I Served in the IDF — Come and Get Me!

A former Left Party MP wrote that 150 Swedish citizens who served in Israel’s military have participated in genocide. They, and others who support them, she continued, are “allowed to live among us”. I served in the Israel Defense Forces myself. Here is why I refuse to be ashamed of my service.

Originally published in Kvartal: Jag har tjänstgjort i IDF – kom och ta mig! – Kvartal

Article photograph
Photo: Private, Jehad Alshrafi/AP/TT. Collage: Felice Larsson/Kvartal.

It seems that the winning side in Sweden’s election has already identified the country’s real problems. Issues such as schools, healthcare and unemployment can wait, but when it comes to the enormous threat apparently posed by Israel’s relations with the EU, something must be done immediately.

Before a new government has even been formed, the Social Democrats have thrown themselves into the issue of the EU’s Association Agreement with Israel, and the new majority has agreed that Sweden should push to suspend its trade provisions.

But that is not enough for the Left Party. Its Member of the European Parliament, Hanna Gedin, has joined Nordic colleagues in writing to the EU’s foreign policy chief, demanding that member states be urged to investigate possible war crimes committed by European citizens who have served in the IDF. Gedin is worried about Israelis walking freely on Europe’s streets. She points to a precedent: “Eurojust has explicitly established that EU citizens who fought for the Islamic State can be held accountable for war crimes and genocide.” In her view, Israel’s military and ISIS deserve the same treatment.

Other parts of the Left Party are equally enthusiastic about going after Israeli soldiers. At the party’s Greater Stockholm district annual conference in 2025, one member proposed a campaign against Israeli soldiers in Sweden. According to the motion, service in the Israeli army should provoke disgust and rejection, both personally and at the societal level. Ahead of the 2026 party congress, another member proposed designating the IDF as a terrorist organization, so that its members could be prosecuted even without concrete evidence of war crimes. The proposals were not adopted, but their wording reveals that, for these activists, the problem is not what an individual Israeli has done, but that the person served in Israel’s armed forces.

Former Left Party MP Lorena Delgado Varas put it even more clearly. Following reports that 150 Swedish citizens had served in the IDF, she wrote on Facebook: “So there are 150 Swedish citizens who have participated in genocide, and many more who have probably known about it and supported it. And they are allowed to live among us as if nothing had happened”. No investigations or verdicts are needed here. Even people alleged to have known about or supported what happened are included. “We must not accept genocidaires walking free, without consequences”, she concluded, without explaining what she means by “genocidaires” or what consequences she thinks should befall them. Is that a threat?

It is probably pointless to reason with political fanatics. But for everyone else, we need to clarify a few concepts. The IDF is the armed forces of an internationally recognized state whose population has repeatedly been subjected to wars, rocket attacks and terrorism, including by fascist, Islamist and fundamentalist organizations and states. Israel, like many other countries, has compulsory military service. An Israeli eighteen-year-old who refuses to report for duty without a legal exemption can be convicted for doing so. Anyone who commits war crimes must, of course, be investigated and, where the evidence is sufficient, prosecuted. But military service is not evidence of criminality. Defending one’s country’s right to exist, serving in Gaza or taking part in a war is not, in itself, a war crime.

Would the same activists demand that Swedish citizens who served in the armed forces of the United States, Ukraine, Iraq or Somalia be catalogued as potential war criminals? The Left Party has indeed called for suspected war crimes in other countries to be investigated, but that is something quite different from casting suspicion on people solely because they served in a country’s armed forces. I have not found any comparable demands to catalogue former American, Ukrainian, Iraqi or Somali soldiers. This special treatment appears to be reserved for the Jewish state.

In the SVT documentary The World’s Most Hated?, representatives of the London-based Declassified UK are given considerable airtime. One says: “You could be living next door to a war criminal, taking the Underground or a bus with someone involved in the systematic destruction of an occupied people”. The association is hard to miss: people who have served in the Israeli army are portrayed as a potential threat in our midst. The same speaker says it does not matter whether the person has even been to Gaza; he must prove his innocence because “a soldier can be guilty simply by enlisting”.

