympathy for terrorists, conspiracy theories and antisemitism among its politicians and activists is a bug. In its case, it seems much more like a feature.


Norwegian Holocaust Center Events on Nakba and Gaza War Draw Ire From Israeli Embassy

Israel's embassy in Norway condemned the events organized by the Norwegian Holocaust Center in Oslo, saying they 'legitimize antisemitism.' The center said the aim is to 'understand shadows of historical traumas without equating them'

Published in Haaretz: Norwegian Holocaust Center Events on Nakba, Gaza War Draw Ire From Israeli Embassy – Jewish World

Israel's Embassy in Norway called for an independent Holocaust studies center in Oslo to cancel two upcoming events that it claims are a "grotesque distortion of Holocaust memory."

As part of a lecture series titled "In Shadow of War – The Way Forward," the Norwegian Center for Holocaust Studies and Religious Minorities is hosting two events with the University of Oslo this spring. The first event, which took place on Thursday, was a lecture by Prof. Nadim Khoury titled "Nakba and Holocaust as cultural traumas."

According to the University of Oslo's website ahead of the event, Khoury – a Palestinian professor of international studies at the Innland Norway University of Applied Sciences – "will trace their trajectories since 1948 and explore how they are intertwined and how the tensions between them are shaping the path forward in Israeli and Palestinian lives."

A second event, scheduled for June 3, will feature Israeli historian and Brown University professor Omer Bartov, whose contributions to Holocaust scholarship were recognized by Yad Vashem in 2019.

In an April 28 X post, Israel's embassy in Norway called on the HL Center to cancel the events "immediately."

"The Norwegian Holocaust Center's decision to host events drawing parallels between the Holocaust, the 'Nakba' and the war in Gaza is a grotesque distortion of Holocaust memory," the post read. The embassy added that the center has chosen political activism over historical responsibility and it called upon it to cancel the events and stop "legitimizing antisemitism in its modern forms."

Addressing the criticism in a social media post, the HL Center explained that it invited academics from different environments and backgrounds as speakers in order to "address and reflect on challenging topics without ending up in polarized debates where constructive nuance tends to disappear."

HL Center director Jan Heiret told Haaretz that the event with Khoury was supposed to follow another event hosting Martin Auerbach, former director of the National Israeli Center for Psychosocial Support of Survivors of the Holocaust and the Second Generation (AMCHA). Auerbach couldn't come due to uncertainty around the ongoing conflict with Iran, but Heiret said the center will make another attempt to host him in the autumn.

Heiret added that both events are meant "to find a way out of a destructive spiral of hatred, dehumanization and violence."

"We must understand the long-lasting shadows of historical traumas without equating, or even putting up, the Holocaust with the Nakba – which would be a historical distortion given the events are so different in nature, course and scope," Heiret said. "We acknowledge that the consequences for the individuals and collectives traumatized by them are interconnected, and that the denial of the trauma of the other lies at the core of the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

Leif Knutsen, an activist and the chair of the Jewish Community of Norway, says the academics invited to speak at the HL Center "represent a fringe element," and that it's a recurring issue.

"The center doesn't question them; it doesn't bring anyone to balance the discussion and it doesn't present their perspectives in anything like a critical light," Knutsen said. "It's always in the same direction – one that's beyond critical to Israel. Someone should be sitting on stage and presenting an alternative point of view or at least a nuanced one."

Knutsen said Norway's Jewish population of about 2,000 is particularly vulnerable due to a sharp rise in antisemitic attitudes. In its most recent report published in early 2024, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies documented an increase in antisemitic attitudes among Norwegians, with 11.5 percent of survey respondents having "pronounced prejudices" against Jews.

Images from Norway, 2024

"The center should be combating antisemitism rather than promoting a one-sided program," he said. "Even worse is the effect that such extreme voices have on Norwegian Jews who are being lectured about their own understanding of reality on the basis of a supposedly academic framework that completely ignores the real conditions in Norway."

According to its website, the Norwegian Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities is a research, education and documentation center intended to focus on the Holocaust and other genocides, as well as antisemitism and minority rights in Norway. The center's exhibitions receive roughly 50,000 visitors each year. It was established in 2001 using capital from a national restitution settlement over World War II between Norway and the country's Jewish community.

The center has previously faced criticism for its programming. In a letter sent in September 2024, more than 100 Norwegian Holocaust survivors and their descendants accused the center of failing to use "its mandate to combat the hostility we experience," and that instead of fighting antisemitism it was positioning itself as a "critic of Israel's policies and military tactics." The letter also said the center manifests "bias in its choice of experts and supporting a narrative that's negative toward Israel as a Jewish state."

In another letter from January 2025, the Norwegian branch of B'nai Brith criticized Heiret for mentioning Palestinians twice while delivering a speech on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, amid Israel's war in Gaza.

"By focusing on Gaza and Palestinian civilians who have lost their lives during the commemoration of the Holocaust and the genocide of the Jews in Europe, at a time when one-sided and anti-Israel portrayals make debates related to Israel very un-nuanced, the director has in a blatant way contributed to the tendency to relativize the Holocaust and the genocide of the Jews," the letter said.