It is somewhat unclear why SVT presents him as a journalist rather than an activist. But the film shows what happens when a group is subjected to collective suspicion. Israeli tourists are thrown out of restaurants and shops, spat at, disinvited from universities and cultural events, and threatened with legal action. Does anyone recognize the pattern? It does not matter whether the individuals have actually committed a crime. So-called pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Sweden and other countries have already adopted “Death, death to the IDF” as a popular slogan. Do they mean all IDF soldiers, past and present? Is the death threat a metaphor? Delgado Varas has the answer: the problem is not just those who have “participated in genocide,” but “many more who have known about it and supported it”.

So let me make things easy for her, for the activists, and for Social Democrats who intend to make themselves dependent on the Left Party’s support. I want to save you the cost of intelligence gathering and digging through old records. I am coming forward voluntarily. I served in the IDF. It was in the 1990s, but compromising photographs are available. Here's one. I am Israeli and a Zionist. Come and get me!

David Stavrou as an IDF soldier
David Stavrou as an IDF soldier in the mid-1990s. Photo: Private.

I have no intention of denying my identity just because life happened to bring me to Sweden. I understand that some people would prefer their Jews to be anti-Zionist, apologetic and perpetually ashamed. Unfortunately, I cannot provide the goods. I grew up where buses were blown up, people were torn to bits in restaurants and caffes and rockets struck people’s homes. When I came of age, I performed my compulsory military service. I committed no war crimes. I murdered no children. But neither did I believe that my country, my family or my fellow human beings had any moral obligation to voluntarily allow themselves to be killed.

There are good reasons to scrutinize Israel’s conduct of war and criticize its government. Turning nationality or past military service into evidence of criminality, however, is something entirely different. When you speak of people who are “allowed to live among us,” you have already made up your mind.

מול מסע הלחצים של טראמפ, דנמרק וגרינלנד רשמו הישג, אך לא בלי מחיר יקר

ההסכם מבטיח לדנמרק וגרינלנד סוף לאיומי הנשיא טראמפ ושמירה על הריבונות הדנית והאפשרות לעצמאות גרינלנדית, אך רק בחלוף הזמן יתברר כמה עמוקה דריסת הרגל האמריקאית באי הגדול בעולם והאם טראמפ אכן בא על סיפוקו

פורסם ב"הארץ": לכתבה המקורית

גרינלנד, האי הגדול בעולם ואחד האזורים הנידחים על פני כדור הארץ, שוב בכותרות. אחרי עשורים של תשומת לב בינלאומית מועטה יחסית, נשיא ארה"ב דונלד טראמפ העלה את האי לכותרות כשהציע לראשונה ב־2019 לרכוש אותו מדנמרק, רעיון שנדחה בקופנהגן ובגרינלנד. לאחר שחזר לבית הלבן בשנה שעברה החיה טראמפ את ההצעה באופן תקיף הרבה יותר, וטען כי שליטה אמריקאית בגרינלנד חיונית לביטחון הלאומי של ארה"ב, בעודו מסרב לשלול הפעלת לחץ כלכלי ואף צבאי כדי להשיגה. מסע הלחצים של טראמפ ושיחות ממושכות בין הצדדים הגיעו אתמול לסיומם בהסכם שצפוי להסדיר את השליטה הביטחונית באי.

למחלוקת בין שתי חברות בנאט"ו היו השלכות אזוריות, והיא הגבירה את המתיחות בין אירופה לארה"ב. דנמרק הגדילה את הוצאות הביטחון שלה באזור הארקטי, גרינלנד עמדה על כך שרק תושביה רשאים להכריע את עתידם, וטראמפ חזר ואמר כי גרינלנד צריכה להיות בשליטת ארה"ב. כעת ייתכן שהעימות נרגע ונכנס לשלב חדש: ארה"ב, דנמרק וגרינלנד הגיעו להסכם שיאפשר נוכחות צבאית אמריקאית קבועה ומורחבת במידה ניכרת, תוך השארת גרינלנד תחת ריבונות דנית ומניעת אפשרות מיריבות של נאט"ו, בייחוד רוסיה וסין, להקים בה בסיסים צבאיים או לבצע השקעות בתחומים רגישים.

"הנקודה המרכזית היא שההסכם קבוע", אומר מרטין בראום, עיתונאי וסופר דני ומומחה לגרינלנד ולגאופוליטיקה של האזור הארקטי. בשיחה עם "הארץ" בתחילת השבוע הסביר בראום כי ארה"ב מודאגת מתרחישים עתידיים, כמו למשל שגרינלנד תהפוך למדינה עצמאית ותפתח יחסי חוץ שיהיו מנוגדים לאינטרסים אמריקאיים. אחד האינטרסים החשובים ביותר קשור להגנה מפני טילים: "ארה"ב רואה בגרינלנד חלק חשוב מ'כיפת הזהב' (Golden Dome) מערכת הגנה רב־שכבתית נגד טילים שהיא מתכננת ושנועדה להגן עליה מפני טילים מרוסיה, צפון קוריאה וסין". טראמפ הכריז על המערכת בשנה שעברה, והיא מתוכננת לזהות וליירט טילים בליסטיים, טילי שיוט וטילים היפרסוניים המאיימים על ארה"ב, בין היתר באמצעות רשת מורחבת של חיישנים באזור הארקטי ובחלל.

הפיורד של נוק, תמונה: דיויד סטברו

למתיחות הטרנס־אטלנטית הנוכחית קדמו עשרות שנים של היסטוריה סוערת. גרינלנד הייתה באופן רשמי מושבה דנית עד 1953, ואז הפכה לחלק מדנמרק. ב־1979 הונהג בה שלטון עצמי (Home Rule), וב־2009 הוא הוחלף בממשל עצמי נרחב, שהעניק לגרינלנד פרלמנט וממשלה משלה ושליטה ברוב ענייני הפנים. דנמרק נותרה אחראית להגנה, לביטחון ולחלק ניכר ממדיניות החוץ. החוק מ־2009 מכיר גם בזכותם של תושבי גרינלנד להחליט בעתיד על עצמאות.

בשנים האחרונות דנמרק וגרינלנד מתמודדות גם עם השלכות היסטוריה כואבת של שלטון קולוניאלי והטמעה תרבותית. אחד הפרקים האפלים ביותר היה ניסוי ב־1951, שבמסגרתו נלקחו 22 ילדים גרינלנדים ממשפחותיהם ונשלחו לדנמרק בניסיון ליצור אליטה גרינלנדית דוברת דנית. בשנים האחרונות הופנתה תשומת הלב גם לפרשה אחרת, שבה התקנים תוך־רחמיים הותקנו משנות ה־60 בגופן של אלפי נשים ונערות גרינלנדיות – במקרים רבים בלי הסכמתן – כחלק ממאמצי דנמרק לצמצם את שיעור הילודה בגרינלנד.

דנמרק התנצלה רשמית על הפרשות, ובשנה שעברה תיארה ראשת הממשלה מדה פרדריקסן את היחס לנשים כ"אפליה שיטתית" נגד תושבי גרינלנד. לצד זאת נמשך דיון פוליטי וכלכלי בנוגע ליחסי גרינלנד ודנמרק ועל האפשרות שבעתיד יזכה האי לעצמאות מלאה.

גם הקשר האמריקאי עם גרינלנד ארוך שנים. במהלך מלחמת העולם השנייה, לאחר שגרמניה הנאצית כבשה את דנמרק, קיבלה ארה"ב על עצמה את האחריות להגנת גרינלנד והקימה בה מתקנים צבאיים. הסכם הגנה אמריקאי־דני מ־1951 מיסד את הנוכחות האמריקאית בתקופת המלחמה הקרה, שבה הפכה גרינלנד לבעלת חשיבות אסטרטגית בזיהוי טילים סובייטיים ובהגנה על צפון אמריקה. רוב המתקנים האמריקאיים נסגרו בהמשך, אך ארה"ב שמרה על מה שמכונה כיום בסיס חיל החלל פיטופיק, שבעבר כונה בסיס תולה ושממשיך למלא תפקיד חשוב בהתרעה מפני טילים, בהגנה ובמעקב בחלל.

ההסכם החדש אינו רק חידוש ההסכם הקודם. "ההסכם מ־1951 ישן, וההסכם החדש יכלול כנראה ניואנסים שהיו חשובים לארה"ב", אמר בראום. "נכון שההסכם הישן אפשר לארה"ב להרחיב את נוכחותה הצבאית לאזורים חדשים, אבל רק לאחר התייעצות עם דנמרק וגרינלנד. ההסכם החדש כנראה יעניק לה יד חופשית להקים בסיסים חדשים ולהציב מערכות מכ"ם ומערכות נשק חדשות".