"As the center's own research shows, demonization of Israel leads to increasing antisemitism in Norway. Trivialization of the Holocaust is, as is well-known, defined as antisemitism."

Israel Between Peace and the Sword

The choices the region will face after the Iran-US-Israel War, and does international law have anything to do with them.

Published in Swedish Svenska Dagbladet: Israel måste alltid ha svärdet redo | David Stavrou | SvD Ledare

The Swedish discourse on the war in Iran has been dominated by the question of its legality. In recent weeks, international law scholars, academics, politicians, and columnists have explained why the American and Israeli attack is “illegal under international law.” There is much to say about this reasoning, but a reasonable question is what the point really is. In the real world, the legality of war matters very little, because international law, in general, has hardly had any real significance over the past decades.

The main reason is simply that it doesn't work. International law has been used by some of the world’s worst despots, from Gaddafi to Assad, to delay international action against their crimes, and when it was finally used for intervention—in many cases, it made the situation even worse and led to more violence and failed states.

International law has also given legitimacy to regimes such as Qatar and Somalia, which have gained seats on the UN Human Rights Council despite their total lack of such rights. Terrorist organizations have used it in their propaganda to avoid the consequences of their actions, and China’s and Russia’s veto rights in the UN Security Council ensure that aggressive dictators go unpunished.

“If the U.S. illegally invades other countries, Russia will do the same” is a common argument against the American offensive. But the truth is rather the opposite: Russia did not wait for the Americans to attack Georgia or Ukraine, and—like Turkey in Syria, Azerbaijan in Armenia, and Eritrea in Ethiopia—has ignored international law for decades. No country is waiting for Israel or the U.S. to legitimize their actions according to the “law of the jungle”.

For a country that has not been at war since 1814, the question of the legality of military interventions may seem like the most important one. Theoretically, even a superpower like the U.S. should be concerned with issues of limiting its global power. But for a country like Israel, which is constantly threatened by real enemies who want to annihilate it and kill its population, this question appears fairly academic.

There is, however, another question that from an Israeli perspective is extremely important. It is simple but crucial, and it should concern other countries as well—it is not whether the war is legal, but whether it is effective. Or more broadly: can military power by itself solve Israel’s problems with Iran and other enemies?

“When all you have is a hammer,” as the well-known saying goes, “every problem looks like a nail.” Israel undoubtedly has a powerful hammer. Could it be that the country has become accustomed to solving all its problems with it? Previously, Israel used many forms of power to strengthen its security and international standing. Diplomats engaged in creating complex alliances, its soft power included outstanding achievements in culture, art, agriculture, science, and technology, and governments were willing to participate in peace negotiations and consider compromises.

The Hamas massacre on October 7 and Iran’s persistence in combining nuclear ambitions with threats to wipe Israel off the map changed all of this. The Israeli foreign service has been marginalized; the country’s artists and scientists are boycotted around the world, and its enemies are blown to pieces rather than invited to ceremonies on the White House lawn. Considering that many of Israel’s enemies are ruthless killers, this is hardly surprising. Anyone who sees value in human life should not shed tears for people like Hassan Nasrallah, Yahya Sinwar, and Ali Khamenei. But do military operations improve reality if they are not accompanied by other measures such as diplomacy, economic development, and new creative political alliances? This is not only an Israeli question. A new world order is taking shape before our eyes, and if we are not heading toward total anarchy, the question of limiting military power and understanding what it can and cannot achieve is crucial.

One indication is the situation in Gaza. After more than two years of extensive military force and enormous destruction, the reality is that Hamas not only still exists, it is armed and controls many state functions. In Lebanon, Israel may have achieved significant military successes against Hezbollah, but the Israeli are still spending far too much time in bomb shelters, and despite everything, Hezbollah is still alive and kicking. Both militarily and politically.

Israelis are once again deprived of basic necessities—schools are closed, workplaces shut down, flights canceled, thousands have lost relatives, been forced from their homes, and suffered injuries and trauma. Not to mention that Israel is deeply divided on issues concerning its democracy, which can only be resolved when the shooting stops. Meanwhile, Israel has also, without justification, become the punching bag of the international community. All the world’s power seems to be of little use in solving this.

And then there is Iran. Now that the war has begun, it should, for the sake of both Iranians and Israelis, end with a regime change—and no regime change is possible without the use of force. The Iranian people themselves, who ultimately must liberate themselves, have asked for foreign intervention, and giving it to them is the right thing to do. But what then?

“From the moment we decided that only here, in the land of Israel, could the Jewish state arise, we accepted that more than a hundred million people from the Arab world, from the Arab nations, and from the Palestinians would be our neighbors,” said Israel’s former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin a few years before he was assassinated in 1995. “There are now only two possibilities: either a serious and determined effort is made to achieve peace—peace and security—or the sword will always rule.” In the 1990s, Rabin chose the first option, but since then, leaders across the region, including Israeli leaders, have developed a dependence on using force. Perhaps even an adiction.

When the war in Iran is over, Israel will face a choice. Previously, the country combined pragmatic diplomacy, careful alliance-building, and visionary openings toward the Arab world. In a region like the Middle East, this is risky. Israel will always need to keep a sword ready, but with security guarantees and economic support instead of anachronistic laws and self-righteous moralism from other countries, peace may once again become an option.