ניואנס שני, לדברי בראום הוא שהבסיס האמריקאי הקיים בגרינלנד מוגדר רשמית דני־אמריקאי. אף שבפועל הוא אמריקאי, נמצאים בו גם דנים. כעת שני הבסיסים שעתידים לקום לפי טראמפ יהיו אמריקאיים בלבד, בלי פיקוח דני או גרינלנדי. "הגורמים האלה מסבירים כנראה מדוע הבית הלבן והעיתונות האמריקאית טוענים שההסכם מעניק לארה"ב שליטה ביטחונית קבועה בגרינלנד". אישים דנים וגרינלנדים הדגישו היבטים אחרים כשהחדשות בדבר ההסכם התפרסמו. ראש ממשלת דנמרק פרדריקסן אמרה כי ההסכם "מכיר בריבונות ובשלמות הטריטוריאלית של הממלכה ובזכותו של העם הגרינלנדי להגדרה עצמית".

היבט נוסף של ההסכם החדש הוא ההגבלות על השקעות זרות באי. בראום אומר כי הסימנים בשלב זה מצביעים על כך שארה"ב תוכל להתערב אם מדינות שאינן ידידותיות כלפיה יתכננו השקעות בגרינלנד, ואם להשקעות אלו תהיינה השלכות ביטחוניות. זאת אף שלא ברור מאילו מדינות בדיוק מודאגת ארה"ב, ומה נכלל בהגדרה של שיקולים ביטחוניים. הדבר חשוב משום ששליטה מלאה בהשקעות זרות היא דבר שגרינלנד דורשת מדנמרק כבר עשרות שנים, וכעת האמריקאים עלולים להפוך למכשול נוסף.

נוק, תמונה: דיויד סטברו

"הפיקוח על קשריה של גרינלנד עם מדינות אחרות עשוי לכלול, למשל, החלטות של גרינלנד להיכנס להסכמים עם קנדה, צרפת, בריטניה, איסלנד או נורווגיה בנוגע להגנה על אזורי דיג או לשיתוף פעולה בין משמרי החופים", מסביר בראום. "אם המסר הקצר של הנשיא ב־Truth Social יתממש במלואו, הסכמים כאלה יצטרכו לקבל, בצורה זו או אחרת, אור ירוק מארה"ב. כנראה שלא תהיה לאמריקאים זכות וטו, אבל למיטב הבנתי, חופש התמרון של גרינלנד יהיה מוגבל ולארה"ב תהיה רמה חדשה של השפעה".

אולריק פראם גד (Ulrik Pram Gad), חוקר בכיר במכון הדני ללימודים בינלאומיים (DIIS) שעבד בעבר הן עבור ממשלת גרינלנד והן עבור משרד החוץ הדני, תיאר בתדרוך לעיתונאים בינלאומיים כיצד הושג ההסכם. הוא הדגיש כי "חלק גדול מהעבודה בפועל במשא ומתן הזה עם האמריקאים לא כלל פוליטיקאים. אלה היו דיפלומטים ועובדי מדינה, קבוצה תלת־צדדית של אמריקאים, דנים וגרינלנדים". הפוליטיקאים היו מעורבים באופן ישיר "בנקודות מסוימות בתחילת הדרך, וכעת לקראת הסוף", בעוד שלדברי פראם גד, ממשלות דנמרק וגרינלנד שמרו לאורך כל התהליך על תיאום הדוק באופן יוצא דופן. ההסכם כבר הוצג בפני ועדות החוץ בנוק ובקופנהגן, אך טרם אושר סופית: פראם גד אמר שההסכם ידרוש אשרור בשני הפרלמנטים וכי "כמובן שתהיה בחינה מדוקדקת של הניסוחים החדשים בשני המקומות".

עם זאת, הוא מעריך שקיים רצון פוליטי חזק לאשרו: "אני לא חושב שמישהו באחד הפרלמנטים ירצה להרוג אותו". זאת על אף שסעיפים מסוימים הנוגעים לריבונות, להגדרה עצמית או לזכויות אמריקאיות בגרינלנד עדיין עשויים לעורר מחלוקת.

פראם גד הסביר גם את השיח שהתפתח סביב ההסכם מאז שטראמפ חשף אותו. לדבריו בתדרוך, ממשלות דנמרק וגרינלנד היו "מאוד עקביות לאורך השנה האחרונה באומרן שזהו משא ומתן קשה, שיש להן קווים אדומים ובימים האחרונים הן אמרו שההסכם מתקרב גם אם הקווים האדומים עדיין שם. כשטראמפ פרסם את הפרשנות שלו להסכם, ממשלת דנמרק וממשלת גרינלנד לא מסרו פרטים כלשהם מטעמן לגבי מה שהרוויחו או הפסידו. זה מאותת שהן החליטו 'לתת לטראמפ ניצחון' – הוא יתאר את הדברים כרצונו, ינצח בקרב על הנרטיב הציבורי, במיוחד בארה"ב, כפי שהוא רוצה, ואז, כשהעניינים קצת יירגעו והטקסט ייחתם ויהפוך להסכם קיים, הן יסבירו לציבור הדני מדוע זה בעצם לא עניין גדול כפי שטראמפ רצה להציג אותו".

"בסך הכול, ההסכם נתפס כהתפתחות חיובית בארה"ב, דנמרק וגרינלנד", מסכם מרטין בראום. "גרינלנד לא ויתרה על זכותה לקבוע את עתידה בעצמה, היא עדיין תהיה חלק מממלכת דנמרק ותוכל להמשיך בדיון שלה עם קופנהגן בנוגע לעצמאות. אבל זו לא פשרה שאין לה מחיר – גרינלנד ודנמרק עמדו בפני איום בפלישה צבאית, ובמשך שנים היו יעד לקמפיין אגרסיבי מצד נשיא ארה"ב. אלה מדינות קטנות שהופעל עליהן לחץ חריג מצד בעלת ברית בנאט"ו, ואף שההסכם החדש אינו התרחיש הגרוע ביותר, עדיין מדובר בפשרה והן משלמות עליה מחיר".

Swedish Election Left the Blocs Closer on Policy – But Split Over Israel and Antisemitism

The center-left won Sweden's election by a slim margin, but now comes the hard part

Published in Haaretz: Swedish Election Left the Blocs Closer on Policy – But Split Over Israel and Antisemitism

Following a tight, polarized election campaign, Sweden woke up Monday morning to a result that almost couldn't be any closer. According to preliminary results, the four opposition parties – the Social Democrats, the Left Party, the Center Party and the Greens – won a combined 176 of the 349 seats in parliament, against 173 for the right-wing bloc. If the result holds, it will mark the end of the center-right government led by Ulf Kristersson and the possible return of Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson as Sweden's prime minister.

The result, however, is not yet final. More votes will be counted on Wednesday, including late-arriving early ballots and votes from abroad, and the Swedish Election Authority is expected to announce the final result only later in the week. The gap between the blocs is small enough that even a shift of a few seats could prove significant. Andersson said on election night that if the current result holds, "Sweden will get a new government." Kristersson, for his part, has not conceded.

The result largely reflects the unusual character of this campaign. Unlike the previous election, in 2022, when immigration and crime were front and center, this time no single issue dominated. The various parties tried to push the issues that suited them – the economy and taxes, healthcare, schools, crime, energy and immigration – but on several of the sharp disputes that once divided right and left, the gaps have narrowed considerably.

The dispute over immigration policy, for example, narrowed after the Social Democrats adopted a policy supporting reduced immigration and stricter requirements for integrating immigrants. Almost all the parties now back NATO membership and a significant increase in the defense budget, and there is also broad agreement on the need to step up the fight against organized crime.

It was against this backdrop that the campaign became especially polarized. Instead of a sharp argument over the direction of a single policy, much of it revolved around the question of who would sit in the next government. The right warned against a "red-green" government in which the Left Party would wield unprecedented influence, while the center-left warned against the populist right-wing Sweden Democrats entering government for the first time. Now, after the election, that question is shifting from a campaign talking point to the practical problem of forming a government.

In recent years, Sweden has been led by a center-right government headed by Kristersson of the conservative-liberal Moderates (Moderaterna). The government had no parliamentary majority and relied on two coalition partners – the Liberals and the Christian Democrats – as well as on the Sweden Democrats, which backed it from the outside and had considerable influence over its policies.

For most of the campaign, the polls gave the opposition a clear lead. At one point the gap reached around 10 percent, and an Andersson victory seemed almost certain. But in the final weeks that gap narrowed rapidly, and in the end the race stayed open almost until the very last vote.

Two senior figures in the outgoing coalition spoke to Haaretz before the election about how they saw the contest. The Social Democrats and the Center Party declined to be interviewed.

Joar Forssell of the Liberal Party (Liberalerna), a classic center-right party, who chairs the parliamentary Committee on Education, said that as far as his party was concerned, the answer to the question of what stood at the center of the election was education. The party, which has held the education portfolio for the past four years, wanted to keep it in order to improve student outcomes, strengthen the standing of teachers and continue removing smartphones and screens from schools.

The difficulty in identifying a single issue at the heart of the election, Forssell argued, was itself a sign of the outgoing government's success. "The current government has been delivering on many of the issues that have concerned Sweden in recent years," he said. "We have brought Sweden into NATO, we managed to reduce crime rates, we managed to accomplish a great deal in the schools, including new legislation banning mobile phones. Inflation is down, and economic growth is better than that of most European countries. The opposition is struggling to find an issue it can use to attack the government."

Alice Teodorescu Mawe, a member of the European Parliament for the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and a candidate for the Swedish parliament, made a similar argument. In her view, the Social Democrats have in recent years moved closer to the right on issues that once defined the fault line in Swedish politics.

"When it comes to the general direction Sweden should take, the differences are relatively small, and there is broad agreement on issues such as migration and the reform of crime policy," she said, adding that the main ambition of the Social Democrats is to return to power and that, to achieve this, they have adopted positions similar to those of the governing coalition.

Teodorescu Mawe also pointed to a paradox that became Andersson's central problem: On some of these issues, the gap between the Social Democrats and their potential partners on the left – the Left Party and the Greens – is greater than the gap between the Social Democrats and the parties of the right-wing bloc. "These parties hold completely different positions on important issues such as nuclear power, the European Union and migration, and this is also one of the reasons why, since 2010, Swedish politics has repeatedly focused more on the composition of the coalition and the identity of the prime minister than on policy itself," she said. "That in itself is symptomatic: It is easier for journalists and politicians to talk about who is playing with whom than to deal with policy, and it is a win-win situation for everyone who is too lazy to get into a discussion about how the promises that have been made can actually be fulfilled."

For most of the 20th century, Sweden was a byword for a social-democratic welfare state. The Social Democrats ruled the country almost without interruption for more than 40 years, and during that time much of what became known as the "Swedish model" was built – powerful trade unions and extensive collective bargaining that brought a very large share of the economy under collective agreements. Alongside this, the state maintained a large public sector, universal public healthcare and education systems and a generous social safety net, financed by high taxes and producing relatively low levels of inequality.

In recent decades, right-wing and left-wing governments have alternated in power, and the model has changed following tax cuts, privatizations, the opening of public services to competition and reforms to benefits and pensions. But its basic skeleton has remained in place.

Even Forssell, a man of the center-right, does not propose dismantling the Swedish model. "Schools and the healthcare system will remain, and the core activities of the welfare state will continue to be financed almost entirely by taxes," he said. "The dividing line lies elsewhere: How large can the welfare state become before it turns into a nanny state? How much welfare can we provide before people become less concerned with finding a job or less concerned with contributing to society? Our government has proposed, for example, limiting the total amount of benefits a person can receive from the state. We want lower taxes and a system that does not reduce the incentive to work."

Teodorescu Mawe described a similar consensus. "There is agreement between the right and the left that Sweden should have a stable and generous welfare system, but a country that imposes such high taxes cannot accept poor public services, and in the coming years we will also face enormous defense expenditures, because security is at the heart of the welfare state – the state must first and foremost protect its citizens and its territory," she said.

She also opposes raising taxes, and emphasized the principle on which, she says, the model was originally built: "Everyone who can work should work. Today there are people, many of them immigrants, who do not work but still receive benefits, and this is destabilizing the system. That is why, for years, I have supported tying some welfare entitlements more closely to citizenship and to contributing to the financing of the system. Such measures would make clear that the welfare state is, to some extent, like a government insurance company: Here, too, you have to pay the premium before you can demand a payout."

Forssell and Teodorescu Mawe both believe the Swedish welfare model itself is not in danger. The Social Democrats, by contrast, largely framed the election as a battle over the future of the welfare state. They argued that four years of right-wing government were marked by the underfunding of the healthcare and education systems and by tax cuts for high earners.

In her speeches, Andersson repeatedly returned to the state of the schools, the long waits in the healthcare system and the erosion of welfare services. In a televised debate with Kristersson the week before the election, she said: "We're making the least sexy election promise, but the most important one – secure basic government funding for elderly care, for the healthcare system and for schools. When costs rise, government funding will rise too."

Swedish Opposition Could Force Shift on EU-Israel Association Agreement

Sources say the Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee's new Social Democratic chair is pushing for a tougher policy toward Israel. The Center Party could determine whether a majority backs seeking suspension or termination

Published in Haaretz: Swedish Opposition Could Force Shift on EU-Israel Association Agreement

The Swedish parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee discussed Thursday whether Stockholm should advocate for suspending or terminating the European Union's association agreement with Israel, as the opposition's narrow majority may help advance the initiative.

Sweden's Left Party has in the past called for the EU-Israel Association Agreement to be terminated, while the Social Democrats and Greens have advocated for suspending it. The Center Party could therefore prove decisive: If all four parties agree on a common position, their 176-seat majority could be used to change the line the caretaker government is expected to represent at EU level.

No formal statement was made after the meeting. Representatives of the Center Party and the Social Democrats said they will release a statement in the future, while the Sweden Democrats' foreign policy spokesperson, Aron Emilsson, said he does not want to see the agreement frozen. He believes that would be harmful and would leave Sweden isolated within the EU.

Sweden's September 13 election produced an exceptionally narrow result, with the Social Democrats remaining the largest party and, together with the rest of the opposition, holding 176 of parliament's 349 seats. But the Social Democrats' majority has so far proved insufficient to form a government.

The Center Party refuses to join a government that includes the Left Party, while the parties remain divided over the composition and policies of a future coalition. Outgoing Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and his center-right government therefore remain in office in a caretaker capacity while Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson tries to find a viable parliamentary arrangement.

This leaves Sweden in an unusual situation: It may take weeks or even months before a new government is formed, but the four opposition parties that won a razor-thin parliamentary majority – 176 seats compared to the coalition's 173 – can already use it to influence government policy, particularly on the relatively few issues on which all four can agree.

Sources familiar with the details have told Haaretz that Former Social Democrat Deputy Prime Minister Morgan Johansson, who has taken over as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is pushing for a change in Sweden's policy towards Israel. According to the sources, when the committee meets tomorrow, October 8, it is expected to discuss whether Sweden should advocate suspending or terminating the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

Although the Foreign Affairs Committee itself will not formally vote to suspend the agreement, a more consequential stage comes the next day.

On Friday, the Swedish government will consult Sweden's Committee on European Union Affairs, ahead of a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on Monday. A parliamentary majority could then establish a new Swedish position, potentially requiring the caretaker government to advocate suspending or terminating the EU-Israel agreement despite it not being the government's own policy.

One issue which may delay the process is the fact that the four parties which hold the current parliamentary majority do not yet appear to have agreed on a common formulation, with some calling to suspend the agreement and another to terminate it.

"Now the Center Party must show its hand: Will it follow the left's lead and collectively punish all Israelis, or will it safeguard Sweden's relations with Israel?" a government source told Haaretz.

Any actual suspension or termination of the agreement would ultimately have to be decided at the EU level, which means that the Swedish move will affect Sweden's bilateral relations with Israel rather than Israel-EU relations.

However, a new Swedish position could also make a difference on a European level, since it will mean that another significant European country joins Spain, Ireland and other governments pushing for measures against Israel under the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The European Commission has already proposed suspending some of the trade preferences Israel receives under the agreement, a measure that can be approved by a qualified majority of EU member states, but the proposal has so far failed to secure sufficient support in the Foreign Affairs Council. A Swedish shift would alter the balance among EU governments and add political weight to efforts to turn the Commission's proposal into EU policy.

The last time a Social Democratic government came to power in Sweden, in 2014, one of its first major foreign-policy decisions was to recognize the State of Palestine, making Sweden the first Western European EU member to do so while already a member of the Union.

The move was followed by years of some of the worst relations between Israel and Sweden in decades, including repeated diplomatic confrontations and periods in which senior-level contacts were severely strained. Relations gradually improved in the years that followed, particularly after Sweden's then-foreign minister Ann Linde visited Israel in 2021, and improved further under the center-right government that took office in 2022.

A new Swedish push to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement would therefore risk reversing a decade-long process in which the two countries slowly rebuilt their political relationship.